Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Raymond Gurrobat, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, filed an action against HTH Corporation and Pacific Beach Corporation (collectively, Defendants), asserting claims of unlawful withholding of wages and unfair methods of competition (UMOC) for Defendants’ alleged failure to distribute the entirety of the service charges they received from customers to service employees and for failing to disclose to customers their practice of retaining a portion of those charges. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gurrabat on the unlawful withholding of wages claim but in favor of Defendants on the UMOC claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s order granting Gurrobat’s motion for class certification; (2) affirmed in large part the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on Gurrobat’s claims for unpaid wages but vacated the portion of the order granting Gurrobat’s motion for summary judgment as to damages that imposed joint and several liability on Defendants; and (3) vacated the circuit court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Gurrobat’s UMOC claim, as Gurrobat alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment on this claim. Remanded. View "Gurrobat v. HTH Corp." on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against defendant for engaging in deceptive internet advertising practices involving the use of a "scareware" scheme that tricked consumers into purchasing computer security software. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's judgment enjoining her from participating in the deceptive practices and holding her jointly and severally liable for equitable monetary consumer redress. The court concluded that the district court had sufficient statutory power to award "complete relief," including monetary consumer redress, which is a form of equitable relief; the court held that one may be found individually liable under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., if she (1) participated directly in the deceptive practices or had authority to control those practices, and (2) had or should have had knowledge of the deceptive practices; the court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges; the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant had authority to control the deceptive acts within the meaning of the Act nor did the district court clearly err in finding that defendant directly participated in the deceptive marketing scheme; and the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant had actual knowledge of the deceptive marketing scheme and/or that she was at the very least recklessly indifferent or intentionally avoided the truth. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "FTC v. Ross" on Justia Law

Arloe Designs, LLC proposed to build a building at an airport. Arkansas Capital Corporation (ACC) and National Bank of Arkansas (NBA) allegedly worked together to procure a loan for the building’s construction. After the NBA approved financing for the project, Arloe entered into a thirty-year lease for the new hangar. Later that month, Arloe learned that NBA would not close the loan without a bond as collateral, which Arloe did not give, and therefore, the loan was not closed. Arloe sued ACC and NBA, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trades Practices Act, negligence, and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants as to all but Arloe’s promissory estoppel claim, and limited damages for that claim to the money Arloe had spent in reliance on the claimed promise. At trial, a jury found Arloe had not proved that either defendant had made a promise to loan Arloe money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Arloe’s claims that the circuit court erred in denying it recovery for lost profit damages and limiting its damages on its promissory-estoppel claim were moot; and (2) summary judgment was proper in regard to the remainder of Arloe’s claims. View "Arloe Designs LLC v. Ark. Capital Corp." on Justia Law

Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc. (Association), filed suit against Defendant, Fairchild Heights, Inc., for negligence and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court found in favor of Defendant on all counts. The Association appealed, arguing that the appellate court erred in concluding that it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before requesting declaratory relief and that it did not have standing to bring an action under CUTPA. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Association had standing to assert a CUPTA claim, as (1) there was no administrative remedy the association could have exhausted to obtain the relief it sought before bringing its CUTPA claim; and (2) the Association did not require the participation of all its individual members to allege ascertainable loss for the purpose of obtaining injunctive and other equitable relief under CUTPA. Remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s CUTPA claim. View "Fairchild Heights Residents Ass’n, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc." on Justia Law

Until 2001 Dean and Suiza competed to process and sell bottled milk to retailers. Suiza was the largest U.S. processor of milk and Dean was the second largest. Both purchased raw milk from other entities. DFA, a dairy farmer cooperative, was Suiza’s primary supplier and business partner. Dean obtained its raw milk predominantly from independent farmers. Dean and Suiza merged in 2001, becoming Dean Foods, hoping to obtain “distribution efficiencies and economies of scale,” for millions of dollars in cost savings. Certain agreements were negotiated, with input from the Department of Justice, which approved the proposed merger, subject to divestment of particular milk processing plants. Retailers of processed milk sued, charging violation of 15 U.S.C. 1, the Sherman Antitrust Act, by conspiring with a raw milk supplier-milk processor and the purchaser of the divested processing facilities to divide markets and restrict output. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dean Foods, finding insufficient proof of injury and failure to establish the relevant antitrust geographic market, primarily because plaintiff’s expert’s testimony was excluded. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the expert should not have been excluded and that the conclusions regarding injury were based on flawed propositions. View "Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Legacy Resources, Inc. brought several claims against Liberty Pioneer Energy Source, Inc. The district court dismissed Legacy's breach of contract and trade secret claims on summary judgment, determining (1) Legacy violated the securities laws by acting as an unlicensed broker in recruiting investors on behalf of Liberty; and (2) Legacy's securities violations rendered its contract unenforceable under Utah Code 61-1-22(8). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the undisputed facts sustained the conclusion that Legacy acted as an unlicensed broker, which violation foreclosed the enforcement of one of its contracts; but (2) another of Legacy's contracts was not implicated by the securities violation, and thus the district court erred by granting summary judgment on Legacy's claim under that contract, along with its trade secret claim. View "Legacy Res., Inc. v. Liberty Pioneer Energy Source, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1983, Appellant, the owner and chief executive officer of an asphalt company, pled guilty to violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for unlawfully bidding on state highway construction contracts. In order to have his company's privilege of bidding on new contracts reinstated, Appellant agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's (AG) investigation and proffered information pertaining to Appellant's involvement in a scheme to "rig" bids for highway construction contracts with the Kentucky Department of Transportation. In 2009, reporters for several newspapers submitted an Open Records Act (ORA) request to have the proffer disclosed. When Appellant learned the AG intended to release the proper, Appellant brought this action against the AG and ORA reporters seeking to have the release enjoined under the privacy exemption or the law enforcement exemption to the ORA. In 2011, the trial court ruled that the proffer should be released to the ORA requestors. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not have standing to invoke the law enforcement exemption provision to the ORA; and (2) matters of sufficient public interest warranted an invasion of Appellant's limited privacy interest in keeping his proffer from being disclosed. View "Lawson v. Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Arlene Easter sold insurance for First Express Services Group, Inc. Arlene subsequently resigned from First Express and began to work for her son, Mark, who was a part owner of a competing agency. After resigning, Arlene took a customer list from First Express and transferred many of First Express' customers to Mark's agency. First Express sued Arlene for breach of contract and Arlene, Mark, and Mark's agency for misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment. After a jury trial, judgment was rendered for First Express on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) modified the judgment against Arlene, finding that Arlene was liable only for the portion of the judgment attributed by the district court to the breach of contract claim; and (2) reversed the judgment against Mark, holding that Mark was not liable for either misappropriation of trade secrets or unjust enrichment. View "First Express Servs. Group, Inc. v. Easter" on Justia Law

Appellant was involved in a car accident with Kent Blough. Appellant's insurer, USAA Casualty Insurance Company, concluded that Appellant was the majority at fault for the accident and refused to honor Appellant's $300,000 UM/UIM coverage. Appellant filed suit against Blough, and in an apparent attempt to prevent Appellant from prevailing, USAA unsuccessfully tried to intervene in the lawsuit. Blough's insurer paid Appellant the limit of Blough's insurance policy. USAA's expert eventually determined that Blough, whom USAA had already paid under Appellant's policy, had been the majority at fault. USAA then tendered to Appellant its $300,000 UM/UIM policy limit. Appellant filed a complaint against USAA for, among other claims, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act and emotional distress as a result of the mishandling of her claim. The district court entered summary judgment for USAA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that Appellant may not pursue a claim based upon USAA's alleged failure to reasonably investigate her claim as required under Mont. Code Ann. 33-13-201(4); and (2) erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of USAA regarding Appellant's claim for damages arising from emotional distress. View " McVey v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a guest passenger in a vehicle insured by Progressive Classic Insurance Company when the vehicle was rear-ended by a truck. Petitioner received medical payments coverage under the Progressive policy for some of the medical expenses she incurred for the treatment of her injuries. Petitioner later successfully sued the truck owner and driver and received damages. Progressive subsequently asserted a subrogation lien on the recovery for the amount it paid under the medical payments coverage. Petitioner filed this complaint against Progressive, alleging common law and statutory bad faith claims. The circuit court dismissed the action, determining that because Petitioner was not a named insured under the Progressive policy and paid no premiums for the policy, Petitioner was a third-party insured and was, therefore, precluded from pursuing her bad faith claims against Progressive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was a first-party insured under the Progressive policy because the policy included within the definition of an insured person "any other person while occupying a covered vehicle"; and (2) therefore, Petitioner may pursue an action against Progressive for common law and statutory bad faith. View "Dorsey v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co." on Justia Law