Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Fair Wind owns sailing schools, including one in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. In 2007 Fair Wind hired Bouffard as a captain and instructor, under a contract precluding Bouffard from joining a competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for two years after the end of his employment. In 2010, relying on Bouffard View "Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster" on Justia Law

The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is composed of industry members, academicians, design professionals, and government officials. Its standards provide guidelines for refrigeration processes and design and maintenance of energy efficient buildings. Thermal manufactures liner insulation systems for nonresidential metal buildings. Thermal’s liner systems compete with “over-the-purlin systems,” which comprise about 90% of the market for metal building roof insulation systems. Since 1999, ASHRAE has published Standard 90.1, which rates the energy efficiency of insulation assemblies and has considerable influence in the commercial building industry. In 2011, the Department of Energy determined that Standard 90.1 would be the national commercial building reference standard; within two years every state had to certify that it had adopted a commercial building code that is at least as stringent as Standard 90.1. Until 2010, Standard 90.1 treated non-laminated metal building insulation assemblies, like Thermal’s liner systems, differently from other insulation assemblies. Owners had to obtain special permission to install liner systems. Thermal alleged that representatives of the North American Insulation Manufacturer’s Association and the Metal Building Manufacturers Association, both of which have voting members on ASHRAE’s Envelope Subcommittee, procured this result by providing inaccurate data. ASHRAE declined to accept results of tests commissioned by Thermal. Thermal sued, alleging unfair competition, violation of Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, antitrust violations, and violation of the Lanham Act. The court rejected all of the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2, alleging that defendants, a group of five competing electronics firms, have attempted to leverage their ownership of certain key patents to gain control of a new technology standard for USB connectors and, by extension, to gain monopoly power over the entire USB connector industry. The court held that, under principles articulated in a line of recent Supreme Court decisions extending from Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. to Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, the requirements of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. 6a, are substantive and nonjurisdictional in nature. Because Congress has not clearly stated that these requirements are jurisdictional, they go to the merits of the claim rather than the adjudicative power of the court. In so holding, the court overruled the court's prior decision in Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A. The court also concluded that, although the FTAIA's requirements are nonjurisdictional and thus potentially waivable, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that defendants somehow have waived them by contract in this case; foreign anticompetitive conduct can have a statutorily required direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic or import commerce even if the effect does not follow as an immediate consequence of defendant's conduct, so long as there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct and the effect; the court rejected the interpretation of "direct...effect" advanced by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies in favor of the interpretation advocated by amici curiae the United States and the FTC and adopted by the Seventh Circuit in its en banc decision in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.; and the court need not decide, however, whether plaintiff here has plausibly alleged the requisite "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" under the proper standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed on alternative grounds the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's claims. View "Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co." on Justia Law

After Central Trust and Investment Company purchased Springfield Trust & Investment Company (STC), Central Trust filed an action against SignalPoint Asset Management, LLC, a registered investment advisor, for affiliating with STC’s ex-employee, who had acquired STC’s client list and had become an independent advisor representative of SignalPoint. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of SignalPoint on its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business relations, and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Central Trust did not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether SignalPoint “misappropriated” Central Trust’s client list as that term is defined by the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (2) this failure also justified the grant of summary judgment against Central Trust’s claim of tortious interference with business relations; and (3) Central Trust’s civil conspiracy claim was moot. View "Cent. Trust & Inv. Co. v. SignalPoint Asset Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

