Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries
HECKMAN V. LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., and Ticketmaster LLC, alleging anticompetitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs had purchased tickets through Ticketmaster’s website, which required them to agree to Ticketmaster’s Terms of Use. These terms included an arbitration agreement mandating that disputes be resolved by an arbitrator from New Era ADR, using expedited/mass arbitration procedures.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the clause delegating the authority to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrator was unconscionable under California law, both procedurally and substantively. The court also held that the entire arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the delegation clause and the arbitration agreement as a whole were unconscionable under California law. The court found that the delegation clause was part of a contract of adhesion and that the terms on Ticketmaster’s website exhibited extreme procedural unconscionability. Additionally, the court identified several features of New Era’s arbitration rules that contributed to substantive unconscionability, including the mass arbitration protocol, lack of discovery, limited right of appeal, and arbitrator selection provisions.The Ninth Circuit also held that the application of California’s unconscionability law to the arbitration agreement was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). As an alternate and independent ground, the court held that the FAA does not preempt California’s prohibition of class action waivers in contracts of adhesion in large-scale small-stakes consumer cases, as established in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. The court concluded that Ticketmaster’s Terms and New Era’s Rules were independently unconscionable under Discover Bank. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "HECKMAN V. LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC." on Justia Law
D’Augusta v. American Petroleum Institute
Gasoline consumers alleged that various oil producers colluded with the U.S. government, including then-President Trump, to negotiate with Russia and Saudi Arabia to cut oil production, limit future oil exploration, and end a price war on oil. Plaintiffs claimed this agreement fixed gas prices in violation of Sherman Act § 1, suppressed competition in violation of Sherman Act § 2, and involved anticompetitive mergers in violation of Clayton Act § 7.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the political question and act of state doctrines. The court also found that Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an antitrust conspiracy. Additionally, the court dismissed Defendant Energy Transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, as well as requests for additional discovery and oral argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the political question doctrine barred judicial review of the President’s foreign policy decisions, as these decisions are committed to the political branches of government. The court also found no judicially manageable standards to resolve the claims under antitrust laws. Additionally, the act of state doctrine barred the claims because they involved evaluating the petroleum policies of foreign nations. The court further held that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible antitrust conspiracy claim regarding Defendants’ private conduct. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s procedural rulings. View "D'Augusta v. American Petroleum Institute" on Justia Law
CSX Transportation, Incorporated v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
CSX Transportation, Inc. sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company in 2018, alleging that they conspired to exclude CSX from competing in the international shipping market at the Norfolk International Terminal by imposing an exclusionary switch rate starting in 2010. CSX claimed this rate caused ongoing injury to its business. The key issue was whether the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations barred CSX’s claims or if an exception applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding CSX’s claims time-barred. The court held that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because the decision to maintain the switch rate did not constitute a new act causing new injury within the limitations period. The court also found that CSX failed to show specific damages resulting from any acts within the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because maintaining the switch rate was not a new act but a continuation of the initial decision. The court also found that CSX did not provide sufficient evidence of new antitrust injury within the limitations period. The court emphasized that for the continuing-violation doctrine to apply, there must be an overt act within the limitations period that causes new injury, which CSX failed to demonstrate. Therefore, the court held that CSX’s claims were time-barred and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CSX Transportation, Incorporated v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law
Tesla v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers
Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates challenged a Louisiana law that prohibits automobile manufacturers from selling directly to consumers and performing warranty services for cars they do not own. Tesla alleged that the law violated federal antitrust law, due process rights, and equal protection rights. The defendants included the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission, its commissioners, the Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association (LADA), and various dealerships.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Tesla's claims. The court found that the private defendants were immune from antitrust liability, Tesla had not plausibly pleaded a Sherman Act violation against the governmental defendants, there was insufficient probability of actual bias to support the due process claim, and the regulations passed rational-basis review for the equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the dismissal of Tesla's due process claim, finding that Tesla had plausibly alleged that the Commission's composition and actions created a possible bias against Tesla, violating due process. The court vacated and remanded the dismissal of the antitrust claim, noting that the due process ruling fundamentally altered the grounds for Tesla's alleged antitrust injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim, holding that the regulations had a rational basis in preventing vertical integration and controlling the automobile retail market.In summary, the Fifth Circuit reversed the due process claim dismissal, vacated and remanded the antitrust claim dismissal, and affirmed the equal protection claim dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Tesla v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers" on Justia Law
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC
A power company based in Florida sued a North Carolina-based power company, alleging that the latter had monopoly power in the wholesale power market in the Carolinas and maintained that power through anticompetitive conduct, violating § 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant devised a plan to exclude the plaintiff from competing for the business of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the only major customer whose contract was expiring soon enough for the plaintiff to compete.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court found that while there was a question of fact regarding the defendant's monopoly power, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted legitimate competition to retain Fayetteville’s business.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by compartmentalizing the defendant's conduct rather than considering it as a whole. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's conduct, including a blend-and-extend strategy and interference with the plaintiff's interconnection efforts, could be seen as part of a coordinated anticompetitive campaign. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant's actions were anticompetitive.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also ordered that the case be assigned to a different judge, citing the principle that once a judge recuses himself, he should remain recused from the case. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC" on Justia Law
Litovich v. Bank of America Corp.
