Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

A company that services and repairs surgical instruments entered into an arrangement to reset the use counters on certain robotic surgical instrument components, allowing hospitals to reuse these components beyond the manufacturer’s programmed limits. The manufacturer of the surgical robots and the associated instruments, which holds more than 99% of the market for the robots and 100% of the market for the instruments, responded by warning hospitals that the use of unauthorized repairs would violate their agreements and that such use could result in the manufacturer refusing service calls. Following these warnings, all hospitals ceased using the servicer’s offerings.The servicer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the manufacturer engaged in unlawful tying, exclusive dealing, monopolization, and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act. The dispute at trial centered on the proper standard for defining a relevant antitrust market. The district court instructed the jury that the servicer was required to prove the so-called “Kodak/Epic factors” to establish the existence of a single-brand aftermarket. The servicer conceded it had not presented evidence on these factors and stipulated to judgment in favor of the manufacturer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the district court erred in requiring proof of the Kodak/Epic factors. The Ninth Circuit held that these factors apply only when a plaintiff cannot show the defendant possesses market power in the foremarket and instead relies solely on aftermarket power. Because the servicer presented evidence that the manufacturer had near-total market power in both the foremarket (surgical robots) and the aftermarket (robotic instruments), proof of the Kodak/Epic factors was not required. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the servicer’s claims and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "SURGICAL INSTRUMENT SERVICE COMPANY, INC. V. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC." on Justia Law

A technology-focused real estate brokerage entered the Utah residential property market in 2015, offering lower commissions to disrupt traditional pricing structures. Initially, the company achieved significant success, becoming one of the largest brokerages by market share in Utah. However, it alleged that its growth was stymied by an organized boycott from local real estate brokers and agents who, dissatisfied with the lower commissions it offered, began “steering” clients away from its listings. The brokerage attributed this behavior to rules set by a national real estate trade association, which it claimed enabled brokers to filter and avoid displaying properties based on commission rates.The company filed suit in 2024 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, asserting violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Utah Antitrust Act, and tortious interference with economic relations. The defendants—comprised of the national association and several large brokerages—moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the claims were time-barred under applicable statutes of limitations and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged an antitrust injury. The district court granted the motion, holding that the claims were untimely and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate both antitrust injury and intentional interference with business relationships.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court ruled that the antitrust claims were time-barred because the challenged rules had been adopted more than four years before the suit was filed and the plaintiff was not entitled to the continuing conspiracy exception. The court found that the rules themselves did not plausibly constitute a conspiracy to exclude competitors, and actions by unidentified brokers did not extend the limitations period. As a result, the case could not proceed. View "Homie Technology v. National Association of Realtors" on Justia Law

A group of consumers who rented rooms at several Atlantic City casino-hotels alleged that the hotels and their shared software provider, Cendyn Group, conspired to fix prices for hotel rooms in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotels supplied non-public pricing and occupancy data to Cendyn’s Rainmaker software, which uses artificial intelligence to generate room rate recommendations. According to the plaintiffs, the hotels overwhelmingly accepted these rate recommendations, resulting in inflated room prices and diminished competition, as the hotels no longer competed aggressively on room rates to attract guests to their casinos.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the complaint. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a hub-and-spoke price-fixing conspiracy because there was insufficient evidence of an agreement or “rim” among the hotel defendants themselves. The court found that the complaint’s allegations mainly described parallel conduct and did not adequately show that the hotels exchanged confidential information or coordinated their pricing decisions through the software platform.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The Third Circuit held that the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, plausibly supported the existence of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy facilitated by the dynamic pricing algorithm. The court found that the combination of the hotels’ use of the same software, the exchange of non-public data, the high rate of adherence to the algorithm’s recommendations, and the economic circumstances provided sufficient circumstantial evidence—augmented by “plus factors”—to infer collusion. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesars Entertainment Inc" on Justia Law

Matthew Goforth, through MG Management Co., LLC, entered a dealer agreement with Sears Authorized Home Stores that included a broad non-compete provision, extending restrictions to his spouse, Malinda Goforth. After Matt decided not to renew the agreement, Sears suspected the Goforths would open a competing business and initiated arbitration, seeking to enforce the non-compete. The Goforths opposed enforcement, asserting the provision was unreasonable. The arbitrator initially denied emergency injunctive relief but later, upon learning that Matt and Malinda were opening Goforth Home & Lawn, granted interim relief enforcing the non-compete and added Malinda and her company as parties. A final arbitration award enforced the non-compete, but an appellate arbitrator later held the provision unenforceable while affirming attorneys’ fees to Sears. Subsequently, the Goforths initiated a second arbitration alleging antitrust violations, but the arbitrator determined their antitrust claims were compulsory counterclaims that should have been brought in the first arbitration.Following Sears’s bankruptcy, the Goforths brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against Sears’s owners, Transform Holdco, LLC and affiliates, asserting the same antitrust claims. Transform moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were compulsory counterclaims barred by their failure to raise them in the initial arbitration. The district court agreed, holding the claims accrued upon Sears’s initiation of the first arbitration and were thus subject to compulsory counterclaim rules. The court granted summary judgment for Transform and did not address alternative grounds or the Goforths’ partial summary judgment motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the Goforths’ antitrust claims accrued when Sears initiated the first arbitration, making them compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. The court also held that Malinda and her company were bound by the agreement’s arbitration provision. View "Goforth v. Transform Holdco, LLC" on Justia Law

PhantomALERT, a developer of a traffic app that crowdsources real-time data, modified its app in early 2020 to help users spot and avoid Covid-19 outbreaks. Apple rejected PhantomALERT’s updated app from its App Store, citing new guidelines limiting Covid-19-related apps to those from recognized health entities and requiring apps in highly regulated fields to be submitted by legal entities, not individual developers. PhantomALERT was invited to revise and resubmit its app for compliance. The Google Play Store also rejected the app for similar reasons. Apple later updated its guidelines, allowing certain Covid-related apps endorsed by government entities, but PhantomALERT alleged it was not notified of this change.PhantomALERT sued Apple in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, California antitrust law, and California unfair competition law. Apple moved to dismiss, and PhantomALERT missed the deadline for an opposition brief, instead filing an amended complaint. The district court dismissed the original complaint without prejudice as conceded and denied leave to late-file the amended complaint, finding it futile. The court determined PhantomALERT’s antitrust allegations failed to define a relevant product or geographic market and that prerequisites for injunctive relief under California law were not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo, finding the dismissal was final and appealable. The Circuit affirmed, holding that PhantomALERT failed to plausibly allege relevant product markets for its Sherman Act claims, including the alleged App Store single-brand aftermarket and submarket for Covid-19-related tracing apps. The court concluded the amended complaint did not state a claim under federal or California antitrust laws, nor under California’s unfair competition law. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice. View "PhantomALERT Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

A major radio broadcasting company sought to purchase national radio audience data from a market research firm, which is the sole supplier of such data in the United States. The broadcaster also desired to buy the firm’s local radio audience data in select markets, while sourcing local data from a competitor in other markets. In 2024, the research firm instituted a policy requiring national broadcasters to purchase its local data in every market where they operate in order to access the full national report. This policy forced the broadcaster to choose between buying all local data from the firm or losing access to the essential national data product.The broadcaster sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that the firm’s policy constituted an unlawful tying arrangement under the Sherman Act. After discovery and a hearing, the district court found that the firm used its monopoly power in the national data market to coerce customers into buying local data products, resulting in anticompetitive effects in local markets by excluding competitors. The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the firm from enforcing its tying policy and from charging commercially unreasonable rates for the national report as a standalone product. The firm’s subsequent counterclaims and the broadcaster’s bankruptcy petition led the district court to stay litigation of the counterclaims, but not the broadcaster’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s order for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that constructive tying—where pricing effectively conditions the purchase of one product on another—can violate the Sherman Act. It affirmed the district court’s findings regarding coercion, anticompetitive effects, irreparable harm, and the tailored injunction, and held that the bankruptcy did not require a stay of the appeal. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Cumulus Media New Holdings Inc. v. The Nielsen Co. (US), LLC" on Justia Law

