Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Rapid-prototyping “additive technology” creates parts by building layer upon layer of plastics, metals, or ceramics. Subtractive technology starts with a block and cuts away layers. Additive technology include SL, fused deposition modeling, laser sintering, 3D printing, direct metal laser sintering, and digital light processing. 3DS is the sole U.S. supplier of SL machines, which use an ultraviolet laser to trace a cross section of an object on a vat of liquid polymer resin. The laser solidifies the resin it touches, while untouched, areas remain liquid. After one cross-section has solidified, the newly formed layer is lowered below the surface of the resin. The process is repeated until the object is completed. Users of SL machines often own many machines with varying sizes, speeds, and accuracy levels. 3DS began equipping some of its SL machines with wireless technology that allows a receiver to communicate with a transmitter on the cap of a resin bottle. A software-based lockout feature shuts the machine off upon detection of a resin not approved by 3DD. 3DS has approved two of Desotech’s resins and entered into negotiations for approval of additional resins. After negotiations broke down, Desotech sued, alleging tying, unreasonable restraint of trade, and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act; tying under the Clayton Act; patent infringement; and violations of the Illinois Antitrust and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. The district court granted 3DS summary judgment on the antitrust claims and certain state-law claims. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Samsung filed suit alleging that defendant's SD card licenses were an anti-competitive agreement in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. At issue was the scope of the continuing violation exception to the four-year statute of limitations on private actions to enforce the antitrust laws. The court agreed with Samsung that defendants' committed two overt acts within the limitations period: the adoption of the 2006 license, which extended the license to cover the second-generation SD cards, and the attempt to enforce either license by collecting royalty payments from Samsung. The court held that, even if the 2006 license was merely a restatement of the 2003 license, the application of the licenses to Samsung when it began to make SD cards in the fall of 2006 was also an overt act that restarted the limitations period. Because the harm Samsung challenged in this suit was speculative at the time of the initial wrong, the law of limitations in federal antitrust actions allowed Samsung to file suit once the harm crystallized in 2006. Because the court concluded that the federal antitrust claims were timely, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the state law claims and remanded. Construing the district court's order as an implicit dismissal of the equitable claim, the court vacated that dismissal and remanded for a determination of whether the equitable claim was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the federal antitrust claims and on the supplemental state law claims. View "Samsung Electronics v. Panasonic Corp." on Justia Law

DuPont filed suit against Kolon, alleging the theft and misappropriation of its Kevlar trade secrets (the trade secrets case). Kolon's answer included the instant counterclaim (the antitrust case), alleging that DuPont had illegally monopolized and attempted to monopolize the U.S. para-aramid market through its supply agreements with high-volume para-aramid customers. Para-aramid is a strong, complex synthetic fiber used in body armor, tires, fiber optic cables, and a variety of other industrial products. The court concluded that following United States v. Owens, recusals under 28 U.S.C. 455(b) include a judicially implied timely-filing requirement, and that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied Kolon's recusal motion on timeliness grounds. The court deferred to the district court's considerable discretion in overseeing discovery and will not disturb its discovery rulings. On the merits of Kolon's antitrust suit, Kolon has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact sufficient to sustain either its attempted or actual monopolization claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kolon Indus. Inc. v. E. I. DuPont De Nemour" on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced his residential home mortgage, taking out a loan secured by his home. The mortgage listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the mortgagee of record. MERS subsequently transferred the mortgage. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee for RMAC Pass-Through Trust, eventually obtained the mortgage. After Wells Fargo sold Serra’s property at foreclosure, Serra brought suit in Massachusetts state court asserting, among other claims, claims for wrongful foreclosure and unfair or deceptive business practices based on his theory that MERS lacked the authority to transfer his mortgage. Serra’s suit was removed on the basis of diversity, and summary judgment as to all claims was entered against Serra. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under Massachusetts law, MERS may validly possess and transfer a legal interest in a mortgage; (2) subsequent mortgage assignees cannot incur liability for the allegedly predatory practices of their predecessor-in-interest; and (3) Plaintiff’s argument that his right to rescission was improperly cut short by the sale of his property was without merit. View "Serra v. Quantum Servicing Corp." on Justia Law

