Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Two psychiatrists challenged the practices of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN), alleging that ABPN unlawfully tied its specialty certification to its maintenance of certification (MOC) product, thereby violating antitrust law and causing unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs argued that ABPN’s monopoly over specialty certifications forced doctors to purchase the MOC product, which includes both activity and assessment requirements, in order to maintain their professional standing and employment opportunities. They claimed that the MOC product functioned as a substitute for other continuing medical education (CME) products required for state licensure, and that this arrangement harmed competition in the CME market.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint with prejudice. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an illegal tying arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, specifically because they did not show that ABPN’s MOC product was a viable substitute for other CME products. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to amend their complaint and had not demonstrated how further amendment would cure the deficiencies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that psychiatrists and neurologists view ABPN’s MOC product as reasonably interchangeable with other CME offerings. The court found that, even if MOC participation could partially or fully satisfy state CME requirements, the additional time, cost, and effort required by the MOC program made it implausible that doctors would choose MOC over other CME products. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Lazarou v. American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology" on Justia Law

Fifteen individuals who purchased new motorcycles from a major American manufacturer received a limited warranty with their purchases. The warranty provided for free repair or replacement of defective parts for up to 24 months but excluded coverage for defects or damage caused by non-approved or non-manufacturer parts. The plaintiffs, concerned that using non-manufacturer parts would void their warranties, opted to buy higher-priced parts from the manufacturer. They later alleged that the company’s warranty practices unlawfully conditioned warranty coverage on the exclusive use of its own parts, in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and various state antitrust laws.The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the plaintiffs’ lawsuits and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The district court dismissed the consolidated complaint for failure to state a claim. It found that the limited warranty did not condition benefits on exclusive use of manufacturer parts and that the risk of losing warranty coverage was insufficient to establish an anticompetitive tying arrangement or economic coercion under state antitrust law. The court also dismissed related state law claims premised on the same conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Seventh Circuit held that the warranty’s terms did not create an express or implied tie prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, nor did the complaint plausibly allege violations of the Act’s disclosure or pre-sale availability requirements. The court further held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege sufficient market power or anticompetitive effects to support their state antitrust claims, and that the warranty’s terms were available to consumers at the time of purchase, precluding a Kodak-style lock-in theory. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims. View "Heymer v. Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas in Wisconsin alleged that several gas companies participated in a conspiracy to fix natural gas prices between 2000 and 2002. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in practices such as wash trading, churning, and false reporting to manipulate published price indices, which in turn affected the prices paid by purchasers in Wisconsin. The plaintiffs sought remedies under Wisconsin antitrust law, including both a “full consideration” refund of payments made under contracts tainted by the conspiracy and treble damages.The litigation was initially consolidated with similar cases from other states in multidistrict proceedings in the District of Nevada, where class certification was denied. After the Ninth Circuit vacated that denial and remanded, the Wisconsin case was returned to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. There, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), relying on expert testimony to show that the alleged price-fixing had a common impact on all class members. The defendants countered with their own experts, arguing that the natural gas market’s complexity and variations in contract terms precluded common proof of impact. The district court certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, but did not fully resolve the disputes between the parties’ experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court was required to engage in a more rigorous analysis of the conflicting expert evidence regarding antitrust impact and the existence of a national market. The Seventh Circuit vacated the class certification and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to make factual findings on these expert disputes before deciding whether class certification is appropriate. View "Arandell Corporation v. Xcel Energy Inc." on Justia Law

East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC and NorthPoint Development, LLC (the East Gate parties) are involved in a dispute with CenterPoint Properties Trust and its affiliates (the CenterPoint parties) over development projects in the Joliet Intermodal Zone in Illinois. CenterPoint entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with local authorities to build a toll bridge, while East Gate later secured an agreement allowing heavy trucks to bypass this toll bridge, which CenterPoint claims violates the MOU.The CenterPoint parties sued in Will County Court to enjoin the East Gate agreement, initially losing but later securing a preliminary injunction on remand from the Illinois Appellate Court. The state court has yet to rule on the merits. Subsequently, the East Gate parties filed a federal antitrust lawsuit, claiming the MOU unlawfully restricted competition. The CenterPoint parties argued the federal court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, should abstain under the Colorado River doctrine, and that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shielded them from antitrust liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument, dismissed the Noerr-Pennington motion without addressing the merits, but stayed the federal proceedings under Colorado River. The East Gate parties appealed the stay, while the CenterPoint parties cross-appealed the rejection of their motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that the stay did not effectively end the federal case and was merely a case management decision. The court also found no basis for immediate appeal of the interlocutory orders denying the motions to dismiss, as these could be reviewed after a final decision. View "East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC v. CenterPoint Properties Trust" on Justia Law

United Wisconsin Grain Producers LLC, along with six other ethanol producers, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM). They alleged that ADM manipulated indexes used to set U.S. ethanol prices, forcing them to charge lower prices in their ethanol sales contracts. The plaintiffs claimed monopolization, attempted monopolization, and market manipulation under § 2 of the Sherman Act and parallel state laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed the case. The court found that United Wisconsin Grain failed to allege that ADM recouped its losses from below-cost prices by charging monopoly prices, which is necessary for a monopolization claim. Additionally, the plaintiffs waived their challenge to the dismissal of the attempted monopolization claim. The court also noted that the Sherman Act does not recognize a generalized market manipulation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that United Wisconsin Grain did not allege the necessary recoupment by way of monopoly prices for a monopolization claim. The court also concluded that United Wisconsin Grain waived its attempted monopolization claim by not adequately addressing it in their appeal. Lastly, the court held that the Sherman Act does not support a separate market manipulation claim based on generalized harm to the market. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint was affirmed. View "United Wisconsin Grain Producers LLC v. Archer Daniels Midland Co." on Justia Law

