Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Heath and Vail Freyer, the parents of Alicia Freyer, were all riding in their vehicle, which was insured by State Farm, when the vehicle rolled over, causing Health's death. In Freyer I, the Court held that the subject policy provided coverage for Alicia's claim for derivative damages stemming from Health's death. After remand, State Farm paid the disputed coverage amounts. The Freyers then brought claims against State Farm for the wrongful denial of coverage for Alicia's derivative claims. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that State Farm had not breached the insurance contract when it failed to indemnify Vail for Alicia's derivative claims based on State Farm's "reasonable basis in law" defense; (2) properly granted summary judgment to State Farm on the common-law bad faith and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to State Farm on the Unfair Trade Practices Act claims. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freyer" on Justia Law

Defendant, an independent insurance broker, offered its clients insurance products from multiple insurance companies. Plaintiff, the State, brought this action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's failure to disclose to its clients certain contingent commission agreements that it had entered into with the insurance companies violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court improperly concluded that Defendant violated CUIPA; and (2) in the absence of a CUIPA violation in this case, the CUTPA claim failed. View "State v. Acordia, Inc." on Justia Law

Leonard Landa was the sole managing member of a Montana limited liability corporation. Landa carried commercial general liability insurance through Assurance. After a former employee of Landa's filed a complaint alleging that Landa had committed various torts by inducing him to work for Landa under allegedly false pretenses, Landa tendered defense of the former employee's claim to Assurance. Assurance refused to defend Landa, stating that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy. Landa filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing that Assurance had a duty to defend and indemnify Landa and alleging violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), negligence, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Assurance, finding that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy and that Assurance was not liable under the UTPA because the denial of coverage was grounded on a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Assurance correctly declined to provide a defense where the former employee's complaint did not allege an "occurrence" and, as a result, did not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. View "Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Intel Corporation appealed a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. (AGLI) in a dispute over the interpretation of an excess insurance policy under California law. AGLI sought and obtained a declaration from the Superior Court that AGLI had no duty to reimburse Intel for defense costs or indemnity claims in connection with Intel's defense of various antitrust lawsuits, because the underlying insurance policy limits of $50 million were not exhausted as required by the AGLI policy. Intel read the AGLI Policy to allow Intel to exhaust the limits of its underlying policy with XL Insurance Company by adding Intel's own contributed payments for defense costs to the amount of Intel's settlement with XL. Under Intel’s interpretation, the XL Policy was exhausted and AGLI's duty to defend was triggered. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that AGLI's reading was the only reasonable reading, and accordingly, affirmed.View "Intel Corporation v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., et al." on Justia Law

Holline and William Parsons (Plaintiffs) were enrolled in Today's Option, a Medicare Advantage Plan sponsored by the Pyramid Life Insurance Company (Pyramid). After Plaintiffs were each disenrolled from their respective plans, they brought suit against Pyramid, asserting numerous state law claims. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part declaring that the Medicare Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims in this case. Pyramid then moved for Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification and a stay pending appeal, requesting permission to file an interlocutory appeal on the issues of whether Plaintiffs' state-law claims arose under the Medicare Act and whether their claims, to the extent they did not arise under the Act, were expressly preempted by the Act. The circuit court certified this appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the finding supporting Rule 54(b) certification was in error. View "Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded. View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs were doctors of chiropractic who alleged they had been victimized by the discriminatory practices of Iowa's largest health insurer, Wellmark, Inc. The district court (1) granted Wellmark's motion to dismiss claims brought under Iowa's insurance regulatory statutes because no private cause of action was provided therein; (2) granted Wellmark's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the "state action" exemption found in Iowa Code 553.6(4); (3) granted summary judgment on claims alleging Wellmark breached its obligations under a judicially approved national class action settlement in Love v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n; and (4) granted summary judgment on several specific antitrust claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the state action exemption, as the record failed to establish the challenged conduct fell within the exemption; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded.View "Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc." on Justia Law

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded.View "Goff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This action arose from practices employed in connection with the handling of claims made under retrocessional reinsurance treaties providing what was known as "non-life" coverage. At issue was the sufficiency and extra-territorial reach of plaintiff's claim under New York State's antitrust statute (Donnelly Act), General Business Law 340 et seq. Plaintiff, a New York branch of a German reinsurance corporation, sued defendants, English based entities engaged in the business of providing retrocessionary reinsurance. The Appellate Division found that the complaint adequately pled a worldwide market. And, while acknowledging that the crucial allegations contained in paragraph 36 of the amended pleading did not separately allege market power, the allegations read together and liberally construed were adequate to that purpose. The Appellate Division granted plaintiff leave to appeal, certifying to the court the question of whether its order reversing the order of Supreme Court was properly made. The court answered in the negative and reversed. Even if the pleading deficiency at issue could be cured and the court perceived no reason to suppose that the formidable hurdle of alleging market power could be surmounted by plaintiff there would remain as an immovable obstacle to the action's maintenance, the circumstance that the Donnelly Act could not be understood to extend to the foreign conspiracy plaintiff purported to described.View "Global Reins. Corp.-U.S. Branch v Equitas Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant in this case issued health care insurance policies to provide coverage for medical services and entered into contracts with practitioners of the healing arts to provide those services. Plaintiffs, three individual podiatrists and the Connecticut Podiatric Medical Association, brought an action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's practice of reimbursing individual podiatrists at a lower rate than medical doctors for the same service constituted unfair discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUIPA, by prohibiting unfair discrimination, bars the denial of reimbursement on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts, but does not preclude setting different reimbursement rates on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts. View "Conn. Podiatric Med. Ass'n v. Health Net of Conn., Inc. " on Justia Law