Until 2001 Dean and Suiza competed to process and sell bottled milk to retailers. Suiza was the largest U.S. processor of milk and Dean was the second largest. Both purchased raw milk from other entities. DFA, a dairy farmer cooperative, was Suiza’s primary supplier and business partner. Dean obtained its raw milk predominantly from independent farmers. Dean and Suiza merged in 2001, becoming Dean Foods, hoping to obtain “distribution efficiencies and economies of scale,” for millions of dollars in cost savings. Certain agreements were negotiated, with input from the Department of Justice, which approved the proposed merger, subject to divestment of particular milk processing plants. Retailers of processed milk sued, charging violation of 15 U.S.C. 1, the Sherman Antitrust Act, by conspiring with a raw milk supplier-milk processor and the purchaser of the divested processing facilities to divide markets and restrict output. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dean Foods, finding insufficient proof of injury and failure to establish the relevant antitrust geographic market, primarily because plaintiff’s expert’s testimony was excluded. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the expert should not have been excluded and that the conclusions regarding injury were based on flawed propositions. View "Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Novell, Inc. filed suit against Microsoft Corporation, alleging anti-trust violations. The matter went to trial in 2011, ending in deadlock. The district court concluded Microsoft's conduct did not offend section 2 of the Sherman Act, and entered judgment as a matter of law. Novell appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that Microsoft refused to share its intellectual property with rivals after first promising to do so. The Tenth Circuit concluded after its review that Novell presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Microsoft's discontinuation of this arrangement suggested a "willingness to sacrifice short-term profits, […] in a manner that was irrational but for its tendency to harm competition." View "Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against polystyrene food service packaging manufacturers and two trade associations, claiming that Defendants refused in concert to deal with Plaintiff in a recycling business method for polystyrene food service products. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Massachusetts Fair Business Practices Act (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A). The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and entered judgment in their favor, finding that, as in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, there were legitimate business reasons that could explain Defendants' refusal to deal with Plaintiff or to compete with each other for market share. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to adequately plead its Sherman Act claim; and (2) because the district court summarily dismissed Plaintiff's chapter 93 claim because it failed for the same reasons that its Sherman Act claim failed, the issue needed to be reconsidered. View "Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Pactiv Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Creative Playthings Ltd., a Massachusetts corporation, entered into a franchising agreement with Defendant under which Defendant agreed to operate a Creative Playthings franchise store in Florida. Plaintiff later terminated its agreement with Defendant and commenced this action against Defendant in the U.S. district court for breach of contract and associated claims. Defendant filed several counterclaims against Creative. Creative moved for summary judgment on Defendant's counterclaims, asserting they were time barred under the limitations provision in the franchise agreement. The federal district court judge declined to decide Creative's motion and instead certified the question of whether contractually shortened statutes of limitations are generally enforceable under Massachusetts law. The Supreme Court answered by holding that, in a franchise agreement governed by Massachusetts law, a limitations period in the contract shortening the time within which claims must be brought is valid and enforceable under Massachusetts law if the claim arises under the contract and the agreed-upon limitations period is subject to negotiation by the parties, is not otherwise limited by controlling statute, is reasonable, is not a statute of repose, and is not contrary to public policy.View "Creative Playthings Franchising Corp. v. Reiser" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees asserting claims for conspiracy, fraud, and violating the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after Appellees took control of a biotech company and bought out the former CEO of the company. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellants then filed a motion to reconsider seeking to vacate the judgment, which was denied. On appeal, Appellees filed motions to dismiss Appellants' appeal, alleging that Appellants' motion to reconsider was a nullity and that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of entry of summary judgment. The Supreme Court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that the motion to reconsider was a valid motion.View "Muccio v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Intel Corporation appealed a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. (AGLI) in a dispute over the interpretation of an excess insurance policy under California law. AGLI sought and obtained a declaration from the Superior Court that AGLI had no duty to reimburse Intel for defense costs or indemnity claims in connection with Intel's defense of various antitrust lawsuits, because the underlying insurance policy limits of $50 million were not exhausted as required by the AGLI policy. Intel read the AGLI Policy to allow Intel to exhaust the limits of its underlying policy with XL Insurance Company by adding Intel's own contributed payments for defense costs to the amount of Intel's settlement with XL. Under Intel’s interpretation, the XL Policy was exhausted and AGLI's duty to defend was triggered. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that AGLI's reading was the only reasonable reading, and accordingly, affirmed.View "Intel Corporation v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., et al." on Justia Law