Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a cardiothoracic surgeon who practiced at Memorial Hermann Memorial City Medical Center until 2012. When Plaintiff agreed to practice at Methodist West, Defendants - Memorial Hermann and certain healthcare practitioners - began conducting a “whisper campaign” against Plaintiff to cast doubt on Plaintiff’s heart surgery procedures. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting claims for business disparagement, defamation, tortious interference with prospective business relationship, and improper restraint of trade. When Plaintiff moved to compel the production of certain documents, Memorial Hermann asserted the documents were protected from discovery under the medical committee privilege and the medical peer review committee privilege. The trial court ordered Defendants to produce the documents. After the court of appeals denied Defendants’ petition for writ of mandamus, Defendants sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief as to some of the documents that the Court determined were protected but denied relief as to the remainder of the documents, holding that they were not confidential under either the medical committee privilege or the medical peer review committee privilege. View "In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys." on Justia Law

Central United Life Insurance Co. (CULI) purchased Judith Gleason’s cancer benefit insurance policy prior to Gleason’s death from breast cancer. Gleason’s Estate submitted notice of potential claims under the policy to CULI. CULI paid certain claims but denied payment for claims submitted outside the policy limit. The Estate contested the denial of the untimely-filed claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that CULI owed payment for the untimely-filed claims, provided it was not prejudiced by the late notice. After a trial, the jury found that CULI had violated the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) but did not award damages and therefore did not consider whether CULI acted with malice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the notice-prejudice rule; and (2) when an insurer is found to have violated the UTPA, a jury is not required to find compensatory damages beyond those for breach of the insurance contract before considering malice and punitive damages under the UTPA, and therefore, a new trial must be held on the issue of malice and punitive damages. View "Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After receiving treatment from St. Peter’s Hospital, Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Hospital violated Montana anti-trust laws and the Montana Constitution by discriminating against her based on her lack of health insurance. After concluding that Plaintiff had standing, the district court awarded summary judgment to the Hospital, determining that uninsured persons are not a protected class under the Montana Constitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s standing determination; but (2) reversed the court’s entry of summary judgment on the merits, holding that the determinations that the district court made in its summary judgment order did not resolve all of Plaintiff’s claims. Remanded. View "Gazelka v. St. Peter’s Hosp." on Justia Law

McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, a Mississippi-based law firm, ran a full-page advertisement in a Northeast Georgia local newspaper, noting that Heritage Healthcare of Toccoa, a Stephens County nursing home owned by PruittHealth, had been cited by the government for deficiencies in the care of its residents and inviting those suspecting abuse or neglect of a loved one at the facility to call the law firm. On the following day, PruittHealth filed a verified complaint for temporary and permanent injunctive relief under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and petitioned ex parte for a temporary restraining order. That same day, the Stephens County Superior Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining McHugh Fuller from publishing, in any newspaper or other media, advertisements regarding PruittHealth utilizing the language of the ad. At the hearing, PruittHealth presented testimony that the government citation referenced in the ad arose from an old report, that the cited deficiencies had been resolved immediately, and the ad had caused severe damage to the facility's reputation. McHugh Fuller presented testimony to substantiate and justify the specific language used in the ad. The trial court found the ad to be deceptive and thus in violation of the UDTPA. Thereafter, the trial court signed an order enjoining McHugh Fuller “from publishing or causing the offending advertisement to be published in the future” and requiring McHugh Fuller remove postings of the ad. McHugh Fuller filed a verified answer and a motion to amend and/or for reconsideration of the court's order. The Supreme Court consolidated both parties' appeals of the trial court's rulings.. In case S15A0362, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by granting permanent injunctive relief at the conclusion of the interlocutory hearing without giving McHugh Fuller clear notice at the time that it was doing so. In case S15A0641, the Court found the trial court erred in its conclusion that that the appellate record in McHugh Fuller's initial appeal should not have included any filings in the trial court submitted after the entry of the permanent injunction on June 2, 2014. View "McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth-Toccoa, LLC" on Justia Law

Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (collectively, Bayer) marketed Cipro, an antibiotic. In 1987, Bayer was issued a United States patent on the active ingredient in Cipro. Twelve years before the expiration of the patent, Barr Laboratories, Inc. filed an application to market a generic version of Cipro. Bayer responded with a patent infringement suit, and Barr counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid. In 1997, Bayer and Barr entered into a settlement agreement under which Bayer agreed to make a “reverse payment” to Barr in exchange for Barr dropping its patent challenge and consenting to stay out of the market. The settlement produced numerous state and federal antitrust suits. This case arose from nine such coordinated class action suits brought by indirect purchasers of Cipro in California. The complaint alleged that the Bayer-Barr reverse payment settlement violated the Cartwright Act, unfair competition law, an common law prohibition against monopolies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bayer and Barr. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that parties illegally restrain trade when they privately agree to substitute consensual monopoly in place of potential competition that would have followed a finding of invalidity or noninfringement. View "In re Cipro Cases I & II" on Justia Law

