Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

In 2003, several class action lawsuits were filed against automobile manufacturers and trade associations, alleging antitrust conspiracy, Bus. & Prof. Code, 167201, and unfair business practices, Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200, on behalf of individuals who purchased or leased new vehicles in California within a certain time period. The lawsuits, which were eventually coordinated, alleged conspiracy to restrict the movement of lower-priced Canadian vehicles into the U.S. market, to avoid downward pressure on U.S. new vehicle prices. After years of litigation, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the two remaining defendants, Ford U.S. and Ford Canada, concluding that there was not sufficient evidence of an actual agreement among Ford and the other manufacturers to restrict the export of new vehicles from Canada to the U.S. The court of appeal affirmed with respect to Ford U.S., but concluded that the admissible evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a material factual issue as to whether Ford Canada participated in an illegal agreement to restrict the export of automobiles. The court noted an expert economic analysis indicating that the manufacturers would not have continued to restrict exports during the alleged conspiracy period absent an agreement that none of them would break ranks and reap the profits available in the export market; parallel conduct by the manufactures during the same period; and deposition testimony. View "In re: Auto. Antitrust Cases I and II" on Justia Law

Hanover Realty contracted with Wegmans to develop a supermarket on its New Jersey property, requiring Hanover to secure necessary permits and approvals before breaking ground. ShopRite and its development subsidiary filed administrative and court challenges to Hanover’s applications. Believing these filings were baseless and intended only to frustrate the entry of a competitor, Hanover sued for antitrust violations. The district court dismissed, holding that Hanover did not have standing because it was not a competitor, consumer, or participant in the restrained markets and did not sustain the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to the claim for attempted monopolization of the market for full-service supermarkets. Hanover can establish that its injury was “inextricably intertwined” with defendants’ anti-competitive conduct. Hanover sufficiently alleged that the petitioning activity at issue was undertaken without regard to the merits of the claims and for the purpose of using the governmental process to restrain trade, so that defendants are not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity because their conduct falls within the exception for sham litigation. The court affirmed as to the claim for attempted monopolization of the rental space market; there was no standing because Hanover does not compete with defendants in that market. View "Hanover 3201 Realty LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

Allied, founded in 1973 by Ramun, competes with Genesis in the field of industrial dismantling and scrap processing, including the design, development, and manufacture of related specialized equipment. From 1992-2001, Ramun’s son Mark worked at Allied. By 1999, Allied developed innovative multi-use demolition machine attachments, called MT. Various sizes and types of jawsets, including a steel beam cutter and a concrete crusher, were available, allowing the MT operator to perform different tasks with just one tool. The jawset could be changed without removing the main pin, saving time and enhancing productivity. Mark had detailed information regarding the design and function of the attachment, which was highly confidential. In 2001 Mark left Allied, taking a laptop containing 15,000 pages of Allied documents, including detailed technical information about the MT. Mark joined Genesis in 2003. Genesis later released its own multiuse tool. Genesis brought trade secret claims, based on similarity to the MT. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Allied. The court awarded damages but refused to enter an injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a subsequent suit under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, alleging misappropriation after that verdict, citing issue preclusion. View "Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. Inc. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc." on Justia Law

Using three photographs taken from a neighboring subdivision’s marketing materials (including one portraying the subdivision’s stylized entrance sign), a realtor group listed adjacent property for sale on a multiple listing service website. The listing also contained a property appraisal stating that: (1) based on plat-related information, existing legal access to the property might compromise the neighboring subdivision’s gated community perimeter fencing; and (2) based on statements made to the appraiser by employees of the local electric association, the neighboring subdivision’s electric service might be subject to legal issues. The subdivision’s developer then sued the realtors for misappropriation of the photos, trade name infringement, and defamation. The superior court granted summary judgment to the realtors and awarded them enhanced attorney’s fees; the developer appealed. Because there were no material factual disputes and the realtors were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the superior court's grant of attorney fees, and affirmed that decision too. View "Alaskasland.com, LLC v. Cross" on Justia Law

Sanger filed suit claiming that it was forced to abandon certain prospective business plans after coming up against the anticompetitive practices of HUB, a major player in the nationwide market for veterinary insurance. The district court granted summary judgment for HUB. The court concluded that Sanger has produced sufficient evidence of preparedness to survive the standing inquiry at the summary judgment stage, and the court reversed the district court’s ruling to the contrary. The court also concluded that the alleged conduct does implicate allocation of risk in the insurance market and thus the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b), exemption. Therefore, the dismissal of the federal antitrust claims is affirmed, but the dismissal of the state antitrust and tortious interference claims is reversed. View "Sanger Ins. Agency v. HUB Int'l" on Justia Law

The U.S. chocolate market is dominated by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA (the Chocolate Manufacturers). A certified class of direct purchasers of chocolate products and a group of individual plaintiffs alleged that the Chocolate Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy products in the United States three times between 2002 and 2007. They offered evidence of a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in Canada. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Canadian conspiracy evidence was ambiguous and did not support an inference of a U.S. conspiracy because the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy; evidence that the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy was weak and, in any event, related only to Hershey. Other traditional conspiracy evidence was insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy. View "In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Graco manufactures fast-set spray foam equipment (FSE) and sells it to distributors, who resell to consumers like Insulate. In 2005 and 2008 Graco purchased competing FSE manufacturers, ultimately raising its market share “to above 90%.” In 2007, Graco sent a letter to its distributors citing the “best efforts” clause in its distributor agreements, stating: It is our opinion that taking on an additional competitive product line may significantly reduce the “best efforts” of a Graco distributor.” In 2009, Foampak, a Graco distributor, considered carrying Gama products but chose not to after Graco threatened to end its distributorship. Graco sued Gama, alleging theft of trade secrets; Gama counterclaimed that Graco had unilaterally monopolized the FSE market (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2). In 2013, the FTC accused Graco of unlawfully acquiring its competitors (Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18). Graco and the FTC entered a consent agreement which confirmed Graco would not engage in any practice “that has the purpose or effect of achieving Exclusivity with any Distributor.” The agreement did “not constitute an admission by [Graco] that the law ha[d] been violated.” Insulate filed suit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal on the pleadings. Insulate did not adequately plead concerted action in the existence of written anticompetitive contracts or implied exclusivity agreements. View "Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

DFA filed suit against Estee Lauder after Estee Lauder refused to do business with DFA and communicated that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental space to DFA. DFW alleged three claims in its amended complaint: (1) attempted monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2; (2) contributory false advertising, in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); and (3) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida law. The district court dismissed the suit based on failure to state a claim. The court concluded that DFW failed to allege basic facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face where DFW did not adequately allege that Estee Lauder engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct for its antitrust claims; DFA does not come close to establishing standing to seek injunctive relief from the requirements that Estée Lauder places on its competitors, inasmuch as DFA no longer does any business with Estée Lauder; DFA failed to plead sufficient facts from which a court could find that Estée Lauder made false statements, or, for that matter, was responsible for any such statements made by DFA’s competitors in DFA's false advertising claim; and the complaint failed to allege any improper conduct sufficient to constitute tortious interference with a business relationship in violation of Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. The Estee Lauder Co." on Justia Law

Best designs and markets exit signs and emergency lighting. Pace manufactured products to Best’s specifications. Best’s founder taught Pace how to manufacture the necessary tooling. There was no contract prohibiting Pace from competing with Best. By 2004, Best was aware that Pace was selling products identical to those it made for Best to Best’s established customers. Several other problems arose between the companies. When they ended the relationship, Pace was in possession of all of the tooling used to manufacture Best’s products and the cloned products, and Best owed Pace almost $900,000 for products delivered. Pace filed a breach of contract suit. Best requested a setoff of damages for breach of warranty and counterclaimed for breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and fraud. Pace claimed that Best had misappropriated Pace’s trade secrets and had tortiously interfered with Pace’s contracts. The district court found that Best had breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay, but that Pace was liable for breach of warranties, breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Pace is liable for breach of contract and tortious interference, but reversed or vacated as to the trade secrets, Lanham Act, conversion, and warranties claims. View "Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, a Mississippi-based law firm, ran a full-page advertisement in a Northeast Georgia local newspaper, noting that Heritage Healthcare of Toccoa, a Stephens County nursing home owned by PruittHealth, had been cited by the government for deficiencies in the care of its residents and inviting those suspecting abuse or neglect of a loved one at the facility to call the law firm. On the following day, PruittHealth filed a verified complaint for temporary and permanent injunctive relief under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and petitioned ex parte for a temporary restraining order. That same day, the Stephens County Superior Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining McHugh Fuller from publishing, in any newspaper or other media, advertisements regarding PruittHealth utilizing the language of the ad. At the hearing, PruittHealth presented testimony that the government citation referenced in the ad arose from an old report, that the cited deficiencies had been resolved immediately, and the ad had caused severe damage to the facility's reputation. McHugh Fuller presented testimony to substantiate and justify the specific language used in the ad. The trial court found the ad to be deceptive and thus in violation of the UDTPA. Thereafter, the trial court signed an order enjoining McHugh Fuller “from publishing or causing the offending advertisement to be published in the future” and requiring McHugh Fuller remove postings of the ad. McHugh Fuller filed a verified answer and a motion to amend and/or for reconsideration of the court's order. The Supreme Court consolidated both parties' appeals of the trial court's rulings.. In case S15A0362, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by granting permanent injunctive relief at the conclusion of the interlocutory hearing without giving McHugh Fuller clear notice at the time that it was doing so. In case S15A0641, the Court found the trial court erred in its conclusion that that the appellate record in McHugh Fuller's initial appeal should not have included any filings in the trial court submitted after the entry of the permanent injunction on June 2, 2014. View "McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth-Toccoa, LLC" on Justia Law