Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Lenox MacLaren Surgical began to sell some of its bone mills (a device it manufactured for use in spinal surgery) through a Medtronic entity, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA. The arrangement ended badly: Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA initiated a recall of Lenox's bone mills, and another Medtronic entity began to manufacture and sell its own bone mill. The result, according to Lenox, was that four Medtronic entities acquired an unfair competitive advantage; thus, Lenox sued these entities for monopolization and attempted monopolization from 2007 to 2010. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both claims, and Lenox appealed. Upon review of the claims and the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding market definition, monopoly power, exclusionary conduct, and harm to competition. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Medtronic on the claims involving monopolization and attempted monopolization, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lenox MacLaren Surgical v. Medtronic, et al" on Justia Law

This criminal antitrust case stems from an international conspiracy between Taiwanese and Korean electronics manufacturers to fix prices for TFT-LCDs. Defendants, AUO, a Taiwanese company, and AUOA, AUO's retailer and wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, "the corporate defendants"), and two executives were convicted of conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court concluded that venue in the Northern District of California was proper; defendants waived their jury instruction challenge regarding the extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act; the price-fixing scheme as alleged and proved is subject to per se analysis under the Sherman Act; the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. 6a, does not limit the power of the federal courts, but rather, it provides substantive elements under the Sherman Act in cases involving nonimport trade with foreign nations; the FTAIA does not apply to defendants' import trade conduct because the government sufficiently pleaded and proved that the conspirators engaged in import commerce with the United States and that the price-fixing conspiracy violated section 1 of the Sherman Act; there was no constructive amendment because the facts in the indictment necessarily supported the domestic effects claim; the evidence offered in support of the import trade theory alone was sufficient to convict defendants of price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act; the unambiguous language of the Alternative Fine Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3571(d), permitted the district court to impose the $500 million fine based on the gross gains to all the coconspirators; and no statutory authority or precedent supports AUO's interpretation of the Alternative Fine Statute as requiring joint and several liability and imposing a "one recovery" rule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hsiung" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Nicholas Long and Julianne Ricci, purchased Dell computers in late 2000. In 2003, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit alleging that Dell violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DPTA) and was negligent in charging Plaintiffs sales tax on nontaxable services purchased in conjunction with the computers. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Dell. The case remained pending for more than ten years. Here, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the negligence count and on the request for injunctive relief by Long; (2) vacated the grant of summary judgment on the DTPA count by Ricci; and (3) affirmed the superior court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the tax administrator’s affirmative defenses. Remanded. View "Long v. Dell, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, physicians and physician associations imitated a group of class actions against various providers of health plans, which were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation. This appeal involves this complex, twelve-year-old multidistrict litigation, a related multidistrict litigation pending in another federal district, and whether the district court reasonably interpreted the Settlement Agreement in the first action. The court affirmed the Injunction as to plaintiffs' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, and antitrust claims and as to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claims based on the denial or underpayment of benefits following the Settlement Agreement's Effective Date. On remand, the district court will need to determine which of plaintiffs' ERISA claims fall on the permissible side of the line, and reconsider the assessment of sanctions. View "Medical Assoc. of GA, et al. v. Wellpoint, Inc." on Justia Law

The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is composed of industry members, academicians, design professionals, and government officials. Its standards provide guidelines for refrigeration processes and design and maintenance of energy efficient buildings. Thermal manufactures liner insulation systems for nonresidential metal buildings. Thermal’s liner systems compete with “over-the-purlin systems,” which comprise about 90% of the market for metal building roof insulation systems. Since 1999, ASHRAE has published Standard 90.1, which rates the energy efficiency of insulation assemblies and has considerable influence in the commercial building industry. In 2011, the Department of Energy determined that Standard 90.1 would be the national commercial building reference standard; within two years every state had to certify that it had adopted a commercial building code that is at least as stringent as Standard 90.1. Until 2010, Standard 90.1 treated non-laminated metal building insulation assemblies, like Thermal’s liner systems, differently from other insulation assemblies. Owners had to obtain special permission to install liner systems. Thermal alleged that representatives of the North American Insulation Manufacturer’s Association and the Metal Building Manufacturers Association, both of which have voting members on ASHRAE’s Envelope Subcommittee, procured this result by providing inaccurate data. ASHRAE declined to accept results of tests commissioned by Thermal. Thermal sued, alleging unfair competition, violation of Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, antitrust violations, and violation of the Lanham Act. The court rejected all of the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant aided and abetted Plaintiff’s former attorneys in breaching their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and that Defendant’s actions violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The trial court entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable three year statutes of limitations and that tolling was inapplicable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff sufficiently invoked the continuing course of conduct doctrine before the trial court; but (2) equitable tolling pursuant to the continuing course of conduct doctrine was not available under the facts of this case. View "Flannery v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, wholesale dealers in pharmaceutical products, filed a putative class action alleging that defendants violated the anti-monopolization provision of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2, by breaching defendants' contracts to supply two of their competitors with an unbranded version of defendants' patented drug for resale under the competitors' own labels. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that these contracts gave rise to a "duty to deal" enforceable by third-party customers such as themselves under the antitrust laws. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege facts that would place this case within Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.'s narrow exception to the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and it was properly dismissed by the district court under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Shire LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2, alleging that defendants, a group of five competing electronics firms, have attempted to leverage their ownership of certain key patents to gain control of a new technology standard for USB connectors and, by extension, to gain monopoly power over the entire USB connector industry. The court held that, under principles articulated in a line of recent Supreme Court decisions extending from Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. to Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, the requirements of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. 6a, are substantive and nonjurisdictional in nature. Because Congress has not clearly stated that these requirements are jurisdictional, they go to the merits of the claim rather than the adjudicative power of the court. In so holding, the court overruled the court's prior decision in Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A. The court also concluded that, although the FTAIA's requirements are nonjurisdictional and thus potentially waivable, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that defendants somehow have waived them by contract in this case; foreign anticompetitive conduct can have a statutorily required direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic or import commerce even if the effect does not follow as an immediate consequence of defendant's conduct, so long as there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct and the effect; the court rejected the interpretation of "direct...effect" advanced by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies in favor of the interpretation advocated by amici curiae the United States and the FTC and adopted by the Seventh Circuit in its en banc decision in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.; and the court need not decide, however, whether plaintiff here has plausibly alleged the requisite "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" under the proper standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed on alternative grounds the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's claims. View "Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co." on Justia Law

Two customers of Wagoner County Rural Water District No. 2 contested the rate charged for providing water to their respective recreational vehicle parks. The customers complained they were charged more for water service than other businesses, and that this practice discriminated against their recreational park businesses and violated the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. Over the objection of the District, the trial court submitted customers' antitrust claim to a jury who found in favor of the customers. Both the customers and the District appealed the judgment entered on the jury verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act did not apply to rates charged by a rural water district; and (2) a customer's relief to challenge a rate was to seek review by the water district and then to appeal to the district court any adverse decision. View "Sinor's Bay Marina, LLC v. Wagoner County Rural Water Dist. No. 2" on Justia Law

Lubrizol, a chemical manufacturer, produces petroleum wax-based oxidates, used in anti-corrosion products. In 2007, Lubrizol acquired Lockhart’s oxidate business and assets, leaving Lockhart’s Flint, Michigan oxidate production facility partially unused. The purchase agreement “prohibited Lockhart, for a period of five years from the date of the purchase agreement, from directly or indirectly engaging in any business competitive with the assets it sold to Lubrizol.” Lubrizol allegedly later employed the clause to prevent the use or re-lease of the plant to another oxidates manufacturer.” The purchase gave Lubrizol a 98% market share monopoly in the oxidate market. Lubrizol subsequently increased prices by 70%. In 2009, the FTC alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In a consent agreement, Lubrizol promised: to divest the Lockhart oxidates assets to Additives Int'l; to rescind any prohibition or restraint including noncompete agreements, on the sale or use of the Flint plant for the manufacture and sale of products by Additives or others; and to lease the Flint plant to Additives. Z Technologies, a purchaser of oxidates that makes anti-corrosion products for cars, filed suit in 2012, alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and Michigan antitrust laws. The district court dismissed, determining that the claims were time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a continuing-violations argument. Lubrizol’s price increases and alleged implementation of the non-compete clause did not constitute a “new and independent” injury. The court also found a hold-and-use argument inapplicable because the alleged implementation of a non-compete clause was not a “new use” of an “asset.”View "Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp." on Justia Law