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The FDA approved Depakote for treating seizures, migraine headaches, and conditions associated with bipolar disorder. Physicians may prescribe it for other "off-label" uses, but a drug’s manufacturer can promote it only as suitable for uses the FDA has found safe and effective. Abbott, which makes Depakote, encouraged intermediaries to promote Depakote’s off-label uses for ADHD, schizophrenia, and dementia, hiding its own involvement. Abbott pleaded guilty to unlawful promotion and paid $1.6 billion to resolve the criminal case and False Claims Act suits, 31 U.S.C. 3729–33. Welfare-benefit plans that paid for Depakote’s off-label uses sought treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1964, for a class comprising all third-party payors. Following a remand, the court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs could not show proximate causation, a RICO requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Payors are not the most directly, injured parties. Patients suffer if they take Depakote when it is useless and may be harmful and costly. Physicians also may lose, though less directly. Because some off-label uses of Depakote may be beneficial to patients, it is hard to treat all off-label prescriptions as injurious to the Payors; if they did not pay for Depakote they would have paid for some other drug. In addition, some physicians were apt to write off-label prescriptions whether or not Abbott promoted such uses. Calculation of damages would require determining the volume of off-label prescriptions that would have occurred absent Abbott’s unlawful activity. View "Sidney Hillman Health Center of Rochester v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

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Titanium dioxide is a commodity-like product with no substitutes, the market is dominated by a few firms, and there are substantial barriers to entry. Valspar, a large-scale titanium dioxide purchaser, alleges that suppliers conspired to increase prices, beginning when DuPont—the largest American supplier—joined the Titanium Dioxide Manufacturers Association (TDMA) in 2002. DuPont then announced a price increase. Within two weeks, DuPont’s price increase was matched by other suppliers. During the next 12 years, the alleged conspirators announced price increases 31 times. Because Valspar claims it was overcharged by $176 million. In 2010, a class of titanium dioxide purchasers filed a price-fixing action. Valspar opted out of that class action, which settled. Valspar then filed its own claim and settled except against DuPont. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of DuPont. Valspar’s characterization of the suppliers’ price announcements “neglects the theory of conscious parallelism” and is contrary to the doctrine that in an oligopoly “any rational decision must take into account the anticipated reaction of the other . . . firms.” Price movement in an oligopoly is interdependent and frequently will lead to successive price increases, because oligopolists may “conclude that the industry as a whole would be better off by raising prices.” Valspar did not show that the suppliers’ parallel pricing went “beyond mere interdependence [and was] so unusual that in the absence of advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged in it.” View "Valspar Corp v. E I Du Pont De Nemours & Co" on Justia Law

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Cox Cable subscribers cannot access premium cable services unless they also rent a set-top box from Cox. A class of plaintiffs in Oklahoma City sued Cox under antitrust laws, alleging Cox had illegally tied cable services to set-top-box rentals in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits illegal restraints of trade. Though a jury found that Plaintiffs had proved the necessary elements to establish a tying arrangement, the district court disagreed. In granting Cox’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion, the court determined that Plaintiffs had offered insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Cox’s tying arrangement "foreclosed a substantial volume of commerce in Oklahoma City to other sellers or potential sellers of set-top boxes in the market for set- top boxes." After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court and affirmed. View "Healy v. Cox Communications" on Justia Law

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BikerGear filed suit against FedEx, accusing FedEx of fraudulently marking up the weights of packages shipped by BikerGear and overcharging BikerGear for Canadian customers, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 13708(b), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ICCTA claim on the pleadings, and the district court's grant of summary judgment for FedEx and dismissal of BikerGear's substantive RICO claims. The court held that (1) Section 13708 of the ICCTA requires shipping documents to truthfully disclose the charges that a motor carrier in fact assesses, and prohibits a motor carrier from stating it will charge one amount when in reality it charges another; and (2) where, as here, the RICO persons and the RICO enterprise were corporate parents and wholly‐owned subsidiaries that "operate within a unified corporate structure" and were "guided by a single corporate consciousness," the mere fact of separate incorporation, without more, did not satisfy RICO's distinctness requirement under Section 1962(c). View "U1IT4Less Inc. v. FedEx Corp." on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of five complaints filed by automobile body shops, asserting federal antitrust and state tort claims against insurance companies. The court held that the shops pleaded enough facts to plausibly support their federal antitrust and state tort claims. In this case, the body shops argued that the insurance companies engaged in two lines of tactics in pursuit of a single goal: to depress the shops' rates for automobile repair. The body shops have supplied enough allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of an illegal agreement; the body shops have consistently alleged the existence of parallel conduct and of plus factors allowing a plausible inference of an illegal agreement; and the allegations have sufficiently established the body shops' state tort claims of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and tortious interference. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Quality Auto Painting Center of Roselle, Inc. v. State Farm Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