A group of branded gasoline retailers, known as the Old Jericho Plaintiffs, operated gas stations and accepted Visa and Mastercard payment cards during a specified period. Following a long-running federal antitrust class action alleging that Visa and Mastercard imposed unlawfully high interchange fees, a $5.6 billion settlement was reached in 2019 with a class defined as all entities accepting Visa- or Mastercard-branded cards in the United States from January 1, 2004, to January 24, 2019. The Old Jericho Plaintiffs did not opt out of this settlement. However, after the opt-out period ended, they filed a separate class action asserting state-law antitrust claims for damages based on the same alleged conduct, contending that their suppliers were the direct payors of the fees and thus should be the proper class members.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were members of the original settlement class and that the settlement agreement barred their new claims. The district court found the term “accepted” in the settlement ambiguous but, after reviewing extrinsic evidence—such as contracts and how transactions were conducted—concluded that the retailers themselves, not their suppliers, “accepted” payment cards within the meaning of the agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that its prior decision in Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. did not require class membership to be determined solely by identifying the “direct payor.” The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual determination that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were intended to be class members. Additionally, it held that the claims brought by these plaintiffs were validly released in the settlement because they rested on the same factual predicate as the released claims and the plaintiffs had been adequately represented. View "In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Branch Metrics, Inc. brought an antitrust action against Google, LLC, alleging violations of the Sherman Act based on documents uncovered in earlier litigation brought by the United States against Google. Branch Metrics claimed Google maintained monopoly power in online search and search advertising markets, using exclusive agreements that caused anticompetitive harm. The suit was filed in the Eastern District of Texas, although most relevant witnesses and evidence were located in California.Google responded by requesting a transfer of venue to the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that it was clearly more convenient for parties and witnesses and that the sources of proof were located there. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas permitted venue discovery but ultimately denied Google’s motion to transfer. The court found that certain private interest factors slightly favored transfer, while one public interest factor—administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion—weighed against transfer, and the rest of the factors were neutral.On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district court misapplied the law by placing undue weight on the court congestion factor, which Fifth Circuit precedent considers speculative and non-dispositive. The appellate court held that the district court erred by allowing that single factor to override all other factors, contrary to circuit authority. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Branch Metrics’ argument that the Clayton Act insulated its choice of venue from transfer. The court granted Google’s petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the case transferred to the Northern District of California. View "In Re: Google" on Justia Law

A group of farmers and farming entities brought suit against several manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of seeds and crop-protection chemicals, alleging that these defendants conspired to obscure pricing data for these “crop inputs.” The plaintiffs claimed that this conspiracy, which included a group boycott of electronic sales platforms and price-fixing activities, forced them to pay artificially high prices. They sought to represent a class of individuals who had purchased crop inputs from the defendants or their authorized retailers dating back to January 1, 2014. The plaintiffs asserted violations of the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various state laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.After the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act because they did not adequately allege parallel conduct among the defendants. The RICO claims were also dismissed with prejudice, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court dismissed the antitrust claim with prejudice, noting that the plaintiffs had prior notice of the deficiencies and had multiple opportunities to amend.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead parallel conduct or provide sufficient factual detail connecting specific defendants to particular acts. It concluded that the complaint’s group pleading and conclusory allegations did not meet the plausibility standard required to survive a motion to dismiss. The court also ruled that the dismissal with prejudice was proper given the plaintiffs’ repeated failures to cure the deficiencies. View "Duncan v. Bayer CropScience LP" on Justia Law

Four football players who had previously attended junior colleges (JUCOs) and then transferred to a Division I university challenged the NCAA’s “JUCO Rule.” This rule treats time spent and games played at JUCOs as counting toward limits on athletes’ eligibility to play NCAA sports—specifically, a five-year window to play four seasons. The NCAA had recently issued a temporary waiver (the “Pavia waiver”) that relaxed the rule regarding the number of seasons, but not the five-year limit. The plaintiffs, having enrolled in college over five years earlier, were rendered ineligible for the 2025–26 season under the rule, even with the waiver. After their requests for an NCAA waiver were denied, the players sued, alleging the rule violated the Sherman Act and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted a preliminary injunction, allowing the players to participate for the 2025–26 season. The NCAA appealed, and the Fourth Circuit requested additional briefing on mootness since the 2025–26 season had ended. The circuit court found the case was not moot because the dispute was capable of repetition yet evading review, especially as one player had already sought a waiver for the following season.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred by applying an abbreviated “quick look” analysis instead of the full “rule of reason” required under the Sherman Act for this type of eligibility rule. The circuit court further found that the district court failed to make adequate factual findings regarding the relevant market, as required for antitrust analysis. The court concluded that the players had not met their burden for a preliminary injunction, and the district court’s order was therefore vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law