The case involves a group of bond investors (plaintiffs) who bought and sold certain types of corporate bonds from and to a group of financial institutions and major dealers in the corporate bond market (defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated antitrust laws by engaging in a pattern of parallel conduct and anticompetitive collusion to restrict forms of competition that would have improved odd-lot pricing for bond investors. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case.Several months after the district court's order, it was discovered that the district court judge had presided over part of the case while his wife owned stock in one of the defendants. Although she had divested that stock before the district court judge issued his decision, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court judge should have disqualified himself due to this prior financial interest of his wife.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was tasked with deciding whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, vacatur was warranted because the district court judge was required to disqualify himself before issuing his decision. The court concluded that while there was no outright conflict when the district court judge ruled on the merits of this action, § 455(a) and related precedents required pre-judgment disqualification, thus vacatur was warranted. As a result, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Litovich v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law
Drabinsky v. Actors’ Equity Association
Broadway producer Garth Drabinsky alleged that the Actors’ Equity Association, a union representing theater actors and stage managers, unlawfully boycotted, defamed, and harassed him during his production of the musical Paradise Square. Drabinsky brought antitrust claims and New York state tort claims against the union.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Drabinsky’s antitrust claims were barred by the statutory labor exemption derived from the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. The court also held that his tort claims were barred under Martin v. Curran, a New York state case that requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a union liable for tortious wrongs to allege the individual liability of every single member.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that an antitrust plaintiff suing a union bears the burden of proving that the statutory labor exemption does not apply. The court found that Drabinsky failed to meet this burden, as the union was acting in its self-interest and did not combine with non-labor groups. The court also agreed with the lower court that Drabinsky's state-law tort claims were barred by the Martin v. Curran rule. View "Drabinsky v. Actors' Equity Association" on Justia Law
SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC
The case involves the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (SCPRT) and Google LLC. The State of South Carolina, along with several other states, sued Google for violations of federal and state antitrust laws. Google subpoenaed SCPRT for discovery pertinent to its defense. SCPRT refused to comply, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court denied SCPRT's motion, holding that any Eleventh Amendment immunity that SCPRT may have otherwise been entitled to assert was waived when the State, through its attorney general, voluntarily joined the federal lawsuit against Google. SCPRT appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that by joining the lawsuit against Google, the State voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court, thereby effecting a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all matters arising in that suit. And because SCPRT’s immunity derives solely from that of the State, South Carolina’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity equally effected a waiver of SCPRT’s immunity. The district court, therefore, properly denied SCPRT’s motion to quash. View "SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC" on Justia Law
SIDIBE V. SUTTER HEALTH
A class of individuals and businesses in Northern California, who paid health insurance premiums to certain health plans, sued Sutter Health, a healthcare system operator in the region. They alleged that Sutter abused its market power to charge supracompetitive rates to these health plans, which were then passed on to the class in the form of higher premiums. The case went to trial on claims under California’s Cartwright Act for tying and unreasonable course of conduct. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sutter.The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider Sutter’s anticompetitive purpose and by excluding evidence of Sutter’s conduct before 2006. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. It held that the district court contravened California law by removing “purpose” from the jury instructions, and that the legal error was not harmless. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in excluding as minimally relevant all evidence of Sutter’s conduct before 2006. The court concluded that these errors were prejudicial and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding the case for a new trial. View "SIDIBE V. SUTTER HEALTH" on Justia Law
In re Bystolic Antitrust Litigation
The case involves a dispute over the antitrust implications of a settlement agreement between Forest Laboratories, a brand manufacturer of the high-blood pressure drug Bystolic, and seven manufacturers of generic versions of Bystolic. The settlement agreement was reached after Forest Laboratories initiated patent-infringement litigation against the generic manufacturers. As part of the settlement, Forest Laboratories entered into separate business transactions with each generic manufacturer, paying them for goods and services.The plaintiffs, purchasers of Bystolic and its generic equivalents, filed a lawsuit against Forest Laboratories and the generic manufacturers, alleging that the payments constituted unlawful “reverse” settlement payments intended to delay the market entry of generic Bystolic. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed twice by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that any of Forest’s payments were unjustified or unexplained, instead of constituting fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. The court also held that the district court’s application of the pleading law was appropriate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Forest’s payments were a pretext for nefarious anticompetitive motives rather than payments that constituted fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. View "In re Bystolic Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law