Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

During the 2008 recession, Chicago faced a $150 million shortfall in revenue and sought an alternative to raising taxes. The city awarded a 75-year Concession over designated parking spaces to the private firm CPM, which agreed to give Chicago an upfront payment of more than a billion dollars. After CPM took over, the price of parking in areas covered by the Concession more than doubled. Litigation in both state and federal courts followed. A federal class action filed by “two car drivers who live in Chicago,” asserted that CPM has violated the federal antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the antitrust theories as barred by the state-action immunity doctrine. The Concession represents a use of municipal authority to substitute, during the term of the lease, exclusive private operation for direct city operation of specified areas of Chicago’s on-street parking facilities. It swaps one “monopolist” (Chicago) for another (CPM). Chicago had the authority to enter into the Concession and has reserved meaningful powers to oversee and regulate CPM’s performance. The court also theorized that there might not be a monopoly; Chicago cars can be found in apartment building parking garages, private residential garages, private lots, public lots, unregulated streets, and metered parking. View "Uetricht v. Chicago Parking Meters, LLC" on Justia Law

The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act (HISA) is a federal law that nationalizes governance of the thoroughbred horseracing industry. To formulate detailed rules on an array of topics, HISA empowers a private entity called the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”), which operates under Federal Trade Commission oversight. Soon after its passage, HISA was challenged by various horsemen’s associations, which were later joined by Texas and the state’s racing commission. Plaintiffs argued HISA is facially unconstitutional because it delegates government power to a private entity without sufficient agency supervision. The district court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ “concerns are legitimate,” that HISA has “unique features,” and that its structure “pushes the boundaries of public-private collaboration.” Nonetheless, the court rejected the private non-delegation challenge.   The Fifth Circuit declared that the HISA is unconstitutional because it violates the private non-delegation doctrine. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded. The court explained that while acknowledging the Authority’s “sweeping” power, the district court thought it was balanced by the FTC’s “equally” sweeping oversight. Not so. HISA restricts FTC review of the Authority’s proposed rules. If those rules are “consistent” with HISA’s broad principles, the FTC must approve them. And even if it finds an inconsistency, the FTC can only suggest changes. What’s more, the FTC concedes it cannot review the Authority’s policy choices. The Authority’s power outstrips any private delegation the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit has allowed. Thus the court declared HISA facially unconstitutional. View "National Horsemen's Benevolent v. Black" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the issue presented for review required an interpretation and application of the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Jonathan Carr registered five domain names that included variations of the identifying marks of the Mississippi Lottery Corporation (MLC). After an unfavorable decision from a national arbitration board, Carr brought a reverse domain name hijacking claim against the MLC, which countersued for cybersquatting. The Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed Carr’s first appeal in this case for lack of a final appealable judgment. Carr appealed the trial judge’s Order Granting and Denying Motions for Injunctive Relief, Order on Motion for New Trial, or In the Alternative, Motion for a Trial By Jury, and Order on Motion for New Trial and/or In the Alternative, to Alter or Amend the Judgment. After a careful review of federal and state law, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court on all issues. View "Carr v. Mississippi Lottery Corporation" on Justia Law

