Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Rooftops sells tickets to view Cubs games and other events at Wrigley Field from the roofs of buildings it controls. Chicago has an ordinance allowing the rooftop businesses. Before the 2002 season, the Cubs installed a windscreen above the outfield bleachers, obstructing the views from rooftop businesses and sued Rooftops, claiming misappropriation of Cubs’ property by charging fees to watch games.The parties settled by entering into the License Agreement running through 2023. Rooftops agreed to pay the Cubs 17% of their gross revenues in exchange for views into Wrigley Field. The Agreement contemplated Wrigley Field's expansion. In 2013, the Cubs released a mock‐up of its proposed renovation, showing that rooftop businesses would be largely blocked by the construction. The city approved the plan over objections. Rooftops claimed that Cubs’ representatives used the threat of blocking views and other “strong-arm tactics” as leverage to force a sale, and sued, alleging: attempted monopolization; false and misleading commercial representations, defamation, false light, and breach of the non‐disparagement provision; and breach of contract. The court denied Rooftops’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed its dismissal of monopolization claims because Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption applies; Rooftops failed to establish a plausible relevant market; and the Cubs cannot be limited by antitrust law from distributing their own product. The contract's plain language did not limit expansions to Wrigley Field's seating capacity. View "Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant on both Plaintiff’s complaint seeking recovery on six promissory notes and on Defendant’s counterclaim alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). On appeal, Plaintiff challenged only the scope of the Appellate Court’s remand order, arguing that the court erred in ordering a new trial rather than restricting the remand proceedings to a hearing in damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court in part, holding that a new trial was unnecessary because Defendant lacked standing to pursue a claim alleging a violation of CUTPA. View "Channing Real Estate, LLC v. Gates" on Justia Law

This case arose from an allegedly forged home-equity loan. Plaintiff sued the lenders, bringing several claims, including statutory fraud and violations of the Texas Finance Code and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the lenders without stating its reasons. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly affirmed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constitutional forfeiture claim; and (2) erred in holding that Plaintiff’s remaining claims were barred on statute of limitations and waiver grounds. View "Kyle v. Strasburger" on Justia Law

Arabian Support & Services Co. (ASASCO), a Saudi Arabian business, sought compensation for assisting Textron Systems Corporation in its pursuit of a weapons deal in Saudi Arabia. ASASCO claimed that Textron backed away from its promises to supplement the modest fees paid under the parties’ written consulting agreements through an “offset” arrangement linked to the weapons sale. ASASCO’s complaint alleged breach of contract, tortious interference with ASASCO’s business and contractual relationship, and violations of Chapter 93A, the Massachusetts Deceptive Trade Practices Act. After limited discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Textron on all of ASASCO’s claims. The First Circuit vacated the summary judgment in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing ASASCO’s Chapter 93A misrepresentation claim based solely on the failure of the contract claim. Remanded for further proceedings on ASASCO’s misrepresentation theory. View "Arabian Support & Services Co. v. Textron Systems Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Suture Express, Inc. appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Cardinal Health 200, LLC (“Cardinal”) and Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc. (“O&M”) under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act, and the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act (“KRTA”). Suture Express, Cardinal, and O&M compete in the national broadline medical-and-surgical (“med-surg”) supply and distribution market. After Suture Express entered the "suture-endo" market and steadily grew its market share, Cardinal and O&M responded by instituting bundling packages in their contracts. Suture Express sued Cardinal and O&M, alleging that their bundling arrangements constituted an illegal tying practice in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. The court held that Suture Express’s federal claims failed as a matter of law because it could not establish that either Cardinal or O&M individually possessed sufficient market power in the other-med-surg market that would permit it to restrain trade in the suture-endo market. Even were this not the case, however, the court also held that: (1) Suture Express could not establish antitrust injury because it had not shown that competition itself had been harmed; and (2) Cardinal and O&M cited sufficient procompetitive justifications for the bundling arrangement to overcome any harm caused by any anticompetitive effects resulting from the bundle. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Suture Express, the Tenth Circuit did not think the company could survive summary judgment under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act, or the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act. "There simply is not enough probative evidence by which a reasonable jury could find that Cardinal’s and O&M’s bundling arrangement unreasonably restrained trade in violation of federal or state antitrust law." View "Suture Express v. Owens & Minor" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute between SOLIDFX, LLC, a software development company, and Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing that developed aviation terminal charts. SOLIDFX sued Jeppesen, asserting antitrust, breach-of-contract, and tort claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment on the antitrust claims, but the remaining claims proceeded to trial. A jury ultimately found in favor of SOLIDFX and awarded damages in excess of $43 million. Jeppesen appealed, challenging only the district court’s ruling that SOLIDFX could recover lost profits on its contract claims. SOLIDFX cross-appealed the district court’s summary judgment order in favor of Jeppesen on the antitrust claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the License Agreement at issue here unambiguously precluded the recovery of lost profits, irrespective of whether they were direct or consequential damages. But the Court also determined that, even if the agreement could be read to allow the recovery of direct lost profits, the lost profits awarded by the jury here were consequential damages and therefore not recoverable. Because the Court held that SOLIDFX was contractually precluded from recovering the amounts awarded for lost profits, it did not reach the question of whether SOLIDFX proved those lost profits with reasonable certainty, nor did it address the admissibility of expert testimony offered by SOLIDFX to establish the amount of its lost profits. Finally, the Court agreed with the district court that Jeppesen was entitled to summary judgment on SOLIDFX’s antitrust claims. View "Solidfx v. Jeppesen Sanderson" on Justia Law

