Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Defendant worked for Plaintiff, a technology company, as an engineer. During and after her employment with Plaintiff, Defendant forwarded confidential emails to her private Gmail account, copied a confidential business plan to a thumb drive, and placed protected information on the record in an administrative proceeding. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Defendant had violated a non-disclosure agreement and misappropriated company trade secrets. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, determining that Plaintiff had failed to make an adequate showing of harm. The court further entered Utah R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against Plaintiff and awarded attorney fees to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence of threatened harm - or at least genuine issues of material fact concerning such harm - to defeat Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff prevailed on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant could not be entitled to sanctions or fees. View "Innosys v. Mercer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of 28 retail pharmacies, filed suit against defendants, primarily pharmaceutical manufacturers, alleging claims for money damages and injunctive relief under subsections 2(a), 2(d), and 2(f) of the Robinson‐Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.13(a), 13(d), 13(f), and sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, 26. Plaintiffs’ main contentions are that the lower prices offered by manufacturers violate the Robinson‐Patman Act by harming their ability to compete, and that favored purchasers violated the Act by using their drug formularies to extract the lower prices. Plaintiffs sought to prove that discounts caused them to lose customers to the favored purchasers, and that as a consequence they suffered injury under the antitrust laws. The district court concluded that plaintiffs could prove neither type of injury and granted defendants summary judgment. The court concluded that, given that an extended discovery process resulted in almost no evidence of diverted sales or other indicia of potential competitive injury, summary judgment was appropriate on the section 2(a) claims; plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to competitive injury and antitrust injury; injunctive relief is inappropriate where plaintiffs have offered no argument that future conditions will change in such a way as to make the injuries they claim to have suffered more pronounced than currently alleged; and since plaintiffs failed to show competitive or antitrust injury with regard to their section 2(a) claim, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to their claims under sections 2(d) and 2(f) as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cash & Henderson Drugs v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class, filed suit alleging that Guitar Center and the manufacturer defendants, as well as NAMM, conspired to implement and enforce minimum-advertised-price policies (MAP policies) that fixed the minimum price at which any retailer could advertise the manufacturers’ guitars and guitar amplifiers. Plaintiffs claimed that these MAP policies tended to raise retail prices and restrain competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs allege that each manufacturer agreed with Guitar Center to adopt MAP policies and that the manufacturers agreed among themselves to adopt the MAP policies proposed by Guitar Center. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissed with prejudice. At issue was whether plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to provide a plausible basis from which the court can infer the alleged agreements’ existence. Because plaintiffs lack direct evidence of horizontal agreements among the manufacturers, they plead that defendant manufacturers’ parallel conduct in adopting MAP policies, in conjunction with several “plus factors,” plausibly suggests the existence of horizontal agreements. The court concluded that plaintiffs have indeed provided a context for the manufacturers’ adoption of MAP policies, but not one that plausibly suggests they entered into illegal horizontal agreements. Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to state a claim under section 1 and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ramsey v. NAMM" on Justia Law

In April 2014, two consumers filed a class action against BF Labs, asserting “deceptive and unconscionable business practices” in marketing and selling Bitcoin mining machines. Five months later, the Federal Trade Commission sued BF for unfair and deceptive acts, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). The court stayed pending suits and imposed a receivership. The stay was subsequently lifted. The two consumers were denied leave to intervene in the FTC action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the interests of the consumers’ proposed class are subsumed within the public interest because the FTC, on behalf of consumers, sought relief for the same “deceptive and unconscionable business practices” alleged by the consumers. The consumers have not made the necessary “strong showing of inadequate representation.” View "Alexander v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Graco manufactures fast-set spray foam equipment (FSE) and sells it to distributors, who resell to consumers like Insulate. In 2005 and 2008 Graco purchased competing FSE manufacturers, ultimately raising its market share “to above 90%.” In 2007, Graco sent a letter to its distributors citing the “best efforts” clause in its distributor agreements, stating: It is our opinion that taking on an additional competitive product line may significantly reduce the “best efforts” of a Graco distributor.” In 2009, Foampak, a Graco distributor, considered carrying Gama products but chose not to after Graco threatened to end its distributorship. Graco sued Gama, alleging theft of trade secrets; Gama counterclaimed that Graco had unilaterally monopolized the FSE market (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2). In 2013, the FTC accused Graco of unlawfully acquiring its competitors (Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18). Graco and the FTC entered a consent agreement which confirmed Graco would not engage in any practice “that has the purpose or effect of achieving Exclusivity with any Distributor.” The agreement did “not constitute an admission by [Graco] that the law ha[d] been violated.” Insulate filed suit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal on the pleadings. Insulate did not adequately plead concerted action in the existence of written anticompetitive contracts or implied exclusivity agreements. View "Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

