Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Mark Ibsen, Inc., the owner and operator of the Urgent Care Plus medical clinic in Helena, purchased health insurance coverage for its employees from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBSMT) through a Chamber of Commerce program. Health Care Corporation (Health Care) subsequently acquired BCBSMT’s health insurance business and changed its name to Caring for Montanans, Inc. (Caring). Less than one year later, Ibsen filed a complaint and class action against Caring and Health Care claiming that they had violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). Health Care filed a motion to dismiss and Caring filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions, concluding that the legislature did not provide private citizens with the right to bring a cause of action to enforce the UTPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ibsen may not maintain a private right of action for violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-208 and -212 of the UTPA; and (2) in the alternative, Ibsen’s claims cannot be sustained as common law claims. View "Mark Ibsen, Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc." on Justia Law

John Fanning founded Jerk LLC (Jerk) and Jerk.com in 2009. From 2009 to 2014, Jerk operated Jerk.com. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission (Commission) filed an administrative complaint charging Jerk and Fanning with engaging in deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission entered a summary decision finding Fanning personally liable for misrepresentations contained on Jerk.com. Fanning petitioned for review. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the Commission’s finding of liability and the recordkeeping provisions and order acknowledgement requirement of the Commission’s remedial order; but (2) vacated Fanning’s compliance monitoring provisions, holding that these provisions were overbroad and not reasonably related to Fanning’s violation. View "Fanning v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Sanofi has sold Lovenox, an anticoagulant drug, in the U.S. since 1993. Fragmin, a competing injectable, sold only abroad until 2005, when Eisai obtained a U.S. license. Some Fragmin indications overlap Lovenox’s indications. The relevant product market also includes two other injectable anticoagulant drugs. In 2005-2010, Lovenox had the most indications of the four drugs, the largest sales force, and a market share of 81.5% to 92.3%. Fragmin had the second largest market share at 4.3-8.2%. In 2005-2010, Sanofi offered the “Lovenox Acute Contract Value Program.” Eisai alleged anticompetitive conduct by: market share and volume discounts, a restrictive formulary access clause, and aggressive sales tactics in marketing the Program. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Sanofi. What Eisai called “payoffs” were only discounts Sanofi offered its customers; what Eisai called “agreements with hospitals to block access” were actually provisions proscribing customers from favoring competing drugs over Lovenox. What Eisai called “a campaign of ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt’” was simply Sanofi’s marketing. Under the rule of reason, there was no evidence that Sanofi’s actions caused broad harm to the competitive nature of the anticoagulant market. If Sanofi’s conduct caused damage to its competitors, that is not a harm for which Congress has prescribed a remedy. View "Eisai Inc v. Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of West Coast fishermen, filed suit againt Frank Dulcich, Pacific Seafood, and an Ocean Gold entity, alleging antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Defendants appealed the district court's decision granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the acquisition and denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration because plaintiffs' claims are not within the scope of the purported arbitration provision in the Resolution Agreement. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction where plaintiffs have shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits because plaintiffs did not release their claims in a prior settlement, plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the proposed transaction could substantially lessen competition, plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of the equities tips in plaintiffs' favor, a preliminary injunction is in the public interest, and the preliminary injunction is not overbroad. View "Boardman v. Pacific Seafood Grp." on Justia Law

The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency sought a prime contractor to provide event-planning services. Plaintiffs offered their services as joint subcontractors to Navar, Inc. Plaintiffs and Navar entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and a Teaming Agreement, which provided that if Navar were awarded a prime contract then it would negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs. The Defense Agency awarded Navar a five-year prime contract, but Navar did not extend subcontracts to either Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sued Navar, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and trade secret misappropriation. A jury found (1) Navar had breached the NDA and Teaming Agreement, and (2) Navar misappropriated one plaintiff’s trade secretes under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The trial court set aside the verdict on breach of the Teaming Agreement and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Navar could not be found liable for breach of contract because nothing in the Act or the NDA required Navar to use Plaintiffs as subcontractors; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding the Teaming Agreement was unenforceable as a binding contract. View "Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council" on Justia Law

An Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) is a U.S. communication service between land and vessels in navigable waterways, existing on specific broadcast frequencies. Advances in technology have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTSs. Under the original site-based system, small geographic regions were defined by location and the waterway served and the FCC provided licenses at no cost to the first applicant. In 2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began issuing licenses by competitive bidding; it divided the U.S. into 10 regions and, at public auctions, sold “geographic” licenses for two blocks of AMTS frequencies in each region. Although geographic licensees may generally place stations anywhere within their region, they may not interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations, so the location of a site-based station creates a gap in a geographic licensee’s coverage area. Plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying pre-existing site-based licenses. Site-based operators refused to provide plaintiffs with the operating contours for their site-based locations within plaintiffs’ geographic locations. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FCA claims and a determination that no antitrust conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs did not identify particular actions that were determined by the FCC to be unreasonable or unjust and, therefore, do not possess a private right of action. View "Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

An Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) is a U.S. communication service between land and vessels in navigable waterways, existing on specific broadcast frequencies. Advances in technology have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTSs. Under the original site-based system, small geographic regions were defined by location and the waterway served and the FCC provided licenses at no cost to the first applicant. In 2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began issuing licenses by competitive bidding; it divided the U.S. into 10 regions and, at public auctions, sold “geographic” licenses for two blocks of AMTS frequencies in each region. Although geographic licensees may generally place stations anywhere within their region, they may not interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations, so the location of a site-based station creates a gap in a geographic licensee’s coverage area. Plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying pre-existing site-based licenses. Site-based operators refused to provide plaintiffs with the operating contours for their site-based locations within plaintiffs’ geographic locations. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FCA claims and a determination that no antitrust conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs did not identify particular actions that were determined by the FCC to be unreasonable or unjust and, therefore, do not possess a private right of action. View "Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Flovac, Inc. and Airvac, Inc. both fabricate vacuum sewer systems. Flovac filed suit against Airvac seeking relief under both federal and Puerto Rico antitrust laws and alleging that Airvac’s conduct in marketing its vacuum sewer systems was anticompetitive. Flovac also brought claims of tortious interference with advantageous economic relations under Puerto Rico’s general tort statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Airvac on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because the summary judgment record disclosed a relevant market much broader than Flovac claimed and a market where Defendant lacked market dominance, summary judgment was properly granted on Flovac’s antitrust claims; and (2) Flovac’s claim of tortious interference with advantageous economic relations was time-barred. View "Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc." on Justia Law

Flovac, Inc. and Airvac, Inc. both fabricate vacuum sewer systems. Flovac filed suit against Airvac seeking relief under both federal and Puerto Rico antitrust laws and alleging that Airvac’s conduct in marketing its vacuum sewer systems was anticompetitive. Flovac also brought claims of tortious interference with advantageous economic relations under Puerto Rico’s general tort statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Airvac on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because the summary judgment record disclosed a relevant market much broader than Flovac claimed and a market where Defendant lacked market dominance, summary judgment was properly granted on Flovac’s antitrust claims; and (2) Flovac’s claim of tortious interference with advantageous economic relations was time-barred. View "Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc." on Justia Law

Gene Wong was employed by Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (HAL) as a pilot until he retired. Upon retiring, Wong became eligible to receive medical insurance paid for by HAL. Wong claimed that, as a result of misinformation he received from the employee benefits director, he did not complete the necessary forms to enroll in Medicare Part B coverage for almost a decade. Wong filed suit against HAL, alleging negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair or deceptive practice (UDAP). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HAL, concluding that (1) Wong’s negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims were preempted by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA) because any duty HAL owed would be derived from HAL’s obligations to retired pilots under a collective bargaining agreement between HAL and the Airline Pilots Association, and (2) the UDAP claim failed because the deceptive act did not occur in the conduct of any trade or commerce. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the record in this case did not support federal preemption of Wong’s negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims because these claims were not dependent on the Pilots Agreement; and (2) summary judgment was correctly granted on Wong’s UDAP claim. View "Wong v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law