Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Antitrust & Trade Regulation
by
Most of the world's reserves of potash, a mineral used primarily in fertilizer, are in Canada, Russia, and Belarus. Defendants are producers with mines in those countries. Plaintiffs are direct and indirect potash purchasers in the U.S. They allege that producers operated a cartel through which they fixed prices in Brazil, China, and India, and that inflated prices in those markets influenced the price of potash in the U.S. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The FTAIA limits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act to foreign anticompetitive conduct that either involves U.S. import commerce or has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. import or domestic commerce. Whether it blocks jurisdiction or establishes an element of a Sherman Act claim, the FTAIA bars this suit. The complaint alleged little of substance concerning the relationship between the alleged overseas anticompetitive conduct and the American domestic market. View "Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc." on Justia Law

by
Trailer Bridge appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Illinois National on Trailer Bridge's complaint, alleging that Illinois National failed to defend Trailer Bridge in an underlying antitrust action and thereby breached its commercial general liability insurance policy issued to Trailer Bridge for the year July 2004 to July 2005. The central issue on appeal was whether the CEO's statement triggered the duty to defend under the "personal and advertising injury" provision in the policy. After review and oral argument, the court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Illinois National for the reasons set forth in the district court's order, which the court adopted as its own. In particular, the court agreed with the district court's rejection of Trailer Bridge's argument that the CEO's statement deployed the advertising idea of "another." The court rejected Trailer Bridge's contention that the use of a co-defendant's idea could qualify as an "offense" under the policy. The underlying plaintiffs sought only antitrust damages; they did not seek to impose any legal obligations upon the insured to pay them damages "because of . . . advertising injury." No facts were alleged in the underlying complaint on the basis of which the underlying plaintiffs might have recovered damages "because of . . advertising injury"; and the underlying plaintiffs could not have recovered such damages because the allegedly misappropriated "advertising idea" was not that of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather was alleged to have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether. View "Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff alleged antitrust violations of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12-27, and Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, and violations of Puerto Rico law based on defendants' merger and later activities. Plaintiff has been a competitor with defendant in the ice cream distribution market. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants.The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff was not negatively affected by purported violations, there is no evidence of increased consumer prices or reduced output. The challenged conduct has been in place for at least two years and the remaining market remains robustly competitive as evidenced by ongoing entry, profitability of rivals, and stability of their aggregate market share.View "Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle SA" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, California grape growers who purchased grapevines covered by the USDA's patents, brought this action to challenge the validity and enforceability of the USDA's patents on three varieties of grapes, as well as the conduct of the California Table Grape Commission (Commission) and the USDA in licensing and enforcing the patents. The court held that the district court correctly held that the USDA was a necessary party to plaintiffs' declaratory judgement claims based on the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court also held that the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., was broad enough to allow plaintiffs to pursue equitable relief against the USDA on its patent law claims. The court further held that plaintiffs' claims were sufficient to overcome any presumption of regularity that could apply to a certain USDA employee who was one of the co-inventors of each of the three varieties of grapes. The court finally held that because plaintiffs failed to point to anything other than the issuance of a patent for the Sweet Scarlet grapes that would provide a plausible basis for finding that Sweet Scarlet grapes form a relevant antitrust market, the court upheld the district court's decision dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claim. View "Delano Farms Co., et al. v. The California Table Grape Comm., et al." on Justia Law

by
Comcast‘s share of programming distribution services in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area allegedly grew from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007. Customers alleged violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 & 2, claiming that Comcast eliminated competition, raised entry barriers, maintained increased prices, and deprived subscribers of lower prices that would result from effective competition. Following a 2008 Third Circuit decision, the district court reconsidered its class certification with respect to Rule 23(b)'s predominance requirement. After taking evidence the court held that plaintiffs demonstrated that: questions of law and fact common to class members predominate; the relevant geographic market could be the Philadelphia Designated Market Area; the class could establish antitrust impact on the theory that clustering through swaps and acquisitions deterred overbuilder competition; plaintiffs' expert provided common evidence to measure damages; and the class could establish antitrust impact through common evidence. The court narrowed class-wide impact to a theory that Comcast engaged in anticompetitive clustering that deterred entry of overbuilders. The Third Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs established by a preponderance of evidence that they would be able to prove through common evidence class-wide antitrust impact (higher cost on non-basic cable programming), and a common methodology to quantify damages on a class-wide basis. View "Behrend v. Comcast Corp." on Justia Law

