Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the owners of the Las Vegas Review-Journal and the Las Vegas Sun regarding a 2005 joint operating arrangement (JOA). The 2005 JOA amended a 1989 JOA, which had been approved by the U.S. Attorney General under the Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA). The NPA allows failing newspapers to combine operations with another newspaper while maintaining editorial independence, provided they receive prior written consent from the Attorney General. The 2005 JOA was not approved by the Attorney General.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the defendants' motion to dissolve a stipulated injunction that required them to continue performing under the 2005 JOA. The district court concluded that the Attorney General's approval was not necessary for the 2005 JOA to be enforceable, interpreting the NPA as only denying antitrust exemption without invalidating the JOA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 2005 JOA is unlawful and unenforceable under the NPA because it did not receive the required prior written consent from the Attorney General. The court clarified that the language of the NPA is clear and unequivocal, declaring unapproved JOAs to be unlawful to enter into, perform, or enforce. The court also rejected the district court's interpretation that the lack of approval merely meant the parties lacked antitrust exemption. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LAS VEGAS SUN, INC. V. ADELSON" on Justia Law

Epic Games, Inc. filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google after Google removed Epic's Fortnite video game from the Google Play Store for noncompliance with its terms of service. Epic had embedded secret code into Fortnite’s software to bypass Google’s required payment-processing systems, which charged a 30% commission on in-app purchases. The jury found that Epic had proven the relevant product markets for Android app distribution and Android in-app billing services and that Google violated both federal and California antitrust laws by willfully acquiring or maintaining monopoly power in those markets, unreasonably restraining trade, and unlawfully tying the use of the Play Store to Google Play Billing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California entered a three-year injunction against Google, prohibiting it from providing certain benefits to app distributors, developers, OEMs, or carriers in exchange for advantaging the Play Store. The injunction also required Google to allow developers to provide users with information about and access to alternative app billing, pricing, and distribution channels. Google appealed the liability verdict and the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict and upheld the district court’s injunction. The court rejected Google’s claim that a decision in Apple’s favor in a similar lawsuit precluded Epic from defining the market differently in this case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a jury trial on Epic’s equitable claims and Google’s damages counterclaims. The court also found that the injunction was supported by the jury’s verdict and the district court’s own findings, and that the district court had broad discretion to craft the antitrust injunction. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

A stockholder of Amazon.com, Inc. sent a letter to the company demanding to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The stockholder aimed to investigate potential wrongdoing and mismanagement by Amazon, believing the company engaged in anticompetitive activities in the U.S. and Europe. When the stockholder and Amazon could not agree on certain conditions for producing the records, the stockholder filed an action in the Court of Chancery.A Magistrate in Chancery conducted a one-day trial and concluded that the stockholder did not meet its burden to prove a "credible basis" for inferring possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The stockholder took exceptions to the final report. A Vice Chancellor adopted the final report's conclusion but did not reach its credible basis analysis, instead finding the scope of the stockholder's stated purpose to be "facially improper" and not "lucid."On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that the Vice Chancellor erred in interpreting the scope of the stockholder's purpose and was required to engage with the evidence presented. The court determined that the evidence, including a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission against Amazon for alleged antitrust violations that largely survived a motion to dismiss, established a credible basis from which a court could infer possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Chancery and remanded for further proceedings to determine the scope and conditions of production consistent with its decision. View "Roberta Ann K.W. Wong Leung Revocable Trust v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the former owner-operator of a professional baseball franchise in Puerto Rico and the league, its president, and other franchise owners. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to force the former owner to relinquish control of the franchise, violating the Sherman Act, a federal civil rights statute, and various Puerto Rico laws. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants' actions were in retaliation for the former owner's public criticism of the conditions at the team's stadium and his proposal to move the team to another municipality.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims, citing the "business of baseball" exemption. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs' claims under Puerto Rico's antitrust and fair competition laws were preempted by federal law. Additionally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal civil rights claim on res judicata grounds, based on a prior judgment from the Superior Court of San Juan. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Puerto Rico law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Sherman Act claims, agreeing that the "business of baseball" exemption applied to the Puerto Rico professional baseball league. However, the court vacated the District Court's dismissal of the Puerto Rico antitrust and fair competition claims, finding that the District Court had incorrectly applied the Supremacy Clause. The court also reversed the dismissal of the federal civil rights claim, concluding that the District Court had misapplied the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, the court reversed the dismissal of the remaining Puerto Rico law claim, as a federal claim remained in the case. View "Cangrejeros de Santurce Baseball Club, LLC v. Liga de Beisbol Profesional de Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC and NorthPoint Development, LLC (the East Gate parties) are involved in a dispute with CenterPoint Properties Trust and its affiliates (the CenterPoint parties) over development projects in the Joliet Intermodal Zone in Illinois. CenterPoint entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with local authorities to build a toll bridge, while East Gate later secured an agreement allowing heavy trucks to bypass this toll bridge, which CenterPoint claims violates the MOU.The CenterPoint parties sued in Will County Court to enjoin the East Gate agreement, initially losing but later securing a preliminary injunction on remand from the Illinois Appellate Court. The state court has yet to rule on the merits. Subsequently, the East Gate parties filed a federal antitrust lawsuit, claiming the MOU unlawfully restricted competition. The CenterPoint parties argued the federal court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, should abstain under the Colorado River doctrine, and that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shielded them from antitrust liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument, dismissed the Noerr-Pennington motion without addressing the merits, but stayed the federal proceedings under Colorado River. The East Gate parties appealed the stay, while the CenterPoint parties cross-appealed the rejection of their motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that the stay did not effectively end the federal case and was merely a case management decision. The court also found no basis for immediate appeal of the interlocutory orders denying the motions to dismiss, as these could be reviewed after a final decision. View "East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC v. CenterPoint Properties Trust" on Justia Law