Eaton manufactures truck transmissions for sale to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), which offer “data books,” listing the options for truck parts. Customer choose among the options; the OEM sources the parts from the manufacturers and uses them to build custom trucks then sold to that customer. Eaton was a near-monopolist in supplying Class 8 truck transmissions. In 1989, ZF emerged as a competitor. Eaton allegedly sought to retain its market share by entering agreements with the OEMs, with increasingly large rebates on Eaton transmissions based on the percentage of transmissions a given OEM purchased from Eaton as opposed to ZF. ZF closed in 2003. In 2006, ZF successfully sued Eaton for antitrust violations. Separately, indirect purchasers who bought trucks from OEMs’ immediate customers brought a class action; that case was dismissed. In this case, Tauro attempt to represent direct purchasers in an antitrust suit was rejected because Tauro never directly purchased a Class 8 truck from the OEMs, but rather purchased trucks from R&R, a direct customer that expressly assigned Tauro its direct purchaser antitrust claims. The Third Circuit reversed. An antitrust claim assignment need not be supported by bargained-for consideration in order to confer direct purchaser standing on an indirect purchaser; it need only be express. That requirement was met. The presumption that a motion to intervene by a proposed class representative is timely if filed before the class opt-out date applies in this pre-certification context. View "Wallach v. Eaton Corp" on Justia Law

This case involved a royalty dispute over the use of nuclear technology. Areva NP, Inc. filed a complaint against Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) and affiliated companies (collectively, the B&W defendants), alleging breach of contract and violation of the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Areva on both claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to set aside the verdict and by entering judgment for the B&W defendants on Areva’s royalty and trade secrets claims. Final judgment entered dismissing Areva’s claims. View "Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc." on Justia Law

USA Power, LLC developed a power plant project in Mona, Utah called the “Spring Canyon vision.” Meanwhile, PacifiCorp entered into negotiations to purchase USA Power’s Spring Canyon assets, and USA Power provided PacifiCorp with details on the entire project. PacifiCorp terminated the negotiations, however, and began construction on a power plant project in Mona that was very similar to the Spring Canyon project. PacifiCorp also retained Jody Williams, USA Power’s former attorney, to help it obtain water rights for its project, called the Currant Creek project. USA Power brought suit against Williams, asserting malpractice claims for Williams’s alleged breach of her fiduciary duties of confidentiality and loyalty, and against PacifiCorp, alleging misappropriation of USA Power’s trade secrets. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the jury returned a special verdict against PacifiCorp and Williams. The trial court reduced the unjust enrichment award against PacifiCorp, granted Williams’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion for lack of evidence related to causation, and determined that USA was entitled to attorney fees. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings as to each issue presented on appeal, holding that the court did not err in its judgment. View "USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency sought a prime contractor to provide event-planning services. Plaintiffs offered their services as joint subcontractors to Navar, Inc. Plaintiffs and Navar entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and a Teaming Agreement, which provided that if Navar were awarded a prime contract then it would negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs. The Defense Agency awarded Navar a five-year prime contract, but Navar did not extend subcontracts to either Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sued Navar, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and trade secret misappropriation. A jury found (1) Navar had breached the NDA and Teaming Agreement, and (2) Navar misappropriated one plaintiff’s trade secretes under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The trial court set aside the verdict on breach of the Teaming Agreement and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Navar could not be found liable for breach of contract because nothing in the Act or the NDA required Navar to use Plaintiffs as subcontractors; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding the Teaming Agreement was unenforceable as a binding contract. View "Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council" on Justia Law