Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2, alleging that defendants, a group of five competing electronics firms, have attempted to leverage their ownership of certain key patents to gain control of a new technology standard for USB connectors and, by extension, to gain monopoly power over the entire USB connector industry. The court held that, under principles articulated in a line of recent Supreme Court decisions extending from Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. to Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, the requirements of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. 6a, are substantive and nonjurisdictional in nature. Because Congress has not clearly stated that these requirements are jurisdictional, they go to the merits of the claim rather than the adjudicative power of the court. In so holding, the court overruled the court's prior decision in Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A. The court also concluded that, although the FTAIA's requirements are nonjurisdictional and thus potentially waivable, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that defendants somehow have waived them by contract in this case; foreign anticompetitive conduct can have a statutorily required direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic or import commerce even if the effect does not follow as an immediate consequence of defendant's conduct, so long as there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct and the effect; the court rejected the interpretation of "direct...effect" advanced by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies in favor of the interpretation advocated by amici curiae the United States and the FTC and adopted by the Seventh Circuit in its en banc decision in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.; and the court need not decide, however, whether plaintiff here has plausibly alleged the requisite "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" under the proper standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed on alternative grounds the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's claims. View "Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co." on Justia Law

Two customers of Wagoner County Rural Water District No. 2 contested the rate charged for providing water to their respective recreational vehicle parks. The customers complained they were charged more for water service than other businesses, and that this practice discriminated against their recreational park businesses and violated the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. Over the objection of the District, the trial court submitted customers' antitrust claim to a jury who found in favor of the customers. Both the customers and the District appealed the judgment entered on the jury verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act did not apply to rates charged by a rural water district; and (2) a customer's relief to challenge a rate was to seek review by the water district and then to appeal to the district court any adverse decision. View "Sinor's Bay Marina, LLC v. Wagoner County Rural Water Dist. No. 2" on Justia Law

Lubrizol, a chemical manufacturer, produces petroleum wax-based oxidates, used in anti-corrosion products. In 2007, Lubrizol acquired Lockhart’s oxidate business and assets, leaving Lockhart’s Flint, Michigan oxidate production facility partially unused. The purchase agreement “prohibited Lockhart, for a period of five years from the date of the purchase agreement, from directly or indirectly engaging in any business competitive with the assets it sold to Lubrizol.” Lubrizol allegedly later employed the clause to prevent the use or re-lease of the plant to another oxidates manufacturer.” The purchase gave Lubrizol a 98% market share monopoly in the oxidate market. Lubrizol subsequently increased prices by 70%. In 2009, the FTC alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In a consent agreement, Lubrizol promised: to divest the Lockhart oxidates assets to Additives Int'l; to rescind any prohibition or restraint including noncompete agreements, on the sale or use of the Flint plant for the manufacture and sale of products by Additives or others; and to lease the Flint plant to Additives. Z Technologies, a purchaser of oxidates that makes anti-corrosion products for cars, filed suit in 2012, alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and Michigan antitrust laws. The district court dismissed, determining that the claims were time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a continuing-violations argument. Lubrizol’s price increases and alleged implementation of the non-compete clause did not constitute a “new and independent” injury. The court also found a hold-and-use argument inapplicable because the alleged implementation of a non-compete clause was not a “new use” of an “asset.”View "Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp." on Justia Law

D&G filed suit against wholesalers under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15(a), and moved for class certification. The court concluded that this case presented a factual dispute about the real terms of the wholesalers' agreement and this genuine material factual dispute prevented summary judgment as to whether a per se violation occurred; the court denied summary judgment under the rule of reason where D&G submitted enough evidence to create a genuine factual dispute about the relevant market and the injury caused by the wholesalers' alleged antitrust violation; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification for all SuperValu customers in the Midwest region; the court vacated the denial of D&G's request to certify a narrower class of SuperValu customers who were charged according to the ABS formula and supplied from Champaign, Illinois; and the district court correctly concluded that 15 U.S.C. 15b does not render D&G's claims untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "D&G, Inc. v. SuperValu, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal and state antitrust laws by conspiring to fix the price for SD cards and engaging in improper practices with respect to the licensing of defendants' patents to other manufacturers of SD cards. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26. The court distinguished this case from a recent decision in Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd v. Panasonic Corp. The court concluded that, because plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief under federal law, their federal antitrust claim was subject to the equitable doctrine of laches and not the four-year statute of limitations in section 4B of the Clayton Act. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish that laches was not a bar to plaintiffs' federal antitrust claim. The court also concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' state law claims. On remand, the district court should apply the California Supreme Court's recent decision in Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. in determining whether plaintiffs' Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 16720, claim was timely filed. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oliver v. SD-3C" on Justia Law