In 1994, Sukumar began caring for his aging father and noticed that rehabilitation fitness machines used by his father did not adequately suit frail seniors. To learn more about rehabilitation for seniors, he attended trade shows where he met Nautilus representatives. In 1998-1999, Sukumar ordered Nautilus machines and asked for modifications to meet elderly users’ needs. When Nautilus delivered the custom fitness machines, Sukumar was dissatisfied and filed a breach of contract action. In 2004, Sukumar founded Southern California Stroke Rehabilitation Associates (SCSRA) to operate senior rehabilitation facilities in which Sukumar would use modified Nautilus fitness machines. SCSRA has acquired over 100 Nautilus fitness machines and, according to Sukumar, has twice attempted to negotiate a patent license from Nautilus. As of 2010, when Sukumar filed a false marking claim, 35 U.S.C. 292(b), SCSRA had no business plan, no employees, no office space, and no prototype designs. The district court found that many of the patents marked on six Nautilus machines did not cover the machines, but concluded that Sukumar had not suffered “competitive injury” necessary to have standing to assert a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Sukumar had not taken sufficient action to enter the market for fitness machines. View "Sukumar v. Nautilus, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue in this case arose from alleged anticompetitive conduct in the ductile iron pipe fittings ("DIPF") market by McWane, Inc., a family-run company headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama. In 2009, following the passage of federal legislation that provided a large infusion of money for waterworks projects that required domestic pipe fittings, Star Pipe Products entered the domestic fittings market. In response, McWane, the dominant producer of domestic pipe fittings, announced to its distributors that (with limited exceptions) unless they bought all of their domestic fittings from McWane, they would lose their rebates and be cut off from purchases for 12 weeks. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") investigated and brought an enforcement action under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 45. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and a divided Commission, found that McWane's actions constituted an illegal exclusive dealing policy used to maintain McWane's monopoly power in the domestic fittings market. The Commission issued an order directing McWane to stop requiring exclusivity from distributors. McWane appealed, challenging nearly every aspect of the Commission's ruling. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit found the Commission's factual and economic conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission's ruling. View "McWane, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Gordon Auto Body Parts, a Taiwanese company, was one of several early entrants into the U.S. market for replacement truck hoods. PBSI eventually entered the market for certain replacement hoods but found that it could not match the prices of Gordon and other Taiwanese firms, with which Gordon had participated in joint ventures. Believing that Gordon and the other firms were conspiring to drive it out of business with predatory prices, PBSI brought antitrust claims against Gordon. The district court granted Gordon summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that PBSI failed to make any showing that Gordon’s prices were below an appropriate measure of cost. View "Superior Prod. P'shp v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co." on Justia Law

Institutions that buy natural gas directly from interstate pipelines sued, claiming that the pipelines had violated state antitrust laws: that they reported false information to the natural-gas indices on which natural-gas contracts were based. The indices affected both retail and wholesale natural-gas prices. The pipelines sought summary judgment, arguing that the Natural Gas Act pre-empted state-law claims. That Act gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to determine whether rates charged by natural-gas companies or practices affecting such rates are unreasonable, 15 U.S.C. 717d(a). It limits FERC’s jurisdiction to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale, and natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, leaving regulation of other portions of the industry, such as retail sales, to the states. The district court granted the motion. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Acknowledging that the pipelines’ index manipulation increased wholesale prices, it held that the state-law claims were not pre-empted because they were aimed at obtaining damages only for excessively high retail prices. The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing the importance of considering the target at which the state-law claims aim. Here, the claims are aimed at practices affecting retail prices, a matter “firmly on the States’ side of [the] dividing line.” State antitrust laws are not aimed at natural-gas companies in particular, but rather all businesses and states have long provided “common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices.” The industries did not identify a specific FERC determination that state antitrust claims are pre-empted by the Act. View "Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc." on Justia Law

In this putative nationwide class action Plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into purchasing Defendants’ “natural” cosmetics, which contained allegedly synthetic and artificial ingredients. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws, and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract. The district court dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so that the parties could seek expert guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not expressly preempt California’s state law causes of action that create consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels; (2) although the district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than staying proceedings while the parties sought guidance from the FDA; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of or superfluous to Plaintiffs’ other claims. View "Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law