In this appeal from an antidumping investigation of biodiesel from Argentina the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade, holding that two challenged calculations Commerce used to determine antidumping duties were supported by substantial evidence.The two calculations at issue were export price and constructed value of the subject biodiesel, a renewable fuels subject to traceable tax credits. In calculating export price, Commerce subtracted the value of the traceable credits, calling them price adjustments under 19 C.F.R. 351.401(c). Calculating constructed normal value of the biodiesel, Commerce used an international market price for soybeans, the price of which is subsidized in Argentina. Appellant argued that correcting for the soybean subsidy in the export price constituted an improper double remedy. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the value Commerce used for the traceable "price adjustment" credits; and (2) substantial evidence supported the constructed value calculation, and the calculation did not result in a double remedy. View "Vicentin S.A.I.C. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of International Trade determining that the United States Customs and Border Protection timely liquidated or reliquidated ten out of eleven entries of wooden bedroom furniture from China and that Customs' mislabeling of the notice of reliquidation for the remaining entry was harmless, holding that any error was harmless.Appellants, importers of wooden bedroom furniture from China, challenged the procedure by which Customs liquidated and/or reliquidated certain of its entires of wooden bedroom furniture. The Court of International Trade granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Court of International Trade (1) did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the date of notice and denying certain discovery; and (2) properly determined that Customs' mislabeling of a notice as "liquidation" as opposed to "reliquidation" was harmless error. View "Aspects Furniture International, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney brought an enforcement action under the California Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (UCL), on behalf of the People of California against Maplebear Inc. DBA Instacart (Instacart). In their complaint, the State alleged Instacart unlawfully misclassified its employees as independent contractors in order to deny workers employee protections, harming its alleged employees and the public at large through a loss of significant payroll tax revenue, and giving Instacart an unfair advantage against its competitors. In response to the complaint, Instacart brought a motion to compel arbitration of a portion of the City’s action based on its agreements with the individuals it hired (called "Shoppers"). The trial court denied the motion, concluding Instacart failed to meet its burden to show a valid agreement to arbitrate between it and the State. Instacart appealed, arguing that even though the State was not a party to its Shopper agreements, it was bound by its arbitration provision to the extent the State sought injunctive relief and restitution because these remedies were “primarily for the benefit of” the Shoppers. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s order. View "California v. Maplebear Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) prohibits disclosure, under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), of documents from pharmaceutical companies and pharmacy benefit managers collected under S.B. 539.The Nevada Independent (TNI) filed a petition with the district court seeking an order directing the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to release the documents at issue. The district court concluded that the documents were not subject to disclosure under the NPRA because the information contained in them comprised trade secrets protected under the DTSA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the DTSA classifies the requested documents, obtained pursuant to S.B. 539, as confidential trade secrets, the documents were exempt from disclosure under the NPRA; and (2) TNI's remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "Nevada Independent v. Whitley" on Justia Law

The SmileDirect parties developed an online service model for patients to access certain orthodontic services; they allege the defendants (members and employees of the California Dental Board) conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations and an intimidation campaign, to drive them out of the market. The district court dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to certain Sherman Act antitrust claims. The SmileDirect parties sufficiently pled Article III standing; they alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to defendants’ challenged conduct and was judicially redressable. They sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action, or an agreement to restrain trade. The court rejected an argument that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy when acting within their regulatory authority.The court affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and of a "disparate treatment" Equal Protection Clause claim. To plead a class-of-one equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. A class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material respects. Rather than claiming that they stood on the same footing as others, the SmileDirect parties argued their uniqueness. View "Sulitzer v. Tippins" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed a suit alleging that a price plan adopted by Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (SRP) unlawfully discriminated against customers with solar-energy systems and was designed to stifle competition in the electricity market.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, applying Arizona’s notice-of-claim statute, which provides that persons who have claims against a public entity, such as SRP, must file with the entity a claim containing a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.The district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ equal protection claim as barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations. The claim did not accrue when SRP approved the price plan, but rather when plaintiffs received a bill under the new rate structure. The plaintiffs alleged a series of violations, each of which gave rise to a new claim and began a new limitations period.Monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under the Sherman Act were not barred by the filed-rate doctrine, which bars individuals from asserting civil antitrust challenges to an entity’s agency-approved rates. SRP was not entitled to state-action immunity because Arizona had not articulated a policy to displace competition.The Local Government Antitrust Act shielded SRP from federal antitrust damages because SRP is a special functioning governmental unit but the Act does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief. The district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege antitrust injury based on the court’s finding that the price plan actually encouraged competition in alternative energy investment. View "Ellis v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District" on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit under 15 U.S.C. 53(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) against appellants, alleging that they had engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. 45(a) under the collective name of "On Point." On appeal, On Point challenges the district court's preliminary injunction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed parts of the preliminary injunction enjoining appellants from misrepresenting their services and releasing consumer information. However, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management that section 53(b) does not permit an award of equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement, leaving the asset freeze and receivership aspects of the preliminary injunction unsupported by law. Therefore, the court vacated parts of the preliminary injunction subjecting the remaining appellants at issue to the asset freeze and receivership to the extent the district court has not already provided relief. View "Federal Trade Commission v. On Point Capital Partners LLC" on Justia Law