Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Two multi-national distilleries have engaged in a lengthy dispute over the use of the words "Havana Club" to sell rum in the United States. Most recently the district held that defendant's use of the words on its label is not a false advertisement of the rum’s geographic origin under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B). The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that no reasonable interpretation of the label as a whole, which includes a statement that it is "distilled and crafted in Puerto Rico," could lead a reasonable consumer to a false or misleading conclusion. The court declined to address whether the term is subject to trademark protection. View "Pernod Ricard USA LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a natural gas supplier, and defendants, a natural gas distributor and its executive, had a written contract. The relationship unraveled in the face of a failed acquisition, several million dollars' worth of unpaid invoices, and frequent disputes over pricing, inflamed by allegations that natural gas suppliers were manipulating the indices on which natural gas price quotes are based. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment and ultimately issued a Rule 54(b) judgment on contract and guaranty claims and rejecting counterclaims. The court awarded $8,929,449 in pre-judgment interest on top of its damages of $13,693,943. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning exclusion of an affidavit submitted by defendant, the alleged existence of additional oral contracts, an implied agreement to waive interest, and the sufficiency of evidence. Without something linking defendant's downfall to plaintiff's divulgence or inappropriate use of information in violation of the confidentiality agreement, there was no issue warranting trial on that claim. There was insufficient evidence of price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a). View "Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multiut Corp." on Justia Law

The City of Newkirk and Kay Electric Cooperative both provide electricity to Oklahoma consumers. "When a city acts as a market participant it generally has to play by the same rules as everyone else. It can't abuse its monopoly power or conspire to suppress competition. Except sometimes it can. If the city can show that its parent state authorized it to upend normal competition [. . . ] the city enjoys immunity from federal antitrust liability. The problem for the City of Newkirk in this case is that the state has done no such thing." Kay sued Newkirk alleging that the City engaged in unlawful tying and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2. The district court refused to allow the case to proceed, granting Newkirk's motion to dismiss after it found the City "immune" from liability as a matter of law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the state did not authorize Newkirk to enter the local electricity market as it did in this case. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kay Electric Cooperative v. City of Newkirk" on Justia Law

TradeComet brought this action against Google for alleged violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, arising out of TradeComet's use of Google's "AdWords" search engine advertising platform. Google filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue because TradeComet had accepted the terms and conditions associated with participation in its AdWords program, which included a forum selection clause requiring TradeComet to file suit in state or federal court in Santa Clara County, California, not in New York. At issue was whether a district court called upon to enforce a forum selection clause was required to enforce it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) whenever the clause permitted suit in an alternative forum. The court held that a defendant could also seek enforcement of a forum selection clause in these circumstances through a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Therefore, in an accompanying summary order, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of TradeComet's complaint. View "TradeComet.Com LLC v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a Mutual Strike Assistance Agreement (MSAA) that was entered into by defendants (grocers) where the MSAA included a revenue-sharing provision (RSP), providing that in the event of a strike/lockout, any grocer that earned revenues above its historical share relative to the other chains during the strike period would pay 15% of those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their pre-strike shares. At issue was whether the MSAA was exempt from the antitrust laws under the non-statutory labor exemption, and if not, whether the MSAA should be condemned as a per se violation of the antitrust laws or on a truncated "quick look," or whether more detailed scrutiny was required. The court held that the MSAA between the grocers to share revenues for the duration of the strike period was not exempt from scrutiny under antitrust laws and that more than a "quick look" was required to ascertain its impact on competition in the Southern California grocery market. Given the limited judicial experience with revenue sharing for several months pending a labor dispute, the court could not say that the restraint's anti-competitive effects were "obvious" under a per se or "quick look" approach. Although the court concluded that summary condemnation was improper, the court expressed no opinion on the legality of the arrangement under the rule of reason. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State, ex rel. v. Safeway, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff, a carpet dealer, settled state law claims against a competing dealer and a manufacturer, alleging slander and refusal to deal arising from a 1998 agreement between the defendants. The federal district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, based on continuing refusal to deal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff adequately alleged an ongoing conspiracy to restrain trade and that the defendants acted on their agreement after the settlement. Although the lawsuit was a plausible alternative reason for refusal to deal, conspiracies are presumed to be ongoing and the allegation was sufficient for the pleadings stage. The 2007 settlement did not bar the claims because it did not effectuate a withdrawal from the conspiracy. The defendants took no actions inconsistent with a continuing conspiracy. View "Watson Carpet & Floor Covering v. Mohawk Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a), prohibition on selling the same product to different buyers at different prices, by a manufacturer of mowing equipment and a distributor/retailer of that equipment. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, courts may no longer accept conclusory allegations that do not include specific facts necessary to establish the cause of action. The new "plausibility" standard is particularly difficult for the plaintiff in this case, because only the defendants have access to the pricing information necessary to show discriminatory pricing, but the plaintiff may not use discovery to obtain those facts. The plaintiff did not have sufficient facts to establish the manufacturer's control of the distributor to proceed under the "indirect purchaser" doctrine. View "New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc." on Justia Law

The hospital filed the proposed class action, alleging that the pharmaceutical company violate antitrust "tying" prohibitions by using its knowledge of insurance reimbursement rates to leverage its market power in one market—White Blood Cell Growth Factor drugs—to impair competition in the market for Red Blood Cell Growth Factor drugs (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 14, 15). The district court dismissed on the ground that the hospital was not a "direct purchaser." The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The mechanics of the hospital's contracts for acquiring the drugs show it to be an indirect purchaser that placed orders and received the drugs through a middleman, despite some direct communications between the manufacturer and the hospital and a rebate program between the two. The court rejected the hospital's claim that it should be granted standing as the first party in the distribution chain to suffer injury from the anti-competitive conduct. View "Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of retail cable and satellite television subscribers, brought suit against television programmers and distributors alleging that programmers' practice of selling multi-channel cable packages violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. At issue was whether the district court properly granted programmers' and distributors' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' third amended complaint with prejudice because plaintiffs failed to allege any cognizable injury to competition. The court held that the complaint's allegations of reduced choice increased prices addressed only the element of antitrust injury, but not whether plaintiffs have satisfied the pleading standard for an actual violation. Therefore, absent any allegations of an injury to competition, the court held that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brantley, et al. v. NBC Universal, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The hospital opposed a proposed medical office building by lobbying public officials, conducting a public relations campaign, offering incentives to discourage prospective tenants, and making negative statements about the developer. Prospective tenants withdrew from conditional agreements and approvals were denied. The developer sued, alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, under which efforts to petition government are shielded from liability, and rejecting a claim of "sham." Even if the hospital made material misrepresentations during and relating to village board proceedings, which were legislative in nature, those misrepresentations are legally irrelevant because those meetings were inherently political in nature. The public relations campaign was inextricably intertwined with efforts before the board. The hospitalâs contacts with other healthcare providers constituted mere speech that is not actionable under the Sherman Act. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the record that the successful effort to convince physicians not to relocate their practices constituted predatory conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws.