Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against AQHA, alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and Texas antitrust law. Plaintiffs' allegations stemmed from votes by the Stud Book and Registration Committee of the AQHA, which had blocked AQHA registration of horses created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT or cloning). On appeal, AQHA challenged the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). The court concluded that reasonable jurors could not draw any inference of conspiracy from the evidence presented, because it neither tends to exclude the possibility of independent action nor does it suggest the existence of any conspiracy at all. Therefore, the court concluded that the JMOL motion should have been granted in the absence of substantial evidence on the issue of an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade under Section 1 of the Act. Further, the Section 2 claim failed as a matter of law because AQHA is not a competitor in the allegedly relevant market for elite Quarter Horses. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for AQHA. View "Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. American Quarter Horse Assoc." on Justia Law

This case arose when the Oakland Athletics wanted to move to the City of San Jose, but the City falls within the exclusive operating territory of the San Francisco Giants. The City, seeking approval of the move, filed suit against MLB, alleging violations of state and federal antitrust laws, of California's consumer protection statute, and of California tort law. The district court granted MLB's motion to dismiss on all but the tort claims and the City appealed. The City argues that the baseball industry's historic exemption from the antitrust laws does not apply to antitrust claims relating to franchise relocation. The court held, however, that antitrust claims against MLB's franchise relocation policies are precluded by Flood v. Kuhn, and, under Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v Kuhn, the court rejected any antitrust claim that was wholly unrelated to the reserve clause. Therefore, the City's claims under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7 and 15 U.S.C. 12-27, must be dismissed. Further, the City's antitrust claims necessarily fall with its federal claims where the City can point to no case that has ever held that state antitrust claims continue to be viable after federal antitrust claims have been dismissed under the baseball exemption. An independent claim under California's unfair competition law is also barred so long as MLB's activities are lawful under the antitrust laws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of San Jose v. Comm'r of Baseball" on Justia Law

When Appellant, a resident of the Pondview Condominiums, did not pay his condominium fees on time, the condominium trustees hired law firm Marcus, Errico, Emmer and Brooks, P.C. (“MEEB”) to collect Appellant’s debt. MEEB filed nine collection actions in Massachusetts state court against Appellant and prevailed in two of them. Displeased with MEEB’s collection activities, Appellant sued MEEB in federal district court, alleging violations of federal and state law. The magistrate judge concluded that MEEB committed numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and that the FDCPA violations constituted “per se” violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge reversed in part, finding MEEB not liable under Chapter 93A. The First Circuit reversed the magistrate judge’s determination that MEEB was not liable under Chapter 93A, holding that MEEB’s violations of the FDCPA constituted per se Chapter 93A violations by virtue of the unambiguous statutory language in the FDCPA and the Federal Trade Commission Act. View "McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks" on Justia Law

Orca Communications Unlimited, LLC filed this action against Ann Noder, its former president, and the competing company Noder started after she left Orca, asserting common law tort clams based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Orca’s common law claims were preempted by Arizona’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (AUTSA), which creates an exclusive cause of action - and displaces conflicting causes of action - for claims based on the misappropriation of trade secrets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AUTSA does not displace common-law claims based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information that is not a trade secret; and (2) therefore, AUTSA did not displace Orca’s unfair competition claim. View "Orca Commc’ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder" on Justia Law

