Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

The State brought a civil action against Pharmacia Corporation, alleging that the company reported inflated drug prices to Wisconsin Medicaid. A jury found Pharmacia liable for violating the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and the Medicaid fraud statute. The jury awarded the State $2 million for the DTPA claim and $7 million for the Medicaid fraud claim. The jury also determined that Pharmacia committed 1,440,000 separate violations of the Medicaid fraud statute. In post-trial proceedings, the circuit court reduced the number of violations to 4,578. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals certified three issues to the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the issues and remanded to the court of appeals, holding (1) the State was entitled to a jury trial on its Medicaid fraud claim; (2) the jury did not impermissibly speculate in determining the damage award; and (3) the circuit court properly reduced the number of violations found by the jury.View "State v. Abbott Labs." on Justia Law

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded.View "Goff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Perot Systems Government Services filed an amended complaint against Defendants, 21st Century Systems, Inc, and several individuals, alleging that Defendants, all of whom were former Perot employees, conspired for the purpose of willfully and maliciously attempting to destroy Perot and steal away Perot business by unfairly and improperly using Perot's confidential and proprietary information. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perot on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense motions to strike testimony regarding lost goodwill damages, and accordingly, the court erred when it refused to set aside the jury's award of lost goodwill damages based upon that testimony; (2) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of both punitive and treble damages in favor of Perot; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of computer forensics damages.View "21st Century Sys. v. Perot Sys. Gov't Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Jack Boyajian, a licensed attorney, was engaged by clients seeking recovery of debts from individuals. The State brought a consumer-protection complaint against Boyajian and his two law offices asserting violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA). The circuit court entered summary judgment finding violations of the ADTPA, assessed a civil penalty, and enjoined Defendants from conducting business in Arkansas until the civil penalty was paid. Boyajian appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the ADTPA is inapplicable to an attorney collecting on debts in the course of the practice of law; and (2) because Boyajian was engaged in the practice of law at the time of the alleged acts, the ADTPA was not applicable.View "Boyajian v. State" on Justia Law

Named plaintiff Sue O'Brien and a class of similarly situated consumers (O'Brien) sued the maker of Brighton handbags, other accessories, and luggage, defendant Leegin Creative Leather Products (Brighton), alleging violations of the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act. O'Brien contended that Brighton's practices as a wholesale supplier and retailer constituted illegal price-fixing, entitling her and other class members to recovery. The district judge granted Brighton's motion for summary judgment and motion for partial summary judgment in part. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding, inter alia, (1) the district judge erred in his demand for proof of a "concrete injury," which required reversal of summary judgment; (2) Brighton was not entitled to summary judgment under a "rule of reason," which is not applied in a price-fixing action brought under the relevant statutes; (3) the district judge erred in ruling that the claims of the plaintiff class did not involve horizontal price-fixing; and (4) the district judge correctly determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained for trial on the issue of whether there was an unlawful combination or arrangement between Brighton and its retailers who had no express agreements as Heart Stores or luggage sellers.View "O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

After allowing discovery on the issue of whether Kansas courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants in this case, the district court granted defendant Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp.'s (TIC) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. At issue on interlocutory appeal was the correct standard for judging a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when that motion is decided after discovery but without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) plaintiff Aeroflex Wichita, as the party with the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction and as the party responding to a motion to dismiss presented to the court without an evidentiary hearing, need only establish a prima facie basis for jurisdiction; (2) in determining if that prima facie burden has been met, a district court should view factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and an appellate court applies the same standard de novo; and (3) in this case, the district court erred erred by weighing the evidence rather than granting all favorable inferences to Aeroflex, and Aeroflex presented a prima facie case of jurisdiction based on a conspiracy between TIC and its codefendants, over whom the court had jurisdiction.View "Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo" on Justia Law

Corey McMillan, individually and on behalf of a purported class, filed a complaint against Live Nation Entertainment and Ticketmaster (collectively Ticketmaster), alleging that Ticketmaster charged fees in excess of the printed ticket price to musical or entertainment events in Arkansas and asserting that the additional charges violated Ark. Code Ann. 5-63-201(a)(1)(B), which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation, firm, or partnership to offer for sale any ticket to any music entertainment event at a greater price than that printed on the ticket or the advertised price of the ticket. The Arkansas Supreme Court accepted certification from the U.S. district court to answer a question of Arkansas law and held that section 5-63-201 by its plain and unambiguous language applies to a person, corporation, firm, or partnership and does not exclude exclusive ticket agents of public facilities who sell music entertainment tickets that include in the price of the ticket additional fees, resulting in the price of the ticket being more than the face value and advertised price of the ticket.View "McMillan v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Central Oklahoma Pipeline successfully bid for the construction of a natural gas pipeline. Appellant subsequently sued the companies that engaged it (the Hawk defendants), and an engineering company (CTS), asserting (1) against the Hawk defendants, claims for breach of contract and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA); and (2) against CTS, negligence or failing to give notice of its requirement to inform Appellant of the necessity of having a contractor's license. Appellant then filed an amended complaint adding Lee Hallmark and several John Does as defendants, contending that they were employees of the Hawk defendants and that their negligence was imputed to the Hawk defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 17-25-103(d) barred Appellant's claims for breach of contract and a violation of the ADTPA; (2) determining that section 17-25-103(d) was constitutional; and (3) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 17-25-313 does not impose a tort duty on engineers who fail to inform prospective bidders that they must have a contractor's license.View "Cent. Okla. Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

This action arose from practices employed in connection with the handling of claims made under retrocessional reinsurance treaties providing what was known as "non-life" coverage. At issue was the sufficiency and extra-territorial reach of plaintiff's claim under New York State's antitrust statute (Donnelly Act), General Business Law 340 et seq. Plaintiff, a New York branch of a German reinsurance corporation, sued defendants, English based entities engaged in the business of providing retrocessionary reinsurance. The Appellate Division found that the complaint adequately pled a worldwide market. And, while acknowledging that the crucial allegations contained in paragraph 36 of the amended pleading did not separately allege market power, the allegations read together and liberally construed were adequate to that purpose. The Appellate Division granted plaintiff leave to appeal, certifying to the court the question of whether its order reversing the order of Supreme Court was properly made. The court answered in the negative and reversed. Even if the pleading deficiency at issue could be cured and the court perceived no reason to suppose that the formidable hurdle of alleging market power could be surmounted by plaintiff there would remain as an immovable obstacle to the action's maintenance, the circumstance that the Donnelly Act could not be understood to extend to the foreign conspiracy plaintiff purported to described.View "Global Reins. Corp.-U.S. Branch v Equitas Ltd." on Justia Law

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm.View "Discover Bank v. Morgan " on Justia Law