UNM, a trade show cleaning company, filed suit against SDC, alleging claims for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and antitrust violations. The court reversed the district court's holding that under California law, SDC could not be held liable for the tort of intentional interference with contractual relationship; reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on that ground; affirmed the district court's holding that it committed instructional error by not interpreting the terms of the contract and that this error constituted prejudicial error that warranted a new trial; affirmed the district court's holding that SDC possessed state action immunity from UNM's antitrust claim; held that the a new trial is warranted on UNM's claim for intentional interference with contractual relationship; and concluded that, under California law, SDC could not be liable for punitive damages because it is a public entity. View "United Nat'l Maint. v. San Diego Convention Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a baseball bat manufacturer, filed an antitrust suit against the NCAA and the NFHS, alleging that they imposed a regulation, the Bat-Ball Coefficient of Restitution Standard (BBCOR), that restrained trade in the market for non-wood baseball bats. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; the only plausible injury asserted was its own and only injuries to the markets were cognizable; and therefore, plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the district court properly dismissed its Sherman Act claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to amend where two prior amendments were granted and allowing a third would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend. View "Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athl. Assn., et al." on Justia Law

In order to renovate a former warehouse building into administrative offices, Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“School Corporation”) implemented a plan to convey the Building to the EVSC Foundation (“Foundation”), a private non-profit entity, have the Foundation contract with a contractor for the renovations, and then have the Foundation sell the Building back to the School Corporation. School Corporation officials selected this arrangement because the Foundation was not subject to public bidding laws, and therefore, the renovation could occur more quickly. Plaintiffs, several area contracting businesses paying taxes in the school district, filed an action against the School Corporation and the Foundation (together, “Defendants”) claiming that Defendants violated public bidding statutes and Indiana’s Antitrust Act. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the School Corporation engaged in the transactions to circumvent the public bidding statutes but that the transactions were not unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the project violated the Public Bidding Laws. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that the scheme used by Defendants violated the Public Bidding Laws; and (2) concluded that Plaintiffs' antitrust claim failed because Plaintiffs did not present evidence of an antitrust injury. View "Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

King Coal Chevrolet Company and Lewis Chevrolet Oldsmobile Cadillac Automotive were two competing Chevrolet dealerships located twelve miles apart. After General Motors Corporation filed for bankruptcy, Lewis closed its Chevrolet operations pursuant to a wind-down agreement with General Motors. General Motors subsequently signed a dealership agreement with Crossroads Chevrolet, which was located ten miles from King Coal. King Coal demanded that General Motors provide it with written notice, as required by W. Va. Code 17A-6A-12(2), of General Motors’ intent to “establish an additional dealer” so that it could exercise its statutory rights and protect its interests under the West Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealers, Distributors, Wholesalers and Manufacturers Act. General Motors asserted that it was exempt from providing notice to King Coal by the safe harbor provision contained in section 17A-6A-12(4) because it was re-establishing a new motor vehicle dealership that had closed within the preceding two years. The federal district court submitted a certified question to the Supreme Court, which answered by holding that the circumstances in this case permitted General Motors to avail itself of the safe harbor contained in section 17A-6A-12(4). View "King Coal Chevrolet Co. v. Gen. Motors LLC " on Justia Law

Lucas County has about 440,000 residents and includes Toledo. Two-thirds of the county’s patients have government-provided health insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid; 29 percent have private insurance, which pays significantly higher rates to hospitals than government-provided insurance. General acute-care (GAC) inpatient services include “primary services,” such as hernia surgeries, radiology services, and most inpatient obstetrical (OB) services. “Secondary services,” such as hip replacements and bariatric surgery, require more specialized resources. “Tertiary services,” such as brain surgery and treatments for severe burns, require even more specialized resources. “Quaternary services,” such as major organ transplants, require the most specialized resources. Different hospitals offer different levels of service. In Lucas County ProMedica has 46.8% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals, which together provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. Mercy Health Partners has 28.7% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals in the county, which provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. University of Toledo Medical Center (UTMC) has 13% of the GAC market with a single teaching and research hospital, focused on tertiary and quaternary services. It does not offer OB services. St. Luke’s Hospital had 11.5% of the GAC market and offered primary (including OB) and secondary services. In 2010 ProMedica merged with St. Luke’s, creating an entity with 50% of the market in primary and secondary services and 80% of the market for obstetrical services. The FTC challenged the merger under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Commission found that the merger would adversely affect competition and ordered ProMedica to divest St. Luke’s. The Sixth Circuit upheld the order. View "ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law