Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

The case involves a group of bond investors (plaintiffs) who bought and sold certain types of corporate bonds from and to a group of financial institutions and major dealers in the corporate bond market (defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated antitrust laws by engaging in a pattern of parallel conduct and anticompetitive collusion to restrict forms of competition that would have improved odd-lot pricing for bond investors. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case.Several months after the district court's order, it was discovered that the district court judge had presided over part of the case while his wife owned stock in one of the defendants. Although she had divested that stock before the district court judge issued his decision, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court judge should have disqualified himself due to this prior financial interest of his wife.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was tasked with deciding whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, vacatur was warranted because the district court judge was required to disqualify himself before issuing his decision. The court concluded that while there was no outright conflict when the district court judge ruled on the merits of this action, § 455(a) and related precedents required pre-judgment disqualification, thus vacatur was warranted. As a result, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Litovich v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Broadway producer Garth Drabinsky alleged that the Actors’ Equity Association, a union representing theater actors and stage managers, unlawfully boycotted, defamed, and harassed him during his production of the musical Paradise Square. Drabinsky brought antitrust claims and New York state tort claims against the union.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Drabinsky’s antitrust claims were barred by the statutory labor exemption derived from the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. The court also held that his tort claims were barred under Martin v. Curran, a New York state case that requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a union liable for tortious wrongs to allege the individual liability of every single member.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that an antitrust plaintiff suing a union bears the burden of proving that the statutory labor exemption does not apply. The court found that Drabinsky failed to meet this burden, as the union was acting in its self-interest and did not combine with non-labor groups. The court also agreed with the lower court that Drabinsky's state-law tort claims were barred by the Martin v. Curran rule. View "Drabinsky v. Actors' Equity Association" on Justia Law

The case involves the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (SCPRT) and Google LLC. The State of South Carolina, along with several other states, sued Google for violations of federal and state antitrust laws. Google subpoenaed SCPRT for discovery pertinent to its defense. SCPRT refused to comply, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court denied SCPRT's motion, holding that any Eleventh Amendment immunity that SCPRT may have otherwise been entitled to assert was waived when the State, through its attorney general, voluntarily joined the federal lawsuit against Google. SCPRT appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that by joining the lawsuit against Google, the State voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court, thereby effecting a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all matters arising in that suit. And because SCPRT’s immunity derives solely from that of the State, South Carolina’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity equally effected a waiver of SCPRT’s immunity. The district court, therefore, properly denied SCPRT’s motion to quash. View "SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

A class of individuals and businesses in Northern California, who paid health insurance premiums to certain health plans, sued Sutter Health, a healthcare system operator in the region. They alleged that Sutter abused its market power to charge supracompetitive rates to these health plans, which were then passed on to the class in the form of higher premiums. The case went to trial on claims under California’s Cartwright Act for tying and unreasonable course of conduct. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sutter.The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider Sutter’s anticompetitive purpose and by excluding evidence of Sutter’s conduct before 2006. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. It held that the district court contravened California law by removing “purpose” from the jury instructions, and that the legal error was not harmless. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in excluding as minimally relevant all evidence of Sutter’s conduct before 2006. The court concluded that these errors were prejudicial and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding the case for a new trial. View "SIDIBE V. SUTTER HEALTH" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the antitrust implications of a settlement agreement between Forest Laboratories, a brand manufacturer of the high-blood pressure drug Bystolic, and seven manufacturers of generic versions of Bystolic. The settlement agreement was reached after Forest Laboratories initiated patent-infringement litigation against the generic manufacturers. As part of the settlement, Forest Laboratories entered into separate business transactions with each generic manufacturer, paying them for goods and services.The plaintiffs, purchasers of Bystolic and its generic equivalents, filed a lawsuit against Forest Laboratories and the generic manufacturers, alleging that the payments constituted unlawful “reverse” settlement payments intended to delay the market entry of generic Bystolic. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed twice by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that any of Forest’s payments were unjustified or unexplained, instead of constituting fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. The court also held that the district court’s application of the pleading law was appropriate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Forest’s payments were a pretext for nefarious anticompetitive motives rather than payments that constituted fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. View "In re Bystolic Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

The case involves Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons), a provider of ambulance services, and the City of Riverside. The City regulates ambulance services within its limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), which requires operators to obtain a valid franchise or permit. Symons filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that the RMC section requiring a permit is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act). The dispute centered on whether the City had regulated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, which would allow it to continue doing so under the EMS Act's grandfathering provisions.The trial court found in favor of the City, concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof. Symons appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies, that the court's factual finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the RMC section violated federal anti-trust law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the admission of testimonies, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, and rejected Symons's anti-trust argument. The court held that the City's regulation of ambulance services did not violate the EMS Act or federal anti-trust law. View "Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

This case involves a dozen gas stations in the Green Bay, Wisconsin area, who alleged that Costco Wholesale Corporation violated a Wisconsin law prohibiting the sale of gasoline below a statutorily defined cost. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent Costco from selling gasoline below that level and damages of over half a million dollars each. Costco argued that it lowered its prices to match a competitor's price, which the statute allows, and that the plaintiffs failed to establish the causal element of the statutory claim.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which sided with Costco and awarded it summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, challenging both the summary judgment and an evidentiary ruling made earlier in the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that for 238 of the 256 days in question, Costco was immune from liability under the "meeting competition" exception in the Wisconsin law. For the remaining 18 days, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that they were injured or threatened with injury as a result of Costco's actions. The court also upheld the lower court's denial of the plaintiffs' request to supplement their expert report. View "Pit Row, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between plaintiffs Michelle Beverage and Joseph Mejia, and defendant Apple, Inc. The plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that Apple's restrictive contractual terms and coercive conduct towards software developers on its App Store constituted unlawful and unfair practices that violated the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The plaintiffs specifically focused on Apple's treatment of one developer, Epic Games, Inc., and its gaming application, Fortnite. The trial court sustained a demurrer brought by Apple without leave to amend, applying the Colgate doctrine and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation. The court determined that the plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law.The trial court's decision was based on the application of the Colgate doctrine and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation. The court found that the plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either the Cartwright Act or the UCL as a matter of law. The plaintiffs appealed only one aspect of the trial court's ruling, arguing that the court erred by relying on Chavez to sustain the demurrer to their UCL cause of action alleging unfair practices by Apple towards Epic Games.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that Chavez was inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company. The court found that the trial court correctly relied on Chavez to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. The court held that the plaintiffs did not state a claim as a matter of law under the "unfair" prong of the UCL, considering the trial court's ruling that Apple's practices constituted permissible unilateral conduct. View "Beverage v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into potentially anti-competitive practices in the real estate industry by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). In November 2020, the DOJ and NAR reached a settlement, and the DOJ sent a letter to NAR stating that it had closed its investigation and that NAR was not required to respond to two outstanding investigative subpoenas. However, in July 2021, the DOJ withdrew the proposed consent judgment, reopened its investigation, and issued a new investigative subpoena. NAR petitioned the district court to set aside the subpoena, arguing that its issuance violated a promise made by the DOJ in the 2020 closing letter. The district court granted NAR’s petition, concluding that the new subpoena was barred by a validly executed settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that the plain language of the disputed 2020 letter permits the DOJ to reopen its investigation. The court noted that the closing of an investigation does not guarantee that the investigation would stay closed forever. The court also pointed out that NAR gained several benefits from the closing of the DOJ’s pending investigation in 2020, including relief from its obligation to respond to the two outstanding subpoenas. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "National Association of Realtors v. United States" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound. View "United States v. Tipton" on Justia Law