Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

William and Sarah Bassett, who were insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, alleged that State Farm engaged in unfair trade practices with regard to the Bassetts’ assertion of unfair trade practices. The Bassetts based their claim on the assertion that State Farm never properly offered additional uninsured coverage, as State Farm was statutorily required to do. The circuit court granted the Bassetts’ motion to compel answers to three interrogatories seeking the names, addresses and telephone numbers of State Farm insureds in West Virginia who may have experienced difficulties regarding their uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm filed this original proceeding in prohibition asking the Court to prohibit enforcement of its discovery order. The Supreme Court granted relief, as moulded, prohibiting enforcement of the order granting the Bassetts’ motion to compel, concluding that the circuit court erred by failing to bar the disclosure of the names, addresses and telephone numbers of State Farm’s other insureds. View "State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hon. Jeffrey D. Cramer" on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against Commerce Planet in order to enjoin it's deceptive marketing of a product called “OnlineSupplier.” The FTC alleged that Commerce Planet violated section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). Commerce Planet and two individual defendants settled. The remaining defendant, Charles Gugliuzza, was enjoined from engaging in similar misconduct and ordered to pay $18.2 million in restitution. In this opinion, the court addressed Gugliuzza's arguments contesting the validity of the restitution award. The court concluded that the district court had the authority to award restitution under section 13(b) of the FTC Act; the court saw no basis for holding that courts are categorically precluded from imposing joint and several liability in actions brought under section 13(b); because joint and several liability is permissible, restitution awards need not be limited to the funds each defendant personally received from the wrongful conduct; and, in this case, the judgment entered against Gugliuzza does not actually hold him jointly and severally liable for Commerce Planet’s restitution obligations. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment. If on remand the district court decides, in the exercise of its discretion, to hold Gugliuzza jointly and severally liable with Commerce Planet, it may reinstate the $18.2 million restitution award. Otherwise, the award must be limited to the unjust gains Gugliuzza himself received. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly followed the two-step burden-shifting framework for calculating restitution awards under section 13(b) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the amount of the award in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "FTC V. Commerce Planet, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, five structural steel contractors filed a complaint against a local union - Labor Union No. 7 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers - alleging labor law violations under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), antitrust law violations under the Sherman Act, and other violations under state law. The First Circuit reviewed the matter and found elements pertaining to the federal claims undeveloped. Therefore, the Court remanded for further proceedings. After a trial, the case once again reached the First Circuit, with both parties appealing and cross-appealing various aspects of the final judgment. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions upholding the LMRA jury verdict and award of damages for Plaintiffs D.F.M. Industries, Inc. and Ajax Construction Company, Inc. and granting summary judgment for Defendant on the antitrust claims, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7" on Justia Law

Lexmark makes and sells printer toner cartridges, for which it holds patents. Lexmark buyers may purchase a “Regular Cartridge” at full price, not subject to any terms restricting reuse or resale of the cartridge, or may purchase a “Return Program Cartridge” at a discount, subject to a single-use/no-resale restriction. Impression acquired restricted cartridges for resale in the U.S. after a third party physically modified them to enable re-use. Impression’s actions infringe under 35 U.S.C. 271, unless Lexmark’s initial sale of the cartridges constitutes the grant of authority that makes later resale and importation non-infringing under the doctrine of exhaustion. The Federal Circuit, en banc, held that a patentee, when selling a patented article subject to a single-use/no-resale restriction that is lawful and clearly communicated to the purchaser, does not thereby give the buyer, or downstream buyers, the resale/reuse authority that has been expressly denied. Such resale or reuse, when contrary to known, lawful limits on the authority conferred at the original sale, remains unauthorized, infringing conduct under section 271. Under Supreme Court precedent, a patentee may preserve its 271 rights through such restrictions when licensing others to make and sell patented articles; there is no basis for denying the same ability to the patentee that sells the articles itself. View "Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

3M and TransWeb manufacture respirator filters, consisting of “nonwoven fibrous webs.” 3M sued Transweb for infringement of several patents. TransWeb sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement. A jury found the patents to be invalid based on TransWeb’s prior public use of the patented method. In accordance with an advisory verdict from the jury, the district court found the patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. An inventor for the patents and a 3M in-house attorney acted with specific intent to deceive the patent office as to the TransWeb materials. The district court awarded approximately $26 million to TransWeb, including trebled attorney fees as antitrust damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient corroborating evidence to support the finding of prior public use by TransWeb, and that attorney fees are an appropriate basis for damages under the antitrust laws in this context. TransWeb’s attorney fees appropriately flow from the unlawful aspect of 3M’s antitrust violation and are an antitrust injury that can properly serve as the basis for antitrust damages. View "Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co." on Justia Law