United appealed the district court's order denying United's motion to dismiss an antitrust complaint brought against it by DHL. At issue was whether DHL had sufficient notice of the availability of the claim against a Chapter 11 debtor to satisfy due process requirements and render the claim discharged. The court concluded that the district court applied an incorrect standard in accepting as true DHL's allegation that it was not aware of, or with due diligence could not have become aware of, sufficient facts to plead an antitrust claim that would survive a motion to dismiss in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, the court remanded for further development of the facts concerning (a) what DHL knew or reasonably should have known in time to present an antitrust claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, or to file a late proof of claim or move to amend the reorganization plan and (b) what United knew or reasonably should have known concerning DHL's claim. View "DPWN Holdings (USA), Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries buy LCD panels and incorporate them into cellphones. They alleged that foreign LCD panel manufacturers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by fixing prices. Only about one percent of the panels were bought by Motorola in the U.S. The other 99 percent were bought by, paid for, and delivered to foreign subsidiaries; 42 percent of the panels were bought by subsidiaries and incorporated into products that were shipped to Motorola in the U.S. for resale. The other 57 percent were incorporated into products that were sold abroad and never became U.S. domestic commerce, subject to the Sherman Act. The district judge ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding the 42 percent was barred by 15 U.S.C. 6a(1)(A): the Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.” View "Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp." on Justia Law

Batson went to Live Nation’s Chicago box office and purchased a non‐refundable ticket to see a popular band. He later realized that the ticket price included a $9 parking fee for a spot he did not want. Believing that the bundled $9 fee was unfair, he sued on behalf of himself and a proposed class, citing the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(1), and claiming that Live Nation had committed an unfair practice in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The complaint referred to the 2010 merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster (which was not blocked by the Department of Justice). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there are times when consumers must accept a package deal in order to get the part of the package they want. The relevant factors ask whether the practice offends public policy; is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; or causes substantial injury to consumers.View "Batson v. Live Nation, Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Buyers, a married couple from Cuba who were only able to communicate in Spanish, purchased a vehicle from a Dealership. Two of the documents Buyers signed with regard to the purchase contained arbitration clauses, and all of the documents were written in English. Buyers subsequently sued the Dealership for fraud in the inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Dealership moved to dismiss the complaint and/or compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed because the arbitration provisions were not agreed upon by the parties and that the provisions were unenforceable because they were procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate disputes but reversed the order insofar as it declined to enforce the arbitration on the reverse side of the retail installment contract with respect to Buyers’ claims for monetary relief. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District and remanded with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s judgment based on controlling precedent. View "Basulto v. Hialeah Auto." on Justia Law

In 1993, Appellants developed Risperdal, a second-generation, or atypical, antipsychotic medication, which was considered highly beneficial in treating schizophrenia patients. In 2007, the State filed suit against Appellants, alleging that Appellants (1) knowingly made false statements or representations of material fact in their Risperdal label in violation of the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud False Claims Act (“MFFCA”); and (2) violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) by distributing a promotional letter to Arkansas healthcare providers that contained “false, deceptive, or unconscionable statements.” A jury found that Janssen violated the MFFCA and the DTPA by failing to comply with federal labeling requirements and imposed civil penalties totaling $11,422,500. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and dismissed the MFFCA claim, as Appellants were not healthcare facilities or applying for certification as described by the statute; and (2) reversed and remanded the DTPA claim, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting certain hearsay into evidence. View "Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

After Central Trust and Investment Company purchased Springfield Trust & Investment Company (STC), Central Trust filed an action against SignalPoint Asset Management, LLC, a registered investment advisor, for affiliating with STC’s ex-employee, who had acquired STC’s client list and had become an independent advisor representative of SignalPoint. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of SignalPoint on its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business relations, and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Central Trust did not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether SignalPoint “misappropriated” Central Trust’s client list as that term is defined by the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (2) this failure also justified the grant of summary judgment against Central Trust’s claim of tortious interference with business relations; and (3) Central Trust’s civil conspiracy claim was moot. View "Cent. Trust & Inv. Co. v. SignalPoint Asset Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law