Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Appellee, Peter Rosenow, brought a class-action complaint individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons against Appellants, Alltel Corporation and Alltel Communications, Inc. (collectively, Alltel), alleging violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and unjust enrichment arising from Alltel’s imposition of an early termination fee on its cellular-phone customers. Alltel filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in its “Terms and Conditions.” The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Alltel’s arbitration provision lacked mutuality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that a lack of mutuality rendered the instant arbitration agreement invalid. View "Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow" on Justia Law

Fair Wind owns sailing schools, including one in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. In 2007 Fair Wind hired Bouffard as a captain and instructor, under a contract precluding Bouffard from joining a competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for two years after the end of his employment. In 2010, relying on Bouffard View "Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster" on Justia Law

UNM, a trade show cleaning company, filed suit against SDC, alleging claims for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and antitrust violations. The court reversed the district court's holding that under California law, SDC could not be held liable for the tort of intentional interference with contractual relationship; reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on that ground; affirmed the district court's holding that it committed instructional error by not interpreting the terms of the contract and that this error constituted prejudicial error that warranted a new trial; affirmed the district court's holding that SDC possessed state action immunity from UNM's antitrust claim; held that the a new trial is warranted on UNM's claim for intentional interference with contractual relationship; and concluded that, under California law, SDC could not be liable for punitive damages because it is a public entity. View "United Nat'l Maint. v. San Diego Convention Ctr." on Justia Law

Buyers, a married couple from Cuba who were only able to communicate in Spanish, purchased a vehicle from a Dealership. Two of the documents Buyers signed with regard to the purchase contained arbitration clauses, and all of the documents were written in English. Buyers subsequently sued the Dealership for fraud in the inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Dealership moved to dismiss the complaint and/or compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed because the arbitration provisions were not agreed upon by the parties and that the provisions were unenforceable because they were procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate disputes but reversed the order insofar as it declined to enforce the arbitration on the reverse side of the retail installment contract with respect to Buyers’ claims for monetary relief. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District and remanded with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s judgment based on controlling precedent. View "Basulto v. Hialeah Auto." on Justia Law

Arloe Designs, LLC proposed to build a building at an airport. Arkansas Capital Corporation (ACC) and National Bank of Arkansas (NBA) allegedly worked together to procure a loan for the building’s construction. After the NBA approved financing for the project, Arloe entered into a thirty-year lease for the new hangar. Later that month, Arloe learned that NBA would not close the loan without a bond as collateral, which Arloe did not give, and therefore, the loan was not closed. Arloe sued ACC and NBA, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trades Practices Act, negligence, and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants as to all but Arloe’s promissory estoppel claim, and limited damages for that claim to the money Arloe had spent in reliance on the claimed promise. At trial, a jury found Arloe had not proved that either defendant had made a promise to loan Arloe money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Arloe’s claims that the circuit court erred in denying it recovery for lost profit damages and limiting its damages on its promissory-estoppel claim were moot; and (2) summary judgment was proper in regard to the remainder of Arloe’s claims. View "Arloe Designs LLC v. Ark. Capital Corp." on Justia Law

Legacy Resources, Inc. brought several claims against Liberty Pioneer Energy Source, Inc. The district court dismissed Legacy's breach of contract and trade secret claims on summary judgment, determining (1) Legacy violated the securities laws by acting as an unlicensed broker in recruiting investors on behalf of Liberty; and (2) Legacy's securities violations rendered its contract unenforceable under Utah Code 61-1-22(8). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the undisputed facts sustained the conclusion that Legacy acted as an unlicensed broker, which violation foreclosed the enforcement of one of its contracts; but (2) another of Legacy's contracts was not implicated by the securities violation, and thus the district court erred by granting summary judgment on Legacy's claim under that contract, along with its trade secret claim. View "Legacy Res., Inc. v. Liberty Pioneer Energy Source, Inc." on Justia Law

Arlene Easter sold insurance for First Express Services Group, Inc. Arlene subsequently resigned from First Express and began to work for her son, Mark, who was a part owner of a competing agency. After resigning, Arlene took a customer list from First Express and transferred many of First Express' customers to Mark's agency. First Express sued Arlene for breach of contract and Arlene, Mark, and Mark's agency for misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment. After a jury trial, judgment was rendered for First Express on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) modified the judgment against Arlene, finding that Arlene was liable only for the portion of the judgment attributed by the district court to the breach of contract claim; and (2) reversed the judgment against Mark, holding that Mark was not liable for either misappropriation of trade secrets or unjust enrichment. View "First Express Servs. Group, Inc. v. Easter" on Justia Law

Appellant was involved in a car accident with Kent Blough. Appellant's insurer, USAA Casualty Insurance Company, concluded that Appellant was the majority at fault for the accident and refused to honor Appellant's $300,000 UM/UIM coverage. Appellant filed suit against Blough, and in an apparent attempt to prevent Appellant from prevailing, USAA unsuccessfully tried to intervene in the lawsuit. Blough's insurer paid Appellant the limit of Blough's insurance policy. USAA's expert eventually determined that Blough, whom USAA had already paid under Appellant's policy, had been the majority at fault. USAA then tendered to Appellant its $300,000 UM/UIM policy limit. Appellant filed a complaint against USAA for, among other claims, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act and emotional distress as a result of the mishandling of her claim. The district court entered summary judgment for USAA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that Appellant may not pursue a claim based upon USAA's alleged failure to reasonably investigate her claim as required under Mont. Code Ann. 33-13-201(4); and (2) erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of USAA regarding Appellant's claim for damages arising from emotional distress. View " McVey v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a guest passenger in a vehicle insured by Progressive Classic Insurance Company when the vehicle was rear-ended by a truck. Petitioner received medical payments coverage under the Progressive policy for some of the medical expenses she incurred for the treatment of her injuries. Petitioner later successfully sued the truck owner and driver and received damages. Progressive subsequently asserted a subrogation lien on the recovery for the amount it paid under the medical payments coverage. Petitioner filed this complaint against Progressive, alleging common law and statutory bad faith claims. The circuit court dismissed the action, determining that because Petitioner was not a named insured under the Progressive policy and paid no premiums for the policy, Petitioner was a third-party insured and was, therefore, precluded from pursuing her bad faith claims against Progressive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was a first-party insured under the Progressive policy because the policy included within the definition of an insured person "any other person while occupying a covered vehicle"; and (2) therefore, Petitioner may pursue an action against Progressive for common law and statutory bad faith. View "Dorsey v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After purchasing a car from Defendant, a car dealership, Plaintiff discovered that the car had extensive problems. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that advertising the car as a "Sporty Car at a Great Value Price" violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and that the salesperson's representation to her that the car would "just need a tune-up" was fraudulent. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court correctly found that Defendant's advertisement was classic puffery, which was fatal to Plaintiff's deception claims; but (2) Plaintiff established an issue of material fact as to her fraud claim based on the salesperson's statements. Remanded. View "Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc." on Justia Law