United Wisconsin Grain Producers LLC, along with six other ethanol producers, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM). They alleged that ADM manipulated indexes used to set U.S. ethanol prices, forcing them to charge lower prices in their ethanol sales contracts. The plaintiffs claimed monopolization, attempted monopolization, and market manipulation under § 2 of the Sherman Act and parallel state laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed the case. The court found that United Wisconsin Grain failed to allege that ADM recouped its losses from below-cost prices by charging monopoly prices, which is necessary for a monopolization claim. Additionally, the plaintiffs waived their challenge to the dismissal of the attempted monopolization claim. The court also noted that the Sherman Act does not recognize a generalized market manipulation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that United Wisconsin Grain did not allege the necessary recoupment by way of monopoly prices for a monopolization claim. The court also concluded that United Wisconsin Grain waived its attempted monopolization claim by not adequately addressing it in their appeal. Lastly, the court held that the Sherman Act does not support a separate market manipulation claim based on generalized harm to the market. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint was affirmed. View "United Wisconsin Grain Producers LLC v. Archer Daniels Midland Co." on Justia Law

Nyzier Fourqurean, a member of the University of Wisconsin-Madison's football team, challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) under § 1 of the Sherman Act. He argued that the NCAA's Five-Year Rule, which restricts student-athletes to four seasons of competition within a five-year period, unreasonably restrained trade by preventing him from playing a fifth season. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, allowing Fourqurean to play an additional season, reasoning that the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Alston suggested that men's NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) football is a relevant market and that the Five-Year Rule likely had anticompetitive effects.The district court concluded that Fourqurean was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, citing Alston and the trend in the law since that decision. The court found that the NCAA's Five-Year Rule excluded student-athletes from the market when their marketability for name, image, and likeness (NIL) income was at its peak. The court also acknowledged the rule's procompetitive benefit of linking athletic careers to degree progression but suggested that the NCAA could achieve this with less restrictive means.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Fourqurean failed to define the relevant market independently and did not establish that the Five-Year Rule had anticompetitive effects. The court emphasized that exclusion from the market alone does not suffice to show anticompetitive effects and that Fourqurean did not demonstrate how the rule harmed competition or created, protected, or enhanced the NCAA's dominant position in the market. Consequently, the court found that Fourqurean did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of his Sherman Act claim. View "Fourqurean v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

A class member objected to the district court's award of attorney's fees in a class action antitrust litigation involving broiler chicken producers. The district court had awarded attorney's fees based on a hypothetical ex ante market for legal services, considering the risk of nonpayment and the normal rate of compensation at the litigation's outset. The objector argued that the district court included skewed fee awards in its calculation.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had awarded attorney's fees, but the objector, John Andren, successfully argued on appeal that the court erred by discounting certain auction bids and excluding fee awards from the Ninth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case, instructing the district court to reconsider these factors. On remand, the district court awarded a new fee, excluding certain bids and Ninth Circuit awards, and giving significant weight to a specific fee agreement from a comparable case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's revised fee award. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain bids and Ninth Circuit awards but erred in relying on a skewed sample of ex post awards. The Seventh Circuit adjusted the fee award by removing non-representative data points, resulting in a revised award of 26.6% of the net common fund. The court affirmed the district court's fee award as modified and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Andren v End User Consumer Plaintiff Class" on Justia Law

CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (collectively, “CoStar”) and Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXi”) are online platforms competing in the commercial real estate listing, information, and auction markets. CoStar sued CREXi for copyright infringement, alleging that CREXi listed images and information hosted by CoStar without permission. CREXi counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, asserting that CoStar engaged in monopolistic practices to exclude competition.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed CREXi’s antitrust counterclaims and directed entry of final judgment on those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court held that CREXi failed to show CoStar had monopoly power and that the agreements at issue were not exclusive. CREXi appealed the dismissal of its antitrust counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust counterclaims. The Ninth Circuit held that CREXi successfully stated claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that CREXi plausibly alleged CoStar had monopoly power in the relevant markets and engaged in anticompetitive conduct by entering into de facto exclusive deals with brokers and imposing technological barriers to entry. The court concluded that a monopolist using its power to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and using exclusive deals to do so violates § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The court also held that CREXi stated claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CREXi’s tortious interference claims as they were improperly raised. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC." on Justia Law

Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law