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Rooftops sells tickets to view Cubs games and other events at Wrigley Field from the roofs of buildings it controls. Chicago has an ordinance allowing the rooftop businesses. Before the 2002 season, the Cubs installed a windscreen above the outfield bleachers, obstructing the views from rooftop businesses and sued Rooftops, claiming misappropriation of Cubs’ property by charging fees to watch games.The parties settled by entering into the License Agreement running through 2023. Rooftops agreed to pay the Cubs 17% of their gross revenues in exchange for views into Wrigley Field. The Agreement contemplated Wrigley Field's expansion. In 2013, the Cubs released a mock‐up of its proposed renovation, showing that rooftop businesses would be largely blocked by the construction. The city approved the plan over objections. Rooftops claimed that Cubs’ representatives used the threat of blocking views and other “strong-arm tactics” as leverage to force a sale, and sued, alleging: attempted monopolization; false and misleading commercial representations, defamation, false light, and breach of the non‐disparagement provision; and breach of contract. The court denied Rooftops’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed its dismissal of monopolization claims because Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption applies; Rooftops failed to establish a plausible relevant market; and the Cubs cannot be limited by antitrust law from distributing their own product. The contract's plain language did not limit expansions to Wrigley Field's seating capacity. View "Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case arose out of a dispute over subcontracting clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between the Carpenters' Union and various construction companies and construction managers. The clauses effectively barred subcontracting of construction work with non-Carpenter affiliates. Ironworkers alleged that the Carpenters have used these subcontracting clauses to expand the scope of work assigned to the Carpenters Union to include work traditionally assigned to the Ironworkers. The district court granted summary judgment to the Carpenters. The Second Circuit held that the Carpenters have met the requirements of the construction industry proviso of Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, but that, on this record, there were factual disputes that precluded a decision on whether the conduct fell within the non‐statutory exemption to antitrust liability. The court explained, to demonstrate that the disputed subcontracting practices were sheltered by the non‐statutory exemption (and thus to defeat the Ironworkers' antitrust claim completely), the Carpenters must show that these practices furthered legitimate aims of collective bargaining, in a way that was not unduly restrictive of market competition. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment as to the Sherman Act claim; affirmed as to the unfair labor practices claim; and remanded. View "Conn. Ironworkers Employers Assoc. v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

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Consolidated appeals involve allegations that the patent-holders for Lipitor and Effexor XR delayed entry into the market by generic versions of those drugs by engaging in a monopolistic scheme that involved fraudulently procuring and enforcing the underlying patents, then entering into a reverse-payment settlement agreement with a generic manufacturer. In 2013, the Supreme Court recognized that reverse payment schemes can violate antitrust laws and that it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question. The district judge dismissed several claims. The Third Circuit remanded after rejecting an argument that plaintiffs’ allegations required transfer of the appeals to the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from civil actions “arising under” patent law, 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(1). Not all cases presenting questions of patent law necessarily arise under patent law; here, patent law neither creates plaintiffs’ cause of action nor is a necessary element to any of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs plausibly allege the existence of agreements between the patent holders and the generic manufacturers. The court remanded one of the Lipitor appeals, brought by California pharmacists, and involving claims solely under California law, for determination of whether remand to state court was appropriate. The Lipitor plaintiffs made plausible allegations of fraudulent patent procurement and enforcement, and other related misconduct. View "In re: Lipitor Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

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Direct purchasers of Wellbutrin XL, a drug for treating depression, sued, alleging that GSK violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by entering into an unlawful conspiracy with Biovail, GSK’s partner in the development of Wellbutrin XL, to delay the launch of generic versions of the drug. Indirect-purchasers asserted similar theories under state law. The purchasers claim that GSK delayed the launch of generic versions by supporting baseless patent infringement suits and a baseless FDA Citizen Petition aimed at generic drug companies and by entering into an unlawful reverse payment settlement agreement with potential competitors. The district court granted GSK summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence that GSK’s patent litigation was a sham or that the settlement delayed the launch of generic Wellbutrin XL. The court granted GSK’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of the purchasers’ economic expert; decertified the indirect-purchaser class for lack of ascertainability; dismissed the indirect-purchaser claims brought under the laws of states that were not the home of a named class representative; and denied Aetna’s motion to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed. After considering the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, FTC v. Actavis, the court concluded that the purchasers failed to establish a genuine dispute of fact either as to whether GSK engaged in sham litigation or whether GSK’s actions delayed the launch of generic Wellbutrin XL. View "In re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

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ILWU and PMA jointly filed suit against ICTSI under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, asking it to order ICTSI to comply with recently issued Joint Committee decisions. ICTSI counterclaimed and alleged, among other things, that ILWU and PMA violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, through their agreement to assign the disputed work to ILWU and their actions taken to enforce such agreement. The district court granted partial final judgment and dismissed ICTSI's antitrust counterclaim with prejudice. All other issues remained stayed in the district court pending the resolution of related NLRB proceedings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not err by entering partial final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); ICTSI had standing to bring its antitrust counterclaim; the section 301 suit was covered by Noerr-Pennington immunity; and the nonstatutory exemption shields the alleged Joint Activity of ILWU and PMA from antitrust scrutiny and ICTSI's counterclaim was properly dismissed. View "International Longshore & Warehouse Union v. ICTSI Oregon, Inc." on Justia Law