Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

In a class action, any settlement must be approved by the court to ensure that class counsel and the named plaintiffs do not place their own interests above those of the absent class members. In this false advertising case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a class action settlement, negotiated prior to class certification, that included cy pres distributions of money and food to unidentified charities. The settlement also included $2 million in attorneys' fees, the equivalent of a $2,100 hourly rate, while offering class members a sum of $15. The Court set aside the class settlement, holding (1) the district court did not apply the correct legal standards governing cy pres distributions and thus abused its discretion in approving the settlement; and (2) the settlement failed because the negotiated attorneys' fees were excessive. Remanded. View "Dennis v. Berg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were automated teller machine (ATM) cardholders, who alleged horizontal price fixing of fees charged to the ATM owners by the banks when cardholders retrieve cash from an ATM not owned by their bank. Plaintiffs did not directly pay the allegedly fixed fee. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit for lack of antitrust standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as indirect purchasers, Supreme Court precedent established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois prohibited Plaintiffs from bringing this suit; (2) Plaintiffs did not qualify for the narrow exception to the Illinois Brick rule; and (3) Plaintiffs did not have standing under the Clayton Act to proceed with their Sherman Act suit. View "Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. " on Justia Law

Most of the world's reserves of potash, a mineral used primarily in fertilizer, are in Canada, Russia, and Belarus. Defendants are producers with mines in those countries. Plaintiffs are direct and indirect potash purchasers in the U.S. They allege that producers operated a cartel through which they fixed prices in Brazil, China, and India, and that inflated prices in those markets influenced the price of potash in the U.S. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The world market for potash is highly concentrated and U.S. customers account for a high percentage of sales. This is not a “House-that-Jack-Built situation in which action in a foreign country filters through many layers and finally causes a few ripples” in the U.S. Foreign sellers allegedly created a cartel, took steps outside the U.S. to drive the price up of a product that is wanted in the U.S., and, after succeeding, sold that product to U.S. customers. The payment of overcharges by those customers was objectively foreseeable, and the amount of commerce is substantial. View "Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were high school football players that earned scholarships to play for National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I football programs. Both suffered career-ending football injuries at college. Their athletic scholarships were good for one year. When injuries prevented them from playing football, their scholarships were not renewed. Plaintiffs challenge two NCAA regulations as having an anticompetitive effect, in violation of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. 1: the cap on the number of scholarships given per team and the prohibition of multi-year scholarships. The district court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to allege a relevant commercial market on which NCAA Bylaws had an anticompetitive effect. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was not clear whether plaintiffs believed that the Bylaws affect an overall market for degrees, which would impact scholarship athletes and non-athletes alike, or some market that only concerns athletes attempting to obtain education in exchange for athletic services. Plaintiffs claimed that they alleged that there was no practical alternative for students wishing to pursue an education in exchange for playing ability, but the complaint explained the lack of practical alternatives for colleges wanting to field teams outside of the NCAA framework, not the lack of alternatives for student-athletes. View "Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n" on Justia Law

Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act. Title insurers in Delaware are required to file their insurance rates with the state Department of Insurance, Del. Code tit. 18, 2504(a). Insurers may comply with the state’s rate filing requirements through a licensed rating organization. Defendants, title insurers, are members of and file their rates through the Delaware Title Insurance Rating Bureau, which is licensed by the DOI; the statutory scheme authorizes cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "McCray v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act. In New Jersey, the Department of Banking and Insurance approves and regulates title insurance rates, N.J. Stat. Ann. 17:1C-19(a)(1). Insurers may collectively file rates for approval through a licensed rating organization, thereby authorizing cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal and state antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Swick v. Censtar Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ohio individuals and businesses sued Duke Energy, alleging violation of the Robinson-Patman Act , 15 U.S.C. 13, Ohio's Pattern of Corrupt Activity Act, a civil RICO claim, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and common-law claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs alleged that Duke, through subsidiaries and an affiliated company, paid unlawful and substantial rebates to certain large customers, including General Motors, in exchange for the withdrawal by said customers of objections to a rate-stabilization plan that Duke was attempting to have approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio as part of a transition to market-based pricing under Ohio Rev. Code 4928.05, enacted in 1999. The district court dismissed, finding that it was deprived of federal question jurisdiction by the filed-rate doctrine, requiring that common carriers and their customers adhere to tariffs filed and approved by the appropriate regulatory agencies, and that PUCO had exclusive jurisdiction over state-law claims, depriving the court of diversity jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the filed-rate doctrine applies only in challenges to the underlying reasonableness or setting of filed rates and that plaintiffs adequately stated claims. View "Williams v. Duke Energy Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

When Sears, Roebuck & Co. merged with Kmart in 2005, the company formed as the parent (Sears) inherited directors from both. Crowley also serves on the boards of AutoNation and AutoZone; Reese is also on the board of Jones Apparel. In a derivative action, Sears shareholders claimed that the consolidated business competes with those other firms and that the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 19 (section 8), forbids the interlocking directorships. Delaware usually allows investors to sue derivatively only if, after a demand for action, the board cannot make a disinterested decision. The investors filed suit without first making a demand. The district court refused to dismiss, accepting an assertion that a demand would have been futile and agreeing that section 8 can be enforced through derivative litigation, even though cooperation with a competitor should benefit the investors. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the suit "serves no goal other than to move money from the corporate treasury to the attorneys' coffers," while depriving Sears of directors, freely elected and of benefit to the company. Usually serving on multiple boards demonstrates breadth of experience, which promotes competent and profitable management. The Antitrust Division and the FTC do not see a problem. View "Frank v. Robert F. Booth Trust" on Justia Law

In these parallel cases, separate petitions were filed requesting the district court to set a "reasonable" rate after ASCAP and BMI were unable to agree on licensing fees with DMX, a provider of background/foreground music. In both cases, the district court adopted DMX's proposals. The court held the Second Amended Final Judgment (AFJ2) permitted blanket licenses subject to carve-outs to account for direct licensing and the court rejected ASCAP's claim that a blanket license with an adjustable carve-out conflicted with the AJF2. The court concluded that the district court in both cases found that ASCAP and BMI did not sustain their burdens of proving that their proposals were reasonable; no legal error contributed to these findings and the findings supported by the record were not clearly erroneous; and in both instances, the district court had the authority to set a reasonable rate for DMX's licenses. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in setting DMX's licensing rates with ASCAP and BMI and that the rates set by the district court were reasonable. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc.; American Society of Computers, Authors and Publishers v. THP Capstar Acquisition Corp." on Justia Law

Hexcel sued BP Amoco on November 26, 2008 for antitrust injuries it allegedly suffered as a result of a carbon fiber price-fixing scheme, beginning in 1992. To avoid the effect of the applicable four-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. 15b, Hexcel contended that the statute of limitations was tolled due to fraudulent concealment by BP Amoco. The court held, however, that based upon the overwhelming evidence of Hexcel's knowledge in the record, the court held that Hexcel's claims were time-barred and affirmed the judgment. View "Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc." on Justia Law