IMP filed suit against LN, alleging that LN violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., by engaging in monopolization, tying arrangements, and exclusive dealing in the music concert industry. IMP and LN both promote concert tours and operate concert venues, but they differ in geographic reach. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to LN, concluding that IMP failed to define the relevant markets or to demonstrate any anticompetitive conduct. View "It's My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, attorneys Eric Turton and Oscar Gonzalez and the Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, alleging that they misappropriated $75,000 in trust funds that Turton received after settling a case on Plaintiff’s behalf. The jury found that all three defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise and a joint venture with respect to Plaintiff’s case and committed various torts in relation to Plaintiff. In response to a proportionate-responsibility question, the jury assigned forty percent to Turton, thirty percent to Gonzalez, and thirty percent to the Law Office. The trial court entered judgment holding all three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual damages, pre-judgment interest, additional Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act damages, and attorney’s fees. Gonzalez and the Law Office appealed. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff could only recover for professional negligence, which amounted to $77,500 in actual damages. The court’s opinion did not address the jury’s proportionate-responsibility findings but nonetheless applied those findings in its judgment, ordering Gonzalez and the Law Firm to each pay Sloan $23,250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to address the sufficiency of the evidence of a joint enterprise or joint venture or the legal implications of those findings. Remanded. View "Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc." on Justia Law

Between 2001 and 2004, Nitek Electronics, Inc. entered thirty-six shipments of pipe fitting components used for gas meters into the United States from China. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) claimed that the merchandise was misclassified and issued Nitek a final penalty claim stating that the tentative culpability was gross negligence. Customs then referred the matter to the United States Department of Justice (“Government”) to bring a claim against Nitek in the Court of International Trade to enforce the penalty. The Government brought suit against Nitek to recover lost duties, antidumping duties, and a penalty based on negligence under 19 U.S.C. 1592. Nitek moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The court denied dismissal of the claims to recover lost duties and antidumping duties but did dismiss the Government’s claim for a penalty based on negligence, concluding that the Government had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies under 19 U.S.C. 1592 by not having Customs demand a penalty based on negligence, instead of gross negligence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the statutory framework of section 1592 does not allow the Government to bring a penalty claim based on negligence in court because such a claim did not exist at the administrative level. View "United States v. Nitek Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce determined that utility scale wind towers from the People’s Republic of China and utility scale wind towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (together, the subject merchandise) were sold in the United States at less than fair value and that it received countervailable subsidies. The International Trade Commission made a final affirmative determination of material injury to the domestic industry. The determination was by divided vote of the six-member Commission. The Court of International Trade upheld the Commission’s affirmative injury determination. Siemens Energy, Inc., an importer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the determination. The issues on appeal concerned the interpretation and effect of the divided vote. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Court of International Trade properly upheld the Commission’s affirmative injury determination. View "Simens Energy, Inc. v. United States, Wind Tower Trade Coalition" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were Richtek Technology Corporation, a Taiwan corporation, and Richtek USA, Inc., its California subsidiary. Respondents were James Chang, H.P. Huang and J.C. Chen, Taiwan residents and former employees of Richtek Technology, and uPI Semiconductor Corporation, a California company they formed. Appellants sued Respondents for trade secret misappropriation. uPI, Chang and Huang filed a demurrer on the ground that Appellants’ claims were time-barred under Taiwan’s statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation claims. Huang, Chang and Chen also filed a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in their employment agreements mandating a Taiwanese forum for Richtek Technology’s trade secret claims. The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted Chen’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed the order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, holding that the trial court erred by using previous complaints filed in Taiwan to conclude that Appellants had knowledge of the misappropriation at issue in this lawsuit and the identity of the parties liable for damages; and (2) affirmed the order granting Chen’s motion to dismiss, holding that the forum selection clause in the employment agreement between Chen and Richtek Technology was mandatory. View "Richtek USA v. uPI Semiconductor Corp." on Justia Law