Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

In 2000, mushroom farmers and related entities formed a cooperative (EMMC) and established minimum pricing policies and programs to improve their market position. EMMC purchased properties and resold them with deed restrictions that prohibited mushroom farming. The Department of Justice invesigated and concluded that EMMC was an agricultural cooperative organized pursuant to the Capper- Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. 291-92. In 2005, EMMC and DOJ entered into a consent judgment that required EMMC to nullify deed restrictions and prohibited it from imposing restrictions for 10 years. Soon after the consent judgment, private parties brought suits, alleging conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. 1, 2, 18). Unlike the DOJ action, the consolidated class action involved both the property purchase program and minimum pricing policies. The district court held that EMMC was not a proper agricultural cooperative under the Act because one member was not technically a grower of agricultural produce and that the uncontested facts revealed an impermissible price-fixing conspiracy with a non-member mushroom distribution company. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the question on interlocutory appeal. View "In Re: Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Washington State Department of Health (Department) would not license Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital (Memorial) to perform certain procedures known as elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) where, according to the Department, the community Memorial served did not need another PCI provider. The district court held that Memorial failed to state a claim of antitrust preemption, holding that the PCI regulations were a unilateral restraint on trade not barred by the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. With regard to Memorial's claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, the district court found Memorial had standing because it alleged it would participate in an interstate market for PCI patients, doctors, and supplies. Nevertheless, the district court found that any burden on Memorial's interstate commercial activity was expressly authorized by Congress' approval of certificate of need regimes, making a dormant Commerce Clause violation impossible. The court agreed that Memorial failed to state a claim of antitrust preemption because the PCI regulations were a unilateral licensing requirement rather than an agreement in restraint of trade. The court also agreed that Memorial had standing under the dormant Commerce Clause, but reversed the district court's judgment on that claim because the Department failed to prove congressional authorization for the PCI regulations. View "Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. v. WA Dept. of Health, et al." on Justia Law

The FTC sued Lundbeck, Inc., alleging that its acquisition of the drug NeoProfen violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12-27, the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, and unjustly enriched Lundbeck. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that the FTC failed to identify a relevant market where the FTC did not meet its burden of proving that the drugs Indocin IV and Neoprofen were in the same product market. The court held that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the judgment. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Lundbeck, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of New York sued defendants under federal and New York State antitrust laws, seeking to prevent the companies from merging. The city appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing the city's complaint without leave to amend. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged relevant market definition, as the "low-cost municipal health benefits market[,]" was legally deficient and concluded that the district court's denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court. View "City of New York v. Group Health Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, domestic purchasers of magnesite, alleged that defendants, Chinese exporters, engaged in a conspiracy to fix the price of magnesite in violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, 16, predicated on alleged violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The district court dismissed, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a. The Third Circuit vacated. FTAIA states that the Sherman Act "shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations" with two exceptions. The Sherman Act does apply if defendants were involved in "import trade or import commerce" or if defendants' "conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce, import commerce, or certain export commerce and that conduct "gives rise" to a Sherman Act claim. FTAIA imposes a substantive merits limitation, not a jurisdictional bar. On remand, if the court addresses the "import trade" exception, it must assess whether plaintiffs adequately allege that defendants' conduct is directed at a U.S. import market and not solely whether defendants physically imported goods. If the court assesses the "effects exception" it must determine whether the alleged domestic effect would have been evident to a reasonable person making practical business judgments. View "Animal Science Prods. Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp." on Justia Law

FICO brought suit against three credit bureaus: Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union, as well as against VantageScore, the credit bureaus' joint venture. The suit alleged antitrust, trademark infringement, false-advertising, and other claims. FICO, Experian, and VantageScore appealed from the district court's judgment. The court held that FICO failed to demonstrate that it had suffered any antitrust injury that would entitle it to seek damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12-27, and FICO failed to demonstrate the threat of an immediate injury that might support injunctive relief under section 16. The court also held that there was no genuine issue of material fact that consumers in this market immediately understood "300-850" to describe the qualities and characteristics of FICO's credit score and therefore, the district court did not err in finding the mark to be merely descriptive. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) relied on FICO's false representation in deciding whether to issue the "300-850" trademark registration. The court agreed with the district court that VantageScore was not a licensee and therefore was not estopped from challenging the mark under either theory of agency or equity. The court finally held that FICO's false advertising claims were properly dismissed and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for attorneys' fees. View "Fair Isaac Corp., et al. v. Experian Information Solutions, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that Citigroup, along with various rating agencies, airlines, and municipalities, conspired to block the use of her finance structure to issue Airline Special Facility bonds. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint and from the district court's order denying her postjudgment motion for reargument and reconsideration of the dismissal and for leave to replead. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by, inter alia, dismissing the complaint without granting leave to replead, denying the postjudgment motion, and exercising supplemental jurisdiction to deny the remaining state law claims. The court held that the district court, in denying the postjudgment motions, applied a standard that overemphasized considerations of finality at the expense of the liberal amendment policy embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying the postjudgment motion and so much of the judgment as retained supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. CitiGroup, Inc." on Justia Law

Two multi-national distilleries have engaged in a lengthy dispute over the use of the words "Havana Club" to sell rum in the United States. Most recently the district held that defendant's use of the words on its label is not a false advertisement of the rum’s geographic origin under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B). The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that no reasonable interpretation of the label as a whole, which includes a statement that it is "distilled and crafted in Puerto Rico," could lead a reasonable consumer to a false or misleading conclusion. The court declined to address whether the term is subject to trademark protection. View "Pernod Ricard USA LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a natural gas supplier, and defendants, a natural gas distributor and its executive, had a written contract. The relationship unraveled in the face of a failed acquisition, several million dollars' worth of unpaid invoices, and frequent disputes over pricing, inflamed by allegations that natural gas suppliers were manipulating the indices on which natural gas price quotes are based. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment and ultimately issued a Rule 54(b) judgment on contract and guaranty claims and rejecting counterclaims. The court awarded $8,929,449 in pre-judgment interest on top of its damages of $13,693,943. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning exclusion of an affidavit submitted by defendant, the alleged existence of additional oral contracts, an implied agreement to waive interest, and the sufficiency of evidence. Without something linking defendant's downfall to plaintiff's divulgence or inappropriate use of information in violation of the confidentiality agreement, there was no issue warranting trial on that claim. There was insufficient evidence of price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a). View "Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multiut Corp." on Justia Law

The City of Newkirk and Kay Electric Cooperative both provide electricity to Oklahoma consumers. "When a city acts as a market participant it generally has to play by the same rules as everyone else. It can't abuse its monopoly power or conspire to suppress competition. Except sometimes it can. If the city can show that its parent state authorized it to upend normal competition [. . . ] the city enjoys immunity from federal antitrust liability. The problem for the City of Newkirk in this case is that the state has done no such thing." Kay sued Newkirk alleging that the City engaged in unlawful tying and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2. The district court refused to allow the case to proceed, granting Newkirk's motion to dismiss after it found the City "immune" from liability as a matter of law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the state did not authorize Newkirk to enter the local electricity market as it did in this case. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kay Electric Cooperative v. City of Newkirk" on Justia Law