Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Landmark Investment Group, LLC entered into a contract with Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC (Chung, LLC) to purchase certain property. Chung, LLC repudiated the contract after receiving a more attractive offer from CALCO Construction & Development Company (Calco) and John Senese, Calco’s president and owner (together, Defendants). Landmark successfully sued for specific performance of the contract but was unable to purchase the property after it was sold at a foreclosure auction where a company controlled by Senese was the highest bidder. Landmark then filed suit against Defendants, alleging tortious interference with its contractual relations and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Landmark on both counts. The trial court, however, granted Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly granted Defendants’ motion for JNOV because it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict; and (2) incorrectly concluded that Landmark presented insufficient evidence to support its claims. View "Landmark Inv. Group, LLC v. CALCO Constr. & Dev. Co." on Justia Law

SawStop filed suit against two dozen saw manufacturers and affiliated entities under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, contending that several major table-saw manufacturers conspired to boycott SawStop’s safety technology and corrupt a private safety-standard-setting process, all with the aim of keeping that technology off the market. The district court dismissed SawStop's amended complaint. The court concluded that SawStop's complaint does not plausibly allege any conspiracy to manipulate safety standards; the complaint also fails to allege any facts at all against several corporate parents and affiliates; and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal as to these claims. However, the court concluded that SawStop has alleged enough to suggest a plausible agreement to engage in a group boycott where the complaint offers enough to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal as to this claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker" on Justia Law

The U.S. chocolate market is dominated by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA (the Chocolate Manufacturers). A certified class of direct purchasers of chocolate products and a group of individual plaintiffs alleged that the Chocolate Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy products in the United States three times between 2002 and 2007. They offered evidence of a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in Canada. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Canadian conspiracy evidence was ambiguous and did not support an inference of a U.S. conspiracy because the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy; evidence that the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy was weak and, in any event, related only to Hershey. Other traditional conspiracy evidence was insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy. View "In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Magnetar filed suit alleging that Intamin maliciously prosecuted a patent infringement action against it and claiming that Intamin prosecuted the action even though the ‘350 Patent was invalid pursuant to the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. 102 (on-sale bar). The district court granted summary judgment to Intamin. The court concluded that a reasonable attorney could have determined that the on-sale bar did not apply due to the genuine dispute concerning whether the magnetic braking system had been (1) offered for sale before the critical date; and (2) was ready for patenting before the critical date. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that Magnetar has not alleged sufficient facts to show a causal antitrust injury stemming from Intamin’s actions. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly refused to sanction Magnetar for filing a frivolous action where Magnetar proceeded in good faith in not admitting facts related to the antitrust injury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "Magnetar Techs. v. Intamin, Ltd." on Justia Law

Prior to July 2011, St. Peter’s Hospital’s Medical Staff granted privileges to qualified, non-employee radiologists, including the physicians of Montana Interventional and Diagnostic Radiology Specialists, PLLC (MIDRS), a professional limited liability company whose members are engaged in the practice of radiology. In July 2011, the Hospital closed its radiology department to all non-employee physicians regardless of qualification. MIDRS brought this action against the Hospital, alleging intentional interference with prospective advantage and unfair trade practices. The district court granted the Hospital’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint as untimely, concluding that MIDRS filed its complaint outside of the applicable statutes of limitation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the accrual of MIDRS’ claims could not be determined from the pleadings alone and that further development of the record was necessary. View "Mont. Interventional & Diagnostic Radiology Specialists, PPLC v. St. Peter’s Hosp." on Justia Law