Nyzier Fourqurean, a member of the University of Wisconsin-Madison's football team, challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) under § 1 of the Sherman Act. He argued that the NCAA's Five-Year Rule, which restricts student-athletes to four seasons of competition within a five-year period, unreasonably restrained trade by preventing him from playing a fifth season. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, allowing Fourqurean to play an additional season, reasoning that the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Alston suggested that men's NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) football is a relevant market and that the Five-Year Rule likely had anticompetitive effects.The district court concluded that Fourqurean was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, citing Alston and the trend in the law since that decision. The court found that the NCAA's Five-Year Rule excluded student-athletes from the market when their marketability for name, image, and likeness (NIL) income was at its peak. The court also acknowledged the rule's procompetitive benefit of linking athletic careers to degree progression but suggested that the NCAA could achieve this with less restrictive means.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Fourqurean failed to define the relevant market independently and did not establish that the Five-Year Rule had anticompetitive effects. The court emphasized that exclusion from the market alone does not suffice to show anticompetitive effects and that Fourqurean did not demonstrate how the rule harmed competition or created, protected, or enhanced the NCAA's dominant position in the market. Consequently, the court found that Fourqurean did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of his Sherman Act claim. View "Fourqurean v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

A class member objected to the district court's award of attorney's fees in a class action antitrust litigation involving broiler chicken producers. The district court had awarded attorney's fees based on a hypothetical ex ante market for legal services, considering the risk of nonpayment and the normal rate of compensation at the litigation's outset. The objector argued that the district court included skewed fee awards in its calculation.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had awarded attorney's fees, but the objector, John Andren, successfully argued on appeal that the court erred by discounting certain auction bids and excluding fee awards from the Ninth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case, instructing the district court to reconsider these factors. On remand, the district court awarded a new fee, excluding certain bids and Ninth Circuit awards, and giving significant weight to a specific fee agreement from a comparable case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's revised fee award. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain bids and Ninth Circuit awards but erred in relying on a skewed sample of ex post awards. The Seventh Circuit adjusted the fee award by removing non-representative data points, resulting in a revised award of 26.6% of the net common fund. The court affirmed the district court's fee award as modified and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Andren v End User Consumer Plaintiff Class" on Justia Law

In this case, plaintiffs in a class action alleged that several corporations in the broiler chicken market violated antitrust laws by engaging in bid rigging and reducing the supply of broiler chickens. The plaintiffs claimed that these actions led to anomalous dips in sales, which they attributed to collusion on price and output. The class action was divided into two tracks: Track 1, which omitted bid-rigging allegations for faster discovery and trial, and Track 2, which included bid-rigging theories and state law claims by indirect purchasers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed the class to place claims against Simmons Foods, Inc. and Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc. on Track 1. Simmons settled for $8 million, but several class members, including the Boston Market group, objected to the settlement. They argued that the settlement was inadequate and that they should not be included in the class because they had filed their own antitrust suits. However, they missed the deadline to opt out of the class, and the district court approved the settlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the settlement's release language was broad enough to cover bid-rigging claims and that the $8 million settlement was reasonable. The court noted that the Boston Market group did not provide evidence that the settlement amount was unreasonably low. Additionally, the court observed that the class had lost a related trial and that criminal antitrust prosecutions against some firms had ended in mistrials or acquittals, indicating uncertainty about the plaintiffs' prospects. The court affirmed the district court's approval of the settlement. View "Boston Market Corporation v Mountainaire Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court certified eight classes, consisting of persons in Illinois and Missouri who take eye drops manufactured by six pharmaceutical companies for treatment of glaucoma. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ eye drops are unnecessarily large and wasteful, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, so that the price of the eye drops is excessive and that the large eye drops have a higher risk of side effects. There was no claim that members of the class have experienced side effects or have been harmed because they ran out of them early. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. The court noted possible legitimate reasons for large drops, the absence of any misrepresentation or collusion, and that defendants’ large eye drops have been approved by the FDA for safety and efficacy. “You cannot sue a company and argue only ‘it could do better by us,’” nor can one bring a suit in federal court without pleading that one has been injured. The plaintiffs allege only “disappointment.” View "Eike v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

BMS provides administrative services to bankruptcy trustees. It uses Rabobank as the depositary for banking services that BMS provides through its software. Crane, the trustee in the Integrated bankruptcy, hired BMS; the contract required Crane to hire Rabobank for banking services in the proceeding. In a separate contract, Crane authorized Rabobank to withdraw its monthly fee. The plaintiff, a law firm, was a creditor of Integrated and filed a bankruptcy claim, ultimately receiving a distribution of $12,472.55. It would have received $12,666.90, but for its part of Rabobank’s fee, and more had Rabobank paid interest on the estate’s deposits. Plaintiff sued under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 1972(1)(E), which states that a bank shall not "extend credit, lease or sell property of any kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing, on the condition … that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or service from a competitor of such bank … other than a condition … to assure the soundness of the credit.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Had Rabobank conditioned its provision of services on the trustee never hiring any other bank in any bankruptcy proceeding, it would constitute exclusive dealing. No one forced Crane to deal with BMS and Rabobank and there was no argument that the fee was exorbitant, or would have been lower with a different bank. View "McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Rabobank, N.A." on Justia Law