by
In 2000, mushroom farmers and related entities formed a cooperative (EMMC) and established minimum pricing policies and programs to improve their market position. EMMC purchased properties and resold them with deed restrictions that prohibited mushroom farming. The Department of Justice invesigated and concluded that EMMC was an agricultural cooperative organized pursuant to the Capper- Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. 291-92. In 2005, EMMC and DOJ entered into a consent judgment that required EMMC to nullify deed restrictions and prohibited it from imposing restrictions for 10 years. Soon after the consent judgment, private parties brought suits, alleging conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. 1, 2, 18). Unlike the DOJ action, the consolidated class action involved both the property purchase program and minimum pricing policies. The district court held that EMMC was not a proper agricultural cooperative under the Act because one member was not technically a grower of agricultural produce and that the uncontested facts revealed an impermissible price-fixing conspiracy with a non-member mushroom distribution company. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the question on interlocutory appeal. View "In Re: Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

by
This case arose when the Washington State Department of Health (Department) would not license Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital (Memorial) to perform certain procedures known as elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) where, according to the Department, the community Memorial served did not need another PCI provider. The district court held that Memorial failed to state a claim of antitrust preemption, holding that the PCI regulations were a unilateral restraint on trade not barred by the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. With regard to Memorial's claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, the district court found Memorial had standing because it alleged it would participate in an interstate market for PCI patients, doctors, and supplies. Nevertheless, the district court found that any burden on Memorial's interstate commercial activity was expressly authorized by Congress' approval of certificate of need regimes, making a dormant Commerce Clause violation impossible. The court agreed that Memorial failed to state a claim of antitrust preemption because the PCI regulations were a unilateral licensing requirement rather than an agreement in restraint of trade. The court also agreed that Memorial had standing under the dormant Commerce Clause, but reversed the district court's judgment on that claim because the Department failed to prove congressional authorization for the PCI regulations. View "Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. v. WA Dept. of Health, et al." on Justia Law

by
The FTC sued Lundbeck, Inc., alleging that its acquisition of the drug NeoProfen violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12-27, the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, and unjustly enriched Lundbeck. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that the FTC failed to identify a relevant market where the FTC did not meet its burden of proving that the drugs Indocin IV and Neoprofen were in the same product market. The court held that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the judgment. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Lundbeck, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The City of New York sued defendants under federal and New York State antitrust laws, seeking to prevent the companies from merging. The city appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing the city's complaint without leave to amend. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged relevant market definition, as the "low-cost municipal health benefits market[,]" was legally deficient and concluded that the district court's denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court. View "City of New York v. Group Health Inc., et al." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, domestic purchasers of magnesite, alleged that defendants, Chinese exporters, engaged in a conspiracy to fix the price of magnesite in violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, 16, predicated on alleged violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The district court dismissed, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a. The Third Circuit vacated. FTAIA states that the Sherman Act "shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations" with two exceptions. The Sherman Act does apply if defendants were involved in "import trade or import commerce" or if defendants' "conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce, import commerce, or certain export commerce and that conduct "gives rise" to a Sherman Act claim. FTAIA imposes a substantive merits limitation, not a jurisdictional bar. On remand, if the court addresses the "import trade" exception, it must assess whether plaintiffs adequately allege that defendants' conduct is directed at a U.S. import market and not solely whether defendants physically imported goods. If the court assesses the "effects exception" it must determine whether the alleged domestic effect would have been evident to a reasonable person making practical business judgments. View "Animal Science Prods. Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp." on Justia Law