A class action filed against Dairy Farmers of America (DFA), a dairy marketing cooperative, Keller’s Creamery, a butter manufacturer, two DFA officers, and two Keller’s officers, alleged a conspiracy to purchase cheese traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in order to help DFA and Keller’s manipulate the price of Class III milk futures. The parties named in the initial complaint reached a settlement (DFA Settlement), which the district court approved in 2014. In 2012, plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint, adding Schreiber Foods as a defendant and alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the California Cartwright Act, the Commodity Exchange Act, and RICO. The district court dismissed the section 2 Sherman Act claims. In 2013, the court granted Schreiber summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court abused its discretion by limiting discovery to only “high-level” employees and prohibiting the depositions of several employees and in including Schreiber in the DFA Settlement. View "Indriolo Distribs., Inc. v. Schreiber Food, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant worked for Plaintiff, a technology company, as an engineer. During and after her employment with Plaintiff, Defendant forwarded confidential emails to her private Gmail account, copied a confidential business plan to a thumb drive, and placed protected information on the record in an administrative proceeding. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Defendant had violated a non-disclosure agreement and misappropriated company trade secrets. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, determining that Plaintiff had failed to make an adequate showing of harm. The court further entered Utah R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against Plaintiff and awarded attorney fees to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence of threatened harm - or at least genuine issues of material fact concerning such harm - to defeat Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff prevailed on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant could not be entitled to sanctions or fees. View "Innosys v. Mercer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of 28 retail pharmacies, filed suit against defendants, primarily pharmaceutical manufacturers, alleging claims for money damages and injunctive relief under subsections 2(a), 2(d), and 2(f) of the Robinson‐Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.13(a), 13(d), 13(f), and sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, 26. Plaintiffs’ main contentions are that the lower prices offered by manufacturers violate the Robinson‐Patman Act by harming their ability to compete, and that favored purchasers violated the Act by using their drug formularies to extract the lower prices. Plaintiffs sought to prove that discounts caused them to lose customers to the favored purchasers, and that as a consequence they suffered injury under the antitrust laws. The district court concluded that plaintiffs could prove neither type of injury and granted defendants summary judgment. The court concluded that, given that an extended discovery process resulted in almost no evidence of diverted sales or other indicia of potential competitive injury, summary judgment was appropriate on the section 2(a) claims; plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to competitive injury and antitrust injury; injunctive relief is inappropriate where plaintiffs have offered no argument that future conditions will change in such a way as to make the injuries they claim to have suffered more pronounced than currently alleged; and since plaintiffs failed to show competitive or antitrust injury with regard to their section 2(a) claim, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to their claims under sections 2(d) and 2(f) as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cash & Henderson Drugs v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class, filed suit alleging that Guitar Center and the manufacturer defendants, as well as NAMM, conspired to implement and enforce minimum-advertised-price policies (MAP policies) that fixed the minimum price at which any retailer could advertise the manufacturers’ guitars and guitar amplifiers. Plaintiffs claimed that these MAP policies tended to raise retail prices and restrain competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs allege that each manufacturer agreed with Guitar Center to adopt MAP policies and that the manufacturers agreed among themselves to adopt the MAP policies proposed by Guitar Center. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissed with prejudice. At issue was whether plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to provide a plausible basis from which the court can infer the alleged agreements’ existence. Because plaintiffs lack direct evidence of horizontal agreements among the manufacturers, they plead that defendant manufacturers’ parallel conduct in adopting MAP policies, in conjunction with several “plus factors,” plausibly suggests the existence of horizontal agreements. The court concluded that plaintiffs have indeed provided a context for the manufacturers’ adoption of MAP policies, but not one that plausibly suggests they entered into illegal horizontal agreements. Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to state a claim under section 1 and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ramsey v. NAMM" on Justia Law

In April 2014, two consumers filed a class action against BF Labs, asserting “deceptive and unconscionable business practices” in marketing and selling Bitcoin mining machines. Five months later, the Federal Trade Commission sued BF for unfair and deceptive acts, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). The court stayed pending suits and imposed a receivership. The stay was subsequently lifted. The two consumers were denied leave to intervene in the FTC action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the interests of the consumers’ proposed class are subsumed within the public interest because the FTC, on behalf of consumers, sought relief for the same “deceptive and unconscionable business practices” alleged by the consumers. The consumers have not made the necessary “strong showing of inadequate representation.” View "Alexander v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law