Class representatives sued Kentucky real estate firms, alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by participating in a horizontal conspiracy to fix commissions charged in Kentucky real estate transactions at an anti-competitive rate. The certified class consists of people who sold residential real estate in Kentucky from 2001 to 2005, and used the services of defendants. Several defendants settled. The district court entered summary judgment for remaining defendants, excluding the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts with respect to whether collusion among the defendants was the likely economic explanation of the pricing of commissions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that although the plaintiffs produced a good deal of circumstantial evidence that would support a theory of collusion, the conduct at issue was also consistent with permissible competition. View "Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Dragon Systems, Inc. (Dragon), a voice recognition software company that faced a deteriorating financial situation, hired Goldman Sachs (Goldman) to provide financial advice and assistance in connection with a possible merger. In 2000, Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V. (Lernout & Hauspie) acquired Dragon. When it was discovered that Lernout & Hauspie had fraudulently overstated its earnings, the merged company filed for bankruptcy, and the Dragon name and technology were sold from the estate. Plaintiffs, two groups of Dragon shareholders, filed suit against Goldman, alleging negligent and intentional misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. A jury found in favor of Goldman on Plaintiffs’ common law claims, and district court found that Goldman had not violated chapter 93A. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly articulated the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs’ chapter 93A claims and correctly applied that standard to its factual findings; and (2) Plaintiffs’ arguments that they were entitled to a new trial on their common law claims because of evidentiary errors and erroneous jury instructions were without merit. View "Baker v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Dick McClary submitted an application for health insurance to Golden Rule Insurance Company that failed to disclose proposed insured Patti Denney’s preexisting condition. Golden Rule issued a policy covering Denney, but later denied coverage for a proposed surgery based on the fact that the conditions documented in Denney’s medical records were not disclosed in her insurance application. The Kansas Insurance Department imposed sanctions on Golden Rule for unfair claim settlement practices, concluding that Golden Rule had wrongfully denied Denney coverage for a medically necessary procedure. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McClary was not acting as Golden Rule’s soliciting agent when he submitted Denney’s health insurance application. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ decision on the agency question, as substantial evidence supported the conclusion that McClary had the actual authority to solicit and submit applications directly to Golden Rule; and (2) reversed the Department and the district court on their ruling that Golden Rule violated Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-2404(9)(f) but affirmed the finding of a violation of subsection (d); and (3) affirmed the Department’s remedy. View "Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

This antitrust class action stemmed from an allegation that Dow Chemical Company conspired with its competitors to fix prices for polyurethane chemical products. Over Dow’s objection, the district court certified a plaintiff class including all industrial purchasers of polyurethane products during the alleged conspiracy period. The action went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict against Dow. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, denying Dow’s motions for decertification of the class and judgment as a matter of law. Dow raised four issues on appeal, all of which the Tenth Circuit rejected. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "In re: Urethane AntiTrust Litigation" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether federal law preempted the effort by a district attorney to recover civil penalties under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on an employer’s alleged violation of workplace safety standards. Petitioners Solus Industrial Innovations, Emerson Power Transmission Corp., and Emerson Electric Co. (collectively Solus) argued the trial court erred by overruling their demurrer to two causes of action filed against them by Respondent, the Orange County District Attorney, alleging a right to recover such penalties. Solus argued that federal workplace safety law (Fed/OSHA) preempted any state law workplace safety enforcement mechanism which has not been specifically incorporated into the state workplace safety plan approved by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. The district attorney argued that once a state workplace safety plan has been approved by the Secretary of Labor, the state retains significant discretion to determine how it will enforce the safety standards incorporated therein, and thus the state may empower prosecutors to enforce those standards through whatever legal mechanism is available when such a case is referred to them. The trial court agreed with the district attorney and overruled Solus’s demurrer. But the court also certified this issue as presenting a controlling issue of law suitable for early appellate review under Code of Civil Procedure section 166.1. Solus then filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to review the trial court’s ruling. After the Court summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause. In the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that the UCL was not even in effect when California’s plan was approved. The California Supreme Court then granted review, and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the matter in light of former Civil Code section 3370.1 repealed by stats. 1977, ch. 299, sec. 3, p. 1204. Having done so, the Court of Appeal again concluded that the district attorney’s reliance on the UCL to address workplace safety violations was preempted. View "Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellee, Peter Rosenow, brought a class-action complaint individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons against Appellants, Alltel Corporation and Alltel Communications, Inc. (collectively, Alltel), alleging violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and unjust enrichment arising from Alltel’s imposition of an early termination fee on its cellular-phone customers. Alltel filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in its “Terms and Conditions.” The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Alltel’s arbitration provision lacked mutuality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that a lack of mutuality rendered the instant arbitration agreement invalid. View "Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow" on Justia Law