Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

The State filed an antitrust enforcement action against four MaineHealth entities based on the proposed acquisition by MaineHealth of two major cardiology practices. The matter was transferred to the business and consumer docket. Central Maine Medical Center (CMMC) moved to intervene in the proceeding, arguing that it had an interest in the case as a principal competitor in cardiovascular surgery of one of MaineHealth's hospitals. The lower court denied CMMC's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of CMMC's motion, holding (1) because CMMC made no evidentiary showing of bad faith, collusion, or other malfeasance on the part of the government, and did not demonstrate that the disposition of the antitrust action would impair its ability to protect its interests through independent litigation, intervention of right was properly denied; and (2) the lower court did not err in denying permissive intervention after determining that joining the private cause of action to the State's enforcement claim would unduly burden the proceedings and supplying an alternative method for CMMC to participate in the action by providing oral comments and written submissions to the court.View "State v. MaineHealth" on Justia Law

The case involved a manufacturer of conveyor pizza ovens, Wolfe Electric, its former employee, Terry Duckworth, and the competing business Duckworth helped form, Global Cooking Systems. Wolfe Electric brought suit against Duckworth and Global Cooking for misappropriation of secrets under the Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Wolfe Electric also separately alleged Duckworth breached his fiduciary duty and his employment contract while Global allegedly tortiously interfered with Duckworth's employment contract. A jury found for Wolfe Electric on all causes of action and awarded damages in a variety of categories. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple erroneous jury instructions and a verdict that failed to specify which of the innumerable acts alleged actually caused which of the particular damages awarded required reversal. Remanded.View "Wolfe Elec., Inc. v. Duckworth" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case issued health care insurance policies to provide coverage for medical services and entered into contracts with practitioners of the healing arts to provide those services. Plaintiffs, three individual podiatrists and the Connecticut Podiatric Medical Association, brought an action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's practice of reimbursing individual podiatrists at a lower rate than medical doctors for the same service constituted unfair discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUIPA, by prohibiting unfair discrimination, bars the denial of reimbursement on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts, but does not preclude setting different reimbursement rates on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts. View "Conn. Podiatric Med. Ass'n v. Health Net of Conn., Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, American Diamond Exchange, brought an action against Defendant, Jurgita Karobikaite, and her husband, Scott Alpert, after Alpert, who was working as an estate buyer for Plaintiff, diverted Plaintiff's customers so that he could personally purchase their jewelry. Defendant shared in the profits. A judgment of default was entered against Alpert. The court found Defendant liable for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy and civil conspiracy and awarded Plaintiff $118,000 in damages. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to damages and remanded for a recalculation of damages based on the existing record. On remand, the trial court awarded $103,355 in damages to Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which its lost profits could be determined with reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to raise it in her direct appeal or because the appellate court decided the claim against her in the first appeal; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support an award of damages.View "Am. Diamond Exch., Inc. v. Alpert" on Justia Law

Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded.View "Curtis v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Students and former students of the University of Alabama, Auburn University, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham, filed three separate class-action lawsuits in the Jefferson Circuit Court challenging the legality of so-called "dining-dollars" programs implemented by the universities and pursuant to which all undergraduate students were required to pay a mandatory dining fee each semester, which was then credited back to the students in the form of "dining dollars" that could be spent only at on-campus dining outlets controlled exclusively by the food-service vendors for the universities - Aramark Educational Services, Inc., at UA; Compass Group, USA, Inc. (Chartwells) at Auburn; and Sodexo, Inc., at UAB. The trial court dismissed the three actions, and the students appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion and affirmed all three. The students sued the boards of trustees governing the universities and the food-service vendors, alleging that the dining-dollars programs violated: (1) state antitrust laws; (2) the Alabama Constitution inasmuch as it forbids the State from having an interest in a private enterprise; (3) the rule in 16-1-32(d) barring universities from charging excessive transaction fees to merchants that accept university-issued debit cards; and (4) the common-law prohibition on conversion. Because the boards of trustees are entitled to state immunity pursuant to section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, all claims against them were properly dismissed. The university administrators and foodservice vendors were entitled to immunity on the asserted antitrust claims as well, albeit state-action immunity as opposed to state immunity. Moreover, because the students lacked standing to pursue a cause of action for a violation of 16-1-32(d), and because the students did not and could not allege the necessary elements of a conversion claim, the trial court also properly dismissed the students' other claims.View "Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick and Mandelena Harmon bought a home pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that realtor Dianne Burright, a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Fiscus Realty, prepared at the Fiscus Realty office. The home was built by Dianne's husband, Jerry. The Harmons subsequently discovered numerous construction problems. The Harmons sued Defendants Jerry and Dianne Burright and Fiscus Reality, raising several causing of action, including a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). A jury returned a verdict against the Burrights on breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims and held for Defendants on all other claims. After trial, Defendants filed motions for attorney fees as prevailing parties under the Act, which the district court denied. Fiscus Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to Fiscus Realty as the Harmons' claims had a basis in fact and law and were not frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded.View "Harmon v. Fiscus Realty" on Justia Law

Progressive Products, Inc. (PPI) filed a four-count complaint in district court against Defendants, former employees of PPI, on various theories alleging Defendants misappropriated protected trade secrets. The trade secrets at issue were a formula, computerized customer lists, and a computerized pricing program. The district court entered judgment for PPI, holding that Defendants misappropriated protected trade secrets possessed by PPI. The court then imposed a royalty injunction on Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) PPI owned protected trade secrets relating to the formula, (2) the price lists were not trade secrets as a matter of law, (3) no evidence supported a finding the customer lists were a trade secret, and (4) the royalty injunction was not supported by the district court's factual findings and did not comport with the available statutory remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment regarding the protected trade secrets but reversed the court of appeals' opinion reversing the remedy the district court ordered, holding that because the district court's findings were incomplete, they did not permit meaningful appellate review. Remanded.View "Progressive Products, Inc. v. Swartz" on Justia Law

St. Louis County enacted an ordinance that established a new trash collection program in the county. Specifically, the ordinance authorized the county to establish trash collection areas in the county and allowed the county executive to advertise for bids or proposals to provide services for trash collection in the designated areas and award contracts to selected trash haulers. The County subsequently enacted an ordinance prohibiting trash haulers that were not selected in the bidding process from providing trash collection services within the eight designated collection areas. Taxpayers living in the waste collection areas then filed a class action petition, alleging (1) the County violated its charter and Mo. Rev. Stat. 260.247, violations that deemed the trash collection program void, and (2) the respondents violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MPA). The trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County did not violate its charter, (2) the taxpayers did not have standing to file a claim under Section 260.247, and (3) the taxypayers' claim under the MPA was derivative of their claims that the trash collection program was void, so that claim also failed.View "Weber v. St. Louis County " on Justia Law

While employed with Alpharma, a pharmaceutical company, Debra Parks was involved in marketing a prescription drug known as Kadian. Parks filed a complaint in circuit court for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, claiming that Alpharma was involved in illegal marketing activities and that after Parks had raised her concerns with various people at Alpharma, Alpharma retaliated against her by terminating her employment. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Parks' appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own initiative. The Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court on the basis that Parks failed to identify any clear mandate of public policy allegedly violated by Alpharma and allegedly reported by her that would constitute some of the required elements of a wrongful discharge claim.View "Parks v. Alpharma" on Justia Law