Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

KME and GTT are competitors in the specialized market for devices that permit emergency vehicles to send a signal that preempts traffic lights and allows the vehicle to pass through an intersection with, rather than against, the light. One system relies on optical signals and one uses GPS signals. GTT’s optical products are called “Opticom.” In 2010, GTT filed a patent infringement suit against KME; KME filed a separate suit against GTT. In 2011, KME twice sued, challenging the New York Department of Transportation’s award of traffic‐preemption contracts to GTT vendors. In 2012 KME sued, alleging that GTT violated antitrust laws by improperly interfering with competitive bidding on public contracts and engaging in monopolistic activity similar to illegal tying, claiming that GTT improperly persuades agencies to specify Opticom technology when drafting public contract requirements and then falsely informs those agencies that Opticom is no longer available and offers to supply a “dual” unit with both optical and GPS technology. The district court dismissed for improper venue, reasoning that GTT did not reside in the district and that none of the events at issue took place there. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after exploring the “surprisingly complex” relation between general principles of personal jurisdiction and venue and the Clayton Act’s special jurisdiction and venue provisions. View "KM Enters. Inc. v. Global Traffic Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

Gorlick sued Allied, a competitor in the auto parts market, alleging that Allied was receiving favorable prices from a manufacturer. The court concluded that Gorlick failed to show that Allied had actual knowledge, trade knowledge or a duty to inquire whether the favorable prices it received might be prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(f). The court also concluded that Gorlick failed to provide a plausible explanation for how the alleged agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor, concerning a product line without market dominance, caused harm to competition in the entire automotive exhaust product market. Even assuming that a vertical agreement existed and that it affected the price of the products at issue, there's no plausible showing of harm to competition in the market for automotive exhaust products as a whole. Therefore, the court concluded that Gorlick's claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Allied. View "Gorlick Distrib. Ctrs. v. Car Sound Exhaust Sys." on Justia Law

In this antitrust case, GSRG challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nucor. The court affirmed, concluding that GSRG's definition of the product market was too restrictive, for it refused to acknowledge that pickled and oiled steel manufacturers could enter the fray in order to enrich themselves on the inflated prices of black hot rolled coil steel. That would, in turn, increase the supply, and lower the price, of black hot rolled coil steel. It would also sap Nucor's potential monopoly over power. GSRG ignored this "actual or potential" economic construct, and its failure to account for cross-elasticity of supply was fatal to the attempted monopolization claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. View "Gulf States Reorganization Group, Inc. v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against polystyrene food service packaging manufacturers and two trade associations, claiming that Defendants refused in concert to deal with Plaintiff in a recycling business method for polystyrene food service products. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Massachusetts Fair Business Practices Act (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A). The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and entered judgment in their favor, finding that, as in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, there were legitimate business reasons that could explain Defendants' refusal to deal with Plaintiff or to compete with each other for market share. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to adequately plead its Sherman Act claim; and (2) because the district court summarily dismissed Plaintiff's chapter 93 claim because it failed for the same reasons that its Sherman Act claim failed, the issue needed to be reconsidered. View "Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Pactiv Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a company that sold aviation fuel at a Puerto Rico airport. Plaintiff filed this action Defendants, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA), Airport Aviation Services (AAS), and employees of those entities, claiming that Defendants wrongfully interfered with its business. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that a corrupt relationship existed between AAS and PRPA and that Defendants took improper actions in order to drive Plaintiff out of business. Before trial, the district court dismissed the claims against some defendants and, after a bench trial, granted judgment for the remaining defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not indicate a sufficiently clear intent to appeal the judgments dismissing the PRPA defendants from the case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding no conspiracy on the part of AAS and its employees to restrain trade, and the court correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to proffer evidence to prove Defendants' actions were unreasonable or anticompetitive. View "Diaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport Aviation Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Board petitioned for review of the FTC order finding that it violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, by engaging in unfair competition in the market for teeth-whitening services in North Carolina. The court concluded that the Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine; the Board engaged in a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; and substantial evidence supported the FTC's factual findings regarding the economic effects of the Board's actions and that those findings supported the conclusion that the Board's behavior violated section 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "The NC State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law

Decedent hired David Poirot as an associate in his law office. After Decedent died, Poirot left Decedent's law office to open his open practice. Poirot and Gordon Johnson (collectively, Defendants) subsequently litigated two traumatic brain injury cases that had originated in Decedent's law office. Plaintiff, Decedent's wife, filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff failed to identify any evidence of damages resulting from her claimed CUTPA violations. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff's failure to produce an itemization of her claimed damages was fatal to her CUTPA claims. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) a litigant need not produce "an itemization" of her claimed CUTPA damages in order to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment; but (2) the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff had failed to identify any evidence of ascertainable loss. View "Marinos v. Poirot" on Justia Law

The CEO and sole shareholder of Zee decided to expand his chemical sales business into the water treatment industry and hired employees who were currently working or had previously worked in the industry. Four employees came from GE and were bound by non-compete agreements. GE sued Zee and its former employees in North Carolina state court for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and unfair trade practices. The state court found the agreements enforceable and held Zee and the employees jointly and severally liable for $288,297.00 in compensatory damages as a result of unfair and deceptive trade practices and for $5,769,903.10 in attorney fees, $864,891.00 in punitive damages, and $257,931.44 in costs. GE discovered that Zee had tied up virtually all of its assets in a credit facility agreement with BMO Harris Bank before entry of judgment; registered the judgment in Illinois, Harris’s principal place of business; and served Harris with a citation to discover Zee’s assets. GE objected to removal to federal court, but the district court dismissed GE’s case entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that GE raised a timely and sound objection to removal under the forum-defendant rule, and the district court should have remanded the case. View "GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against a check advance company, asserting claims based on numerous Florida statutes. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to add Tiffany Kelly as an additional plaintiff and named class member. Because Kelly had signed the version of Defendant's arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver, this case focused on her contracts with Defendant. The trial court eventually denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it was void as against public policy. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that no other reasonable avenue for relief would be available if it enforced the class action waiver. After the court of appeal decided this case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. Applying the rationale of Concepcion to the facts set forth in this case, the Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted invalidating the class action waiver in this case on the basis of the waiver being void as against public policy. View "McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts" on Justia Law