DFA filed suit against Estee Lauder after Estee Lauder refused to do business with DFA and communicated that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental space to DFA. DFW alleged three claims in its amended complaint: (1) attempted monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2; (2) contributory false advertising, in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); and (3) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida law. The district court dismissed the suit based on failure to state a claim. The court concluded that DFW failed to allege basic facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face where DFW did not adequately allege that Estee Lauder engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct for its antitrust claims; DFA does not come close to establishing standing to seek injunctive relief from the requirements that Estée Lauder places on its competitors, inasmuch as DFA no longer does any business with Estée Lauder; DFA failed to plead sufficient facts from which a court could find that Estée Lauder made false statements, or, for that matter, was responsible for any such statements made by DFA’s competitors in DFA's false advertising claim; and the complaint failed to allege any improper conduct sufficient to constitute tortious interference with a business relationship in violation of Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. The Estee Lauder Co." on Justia Law

Best designs and markets exit signs and emergency lighting. Pace manufactured products to Best’s specifications. Best’s founder taught Pace how to manufacture the necessary tooling. There was no contract prohibiting Pace from competing with Best. By 2004, Best was aware that Pace was selling products identical to those it made for Best to Best’s established customers. Several other problems arose between the companies. When they ended the relationship, Pace was in possession of all of the tooling used to manufacture Best’s products and the cloned products, and Best owed Pace almost $900,000 for products delivered. Pace filed a breach of contract suit. Best requested a setoff of damages for breach of warranty and counterclaimed for breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and fraud. Pace claimed that Best had misappropriated Pace’s trade secrets and had tortiously interfered with Pace’s contracts. The district court found that Best had breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay, but that Pace was liable for breach of warranties, breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Pace is liable for breach of contract and tortious interference, but reversed or vacated as to the trade secrets, Lanham Act, conversion, and warranties claims. View "Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, users and operators of independent (non-bank) ATMs, filed related actions against Visa, MasterCard, and certain affiliated banks, alleging anticompetitive schemes for pricing ATM access fees. Plaintiffs alleged anticompetitive harm because Visa and MasterCard prevent an independent operator from charging less, and potentially earning more, when an ATM transaction is processed through a network unaffiliated with Visa and MasterCard. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to establish standing or the existence of a horizontal conspiracy to restrain trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Osborn v. Visa Inc." on Justia Law

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) creates and assigns top level domains (TLDs), such as “.com” and “.net.” Plaintiff, a registry specializing in “expressive” TLDs, filed suit alleging that the 2012 Application Round for the creation of new TLDs violated federal and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because plaintiff failed to allege an anticompetitive agreement; the court rejected plaintiff's claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, because ICANN’s authority was lawfully obtained through a contract with the DOC and did not unlawfully acquire or maintain its monopoly; the trademark and unfair competition claims were not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not alleged that ICANN has delegated or intends to delegate any of the TLDs that plaintiff uses; and the complaint failed to allege a claim for tortious interference or unfair business practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "name.space, Inc. V. ICANN" on Justia Law

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) creates and assigns top level domains (TLDs), such as “.com” and “.net.” Plaintiff, a registry specializing in “expressive” TLDs, filed suit alleging that the 2012 Application Round for the creation of new TLDs violated federal and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because plaintiff failed to allege an anticompetitive agreement; the court rejected plaintiff's claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, because ICANN’s authority was lawfully obtained through a contract with the DOC and did not unlawfully acquire or maintain its monopoly; the trademark and unfair competition claims were not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not alleged that ICANN has delegated or intends to delegate any of the TLDs that plaintiff uses; and the complaint failed to allege a claim for tortious interference or unfair business practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "name.space, Inc. V. ICANN" on Justia Law