Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Best designs and markets exit signs and emergency lighting. Pace manufactured products to Best’s specifications. Best’s founder taught Pace how to manufacture the necessary tooling. There was no contract prohibiting Pace from competing with Best. By 2004, Best was aware that Pace was selling products identical to those it made for Best to Best’s established customers. Several other problems arose between the companies. When they ended the relationship, Pace was in possession of all of the tooling used to manufacture Best’s products and the cloned products, and Best owed Pace almost $900,000 for products delivered. Pace filed a breach of contract suit. Best requested a setoff of damages for breach of warranty and counterclaimed for breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and fraud. Pace claimed that Best had misappropriated Pace’s trade secrets and had tortiously interfered with Pace’s contracts. The district court found that Best had breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay, but that Pace was liable for breach of warranties, breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Pace is liable for breach of contract and tortious interference, but reversed or vacated as to the trade secrets, Lanham Act, conversion, and warranties claims. View "Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, users and operators of independent (non-bank) ATMs, filed related actions against Visa, MasterCard, and certain affiliated banks, alleging anticompetitive schemes for pricing ATM access fees. Plaintiffs alleged anticompetitive harm because Visa and MasterCard prevent an independent operator from charging less, and potentially earning more, when an ATM transaction is processed through a network unaffiliated with Visa and MasterCard. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to establish standing or the existence of a horizontal conspiracy to restrain trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Osborn v. Visa Inc." on Justia Law

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) creates and assigns top level domains (TLDs), such as “.com” and “.net.” Plaintiff, a registry specializing in “expressive” TLDs, filed suit alleging that the 2012 Application Round for the creation of new TLDs violated federal and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because plaintiff failed to allege an anticompetitive agreement; the court rejected plaintiff's claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, because ICANN’s authority was lawfully obtained through a contract with the DOC and did not unlawfully acquire or maintain its monopoly; the trademark and unfair competition claims were not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not alleged that ICANN has delegated or intends to delegate any of the TLDs that plaintiff uses; and the complaint failed to allege a claim for tortious interference or unfair business practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "name.space, Inc. V. ICANN" on Justia Law

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) creates and assigns top level domains (TLDs), such as “.com” and “.net.” Plaintiff, a registry specializing in “expressive” TLDs, filed suit alleging that the 2012 Application Round for the creation of new TLDs violated federal and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because plaintiff failed to allege an anticompetitive agreement; the court rejected plaintiff's claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, because ICANN’s authority was lawfully obtained through a contract with the DOC and did not unlawfully acquire or maintain its monopoly; the trademark and unfair competition claims were not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not alleged that ICANN has delegated or intends to delegate any of the TLDs that plaintiff uses; and the complaint failed to allege a claim for tortious interference or unfair business practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "name.space, Inc. V. ICANN" on Justia Law

The Robbinses provide towing and wrecker services along the I-44 corridor in eastern Missouri. State Highway Patrol (MSHP) Troops C and I, pursuant to MSHP policy, used a “rotation list” of approved towing and wrecking companies to determine which company to call to the scene of a disabled vehicle if the vehicle owner had no preference. The Robbinses were on both lists until they were removed, reportedly because Robbins had been charged with shooting at a competitor’s truck in 1999. The Robbinses alleged the criminal charge resulted from a “sham investigation” and that their competitor used a friendship with an MSHP officer, with whom Robbins had had a confrontation, to harm the Robbinses’ business. A jury acquitted Robbins, but they were never reinstated to either list. In 2005, the Robbinses sued the MSHP. The state court determined the MSHP lacked statutory authority to create a rotation list. In 2010, the Robbinses sued officers in their individual capacities, alleging due process and equal protection violations and conspiracy to violate those rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, claiming that the officers conspired to deny them work and disparaged their business. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Robbins v. Becker," on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, automobile body shops and an auto body association, brought this class action against Defendant, The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, on behalf of more than 1,000 independent auto body repair shops in Connecticut, claiming that Defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) by requiring its staff motor vehicle physical damage appraisers to use, when appraising auto body damage sustained by Defendant’s insureds, the hourly labor rates agreed on by Defendant and the plaintiff auto body shops instead of rates that more accurately reflect the actual value of those services. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Defendant’s hourly rate practices constituted an unfair trade practice because they offended the public policy found in section 38a-790-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court incorrectly concluded that section 38a-790-8 supports Plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim alleging unfair labor rate practices. View "Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

John and Jane Couto entered into a contract with Joseph General Contracting, Inc. for the purchase and construction of a home and carriage house. The trial court found that the contract existed also between the Coutos and Anthony Silvestri, the owner and president of Joseph General. After disputes arose regarding the construction of the dwellings, Joseph General sued the Coutos for, inter alia, breach of contract. The Coutos counterclaimed against Joseph General, Silvestri and Landel Realty, LLC. The trial court held Joseph General, Landel and Silvestri each jointly and severally liable for breach of contract and implied warranty, trespass and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Silvestri appealed the propriety of these adverse rulings with respect to his personal liability. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment pertaining to Silvestri in an individual capacity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the claims of breach and contract and implied warranty against Silvestri in his individual capacity and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in determining that Silvestri had incurred contractual obligations to the Coutos in his individual capacity; and (2) properly determined that Silvestri could be held individually liable for alleged violations of CUTPA. View "Joseph Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Couto" on Justia Law

The Justice Department and 33 states and territories filed suit alleging that Apple, in launching the iBookstore, had conspired with the Publisher Defendants to raise prices across the nascent ebook market, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., and state antitrust laws. All five Publisher Defendants settled and signed consent decrees, which prohibited them, for a period, from restricting ebook retailers’ ability to set prices. The district court found that the agreement constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act and, in the alternative, unreasonably restrained trade under the rule of reason. The district court issued an injunctive order that, inter alia, prevents Apple from entering into agreements with the Publisher Defendants that restrict its ability to set, alter, or reduce the price of ebooks, and requires Apple to apply the same terms and conditions to ebook applications sold on its devices as it does to other applications. The court concluded that the district court’s decision that Apple orchestrated a horizontal conspiracy among the Publisher Defendants to raise ebook prices is amply supported and well‐reasoned, and that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court also concluded that the district court’s injunction is lawful and consistent with preventing future anticompetitive harms. The court rejected Macmillan and Simon & Schuster's argument that the portion of the injunction related to Apple’s pricing authority either unlawfully modifies their consent decrees or should be judicially estopped. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging that Apple conspired with ATTM to violate federal antitrust laws by entering into an exclusivity agreement in which ATTM would be the exclusive provider of voice and data services for Apple's iPhone. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under F.R.C.P. 19 for failure to join ATTM as a defendant. As a preliminary matter, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because this is an appeal from a final decision of the district court. On the merits, the court concluded that ATTM's role as an antitrust co-conspirator is not alone dispositive of whether it had interests that warrant protection under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i). In this case, the district court erred by failing to specify the interests ATTM claimed or to address how those interests might be impaired if the action were resolved in its absence. The court concluded that Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM has a legally protected interest in this action where Apple has not demonstrated that the risk of regulatory scrutiny gives ATTM a legally protected interest in this action; ATTM’s reputational interests in this action are not legally protected under Rule 19; and Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM currently has any substantial contract rights that may be impaired by resolution of this action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ward v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

In this battle between two domestic producers of chondroitin sulfate, Plaintiffs filed suit claiming trade-secrets violations against Defendants. Before the Supreme Court was an interlocutory appeal on a discovery issue. The district court entered a protective order requiring the redesignation of Plaintiffs’ standard operating procedures from “attorneys’ eyes only” to “confidential,” which would allow these materials to be disclosed to the defendants themselves. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while removing the “attorneys’ eyes only” designation may have been appropriate, the district court’s rationale for ordering redesignation was insufficient. Remanded for further consideration. View "Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs., Inc." on Justia Law