Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case arose from alleged anticompetitive conduct in the ductile iron pipe fittings ("DIPF") market by McWane, Inc., a family-run company headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama. In 2009, following the passage of federal legislation that provided a large infusion of money for waterworks projects that required domestic pipe fittings, Star Pipe Products entered the domestic fittings market. In response, McWane, the dominant producer of domestic pipe fittings, announced to its distributors that (with limited exceptions) unless they bought all of their domestic fittings from McWane, they would lose their rebates and be cut off from purchases for 12 weeks. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") investigated and brought an enforcement action under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 45. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and a divided Commission, found that McWane's actions constituted an illegal exclusive dealing policy used to maintain McWane's monopoly power in the domestic fittings market. The Commission issued an order directing McWane to stop requiring exclusivity from distributors. McWane appealed, challenging nearly every aspect of the Commission's ruling. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit found the Commission's factual and economic conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission's ruling. View "McWane, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Gordon Auto Body Parts, a Taiwanese company, was one of several early entrants into the U.S. market for replacement truck hoods. PBSI eventually entered the market for certain replacement hoods but found that it could not match the prices of Gordon and other Taiwanese firms, with which Gordon had participated in joint ventures. Believing that Gordon and the other firms were conspiring to drive it out of business with predatory prices, PBSI brought antitrust claims against Gordon. The district court granted Gordon summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that PBSI failed to make any showing that Gordon’s prices were below an appropriate measure of cost. View "Superior Prod. P'shp v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co." on Justia Law

Institutions that buy natural gas directly from interstate pipelines sued, claiming that the pipelines had violated state antitrust laws: that they reported false information to the natural-gas indices on which natural-gas contracts were based. The indices affected both retail and wholesale natural-gas prices. The pipelines sought summary judgment, arguing that the Natural Gas Act pre-empted state-law claims. That Act gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to determine whether rates charged by natural-gas companies or practices affecting such rates are unreasonable, 15 U.S.C. 717d(a). It limits FERC’s jurisdiction to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale, and natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, leaving regulation of other portions of the industry, such as retail sales, to the states. The district court granted the motion. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Acknowledging that the pipelines’ index manipulation increased wholesale prices, it held that the state-law claims were not pre-empted because they were aimed at obtaining damages only for excessively high retail prices. The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing the importance of considering the target at which the state-law claims aim. Here, the claims are aimed at practices affecting retail prices, a matter “firmly on the States’ side of [the] dividing line.” State antitrust laws are not aimed at natural-gas companies in particular, but rather all businesses and states have long provided “common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices.” The industries did not identify a specific FERC determination that state antitrust claims are pre-empted by the Act. View "Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc." on Justia Law

In this putative nationwide class action Plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into purchasing Defendants’ “natural” cosmetics, which contained allegedly synthetic and artificial ingredients. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws, and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract. The district court dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so that the parties could seek expert guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not expressly preempt California’s state law causes of action that create consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels; (2) although the district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than staying proceedings while the parties sought guidance from the FDA; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of or superfluous to Plaintiffs’ other claims. View "Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

A class action antitrust suit on behalf of text messaging customers, claimed conspiracy by providers, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, to increase price per use. On remand, after three years of discovery, the district judge granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that it is difficult to prove illegal collusion without witnesses to an agreement. Competing firms can be expected to keep close track of each other’s pricing and other market behavior and often to imitate that behavior rather than try to undermine it. The plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence consistent with an inference of collusion, but that evidence was equally consistent with independent parallel behavior. Tacit collusion, also known as conscious parallelism, does not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Collusion is illegal only when based on agreement. Agreement can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the plaintiffs failed to find sufficient evidence of express collusion to make a prima facie case. View "Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are direct purchasers of traditional blood reagents, used to test blood compatibility between donors and recipients, from Immucor and OrthoClinical (defendants). By 1999, the entire domestic supply of that product was under defendants’ control. In 2000, defendants’ executives attended a trade meeting at which plaintiffs assert the conspiracy began. Defendants soon began rapidly increasing prices. By 2009, many prices had risen more than 2000%. Following a Department of Justice probe, private suits were filed, transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and consolidated. Plaintiffs sought damages under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, for alleged horizontal price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. After preliminary approval of plaintiffs’ settlement with Immucor, the court certified plaintiffs’ class of “[a]ll individuals and entities who purchased traditional blood reagents in the United States directly from Defendants ... at any time from January 1, 2000 through the present.” Plaintiffs relied in part on expert testimony to produce their antitrust impact analyses and damages models, which Ortho challenged. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Comcast v. Behrend, which reversed Behrend v. Comcast, on which the district court relied in granting class certification. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the court had no opportunity to consider the implications of Comcast; a court must resolve any Daubert challenges to expert testimony offered to demonstrate conformity with Rule 23 View "In re: Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Montana corporation, sells workers’ compensation insurance to employers without the use of insurance agencies. Defendant Montana State Fund sells workers’ compensation insurance through in-house and out-of-house agents. The remaining defendants also sell workers’ compensation insurance, including State Fund policies. In 2011, Plaintiff brought this of action against Defendants, alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s UTPA claim on the grounds that the UTPA does not create a private right of action by one insurance company against another; and (2) granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment with respect to interference with prospective economic advantage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s inability to establish damages was fatal to its intentional interference claim and would be fatal as well to any UTPA-related claim. View "Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a false advertising lawsuit against Johnson & Johnson and McNeil Nutritionals, LLC (collectively, McNeil) challenging several of McNeil’s assertions about its product, Benecol, a vegetable oil-based spread. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that McNeil’s claims about its product were not authorized under the FDA’s regulations and were false. Plaintiff asserted claims for relief on behalf of a putative class of Benecol purchasers under California’s Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The district court granted McNeil’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to plead reasonable reliance on any misrepresentations and that Plaintiff’s claims for relief were preempted under federal law. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to challenge McNeil’s statements; (2) Plaintiff’s claims for relief were not preempted to the extent they were predicated on McNeil’s statements about trans fat, and a certain FDA letter was not entitled to preemptive effect; and (3) Plaintiff’s action was not barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Remanded. View "Reid v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2011 and 2012, the government brought enforcement actions against more than 80 facilities alleged to be selling and distributing marijuana for medicinal purposes in violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code for public nuisance, the Narcotics Abatement Law, Health & Safety Code section 11570, and the state unfair competition law, Business & Professions Code section 17200. The complaints sought permanent injunctions, abatement of the nuisances and civil penalties. The trial court denied the government’s omnibus motion for summary judgment, reasoning that claims for penalties made under each of the statutory plans are elements of the causes of action alleged. The court of appeal vacated, holding that the penalties being sought are among the remedies available rather than elements of the causes of action alleged in the several complaints. View "People v. Cahuenga's The Spot" on Justia Law

Wellmark, Inc., an Iowa-based health insurer that belongs to the national Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) network, contracted with health care providers in Iowa to provide services at certain reimbursement rates. Wellmark agreed to make those rates available both to self-insured Iowa plans that it administers and to out-of-state BCBS affiliates when those entities provide coverage for services provided in Iowa. Plaintiffs, a number of Iowa chiropractors, sued Wellmark, claiming that Wellmark had abused monopoly power in violation of the Iowa Competition Law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of some of the chiropractors’ antitrust claims and remanded on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. On remand, Plaintiffs stipulated that their remaining antitrust claims regarding the agreements between Wellmark and both the self-insuring employers and the out-of-state BCBS affiliates were being asserted on a per se theory. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ per se theories and entered summary judgment for Wellmark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wellmark’s arrangements with the self-insured employers and out-of-state BCBS licensees did not amount to per se violations of Iowa antitrust law. View "Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc." on Justia Law