Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, two motor vehicle dealers and an organization that represents the interests of new automobile and truck franchised dealerships in the state, filed this action against Tesla Motors, Inc., an automobile manufacturer, and Tesla Motors MA, Inc., its Massachusetts subsidiary, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B and conspiracy to violate chapter 93B. The superior court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action because they were not affiliated dealers of Tesla or Tesla MA. At issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the 2002 amendments to chapter 93B broadened the scope of standing under the statute since the Court’s 1985 decision in Beard Motors, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distribs., Inc. such that Massachusetts motor vehicle dealers now have standing to maintain an action for an alleged violation of the statute against unaffiliated motor vehicle manufacturers or distributors. The Court affirmed, holding that chapter 93B does not confer standing on a motor vehicle dealer to maintain an action for violation of the statute against a manufacturer with which the dealer is not affiliated. View "Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint alleging that Defendants fraudulently marketed and sold debt-related services, failed to provide those services, and retained money as upfront fees in violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a); the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310; and the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule, 12 C.F.R. 1015. The FTC also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, and provided more than 1,000 pages of exhibits. Defendants sought to stay proceedings, asserting that a criminal investigation had been launched into their business activities, as evidenced by a raid conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that resulted in seizure of records they claim were necessary to defend against the FTC’s allegations. The district court denied the motion; the FTC and Defendants entered into a stipulated preliminary injunction. Defendants later renewed the motion for a stay, claiming that they were unable to access critical records. Without explanation, the district court denied the motion and later granted the FTC’s motion for summary judgment, ordering Defendants to jointly pay restitution in the amount of $5,706,135.48 to injured consumers. The Sixth circuit affirmed, finding clear evidence of the violations. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc." on Justia Law

Fair Wind owns sailing schools, including one in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. In 2007 Fair Wind hired Bouffard as a captain and instructor, under a contract precluding Bouffard from joining a competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for two years after the end of his employment. In 2010, relying on Bouffard View "Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster" on Justia Law

Ferring and Watson market competing prescription progesterone products. Progesterone plays a key role in helping women become pregnant and maintain pregnancies by preparing and maintaining the uterine lining to support the embryo during early pregnancy. Historically, women have received progesterone through intramuscular shots, which are not FDA-approved and which patients consider painful. Both companies manufacture a product that administers progesterone to women through vaginal inserts rather than shots. Ferring’s product, Endometrin, is delivered in capsule form. Watson’s product, Crinone, is a gel delivered via applicator. Ferring unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act, based on two presentations made by Watson in 2012 to healthcare professionals concerning Crinone. Watson’s consultant, Dr. Silverberg made statements concerning a “Black Box” warning on Endometrin’s package insert; a patient preference survey comparing the products; and Endometrin’s effectiveness in women over the age 35. Silverberg was alerted to the inaccuracy of his statement about a Black Box warning after the first webcast and certified to Ferring and to the court that he would not repeat the statement. The district court held that Ferring failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court holdings that a party bringing a claim under the Lanham Act is not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction and must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely. View "Ferring Pharm. Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law

After leaving Gensler, an architectural firm with projects throughout the world, where he had been a Design Director, Strabala opened his own firm, 2Define Architecture. Strabala stated online that he had designed five projects for which Gensler is the architect of record. Gensler contends that Strabala’s statements, a form of “reverse passing off,” violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.1125(a). The district court dismissed, ruling that, because Strabala did not say that he built or sold these structures, he could not have violated section 43(a), reading the Supreme Court decision Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox (2003), to limit section 43(a) to false designations of goods’ origin. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that Gensler maintains that Strabala falsely claims to have been the creator of intellectual property. View "M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FTC and its order permanently enjoining defendant from engaging in a variety of marketing tactics, and ordering him to pay restitution. The court concluded that the district court properly held defendant personally liable for both injunctive relief and the requirement to pay restitution with respect to all of the marketing schemes at issue, with the exception of the Acai Total Burn scheme; individual liability for corporate malfeasance is available for violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1693, because such violations are also deemed to be violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 41-58, and that defendant is liable for Vertek's, defendant's wholly controlled company, violations of the EFTA because of his personal involvement in concocting and carrying out the several schemes that violated the EFTA; and defendant's challenges to the scope of the district court's injunction are unavailing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FTC in part, and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FTC with respect to the Acai Total Burn scheme. The court remanded so that the district court could modify its permanent injunction and the amount of restitution. View "FTC v. Kimoto" on Justia Law

Astellas holds patents on a cardiac test and sells its unpatented pharmaceutical product, Adenoscan, for using during that test. The Medical Center, which conducts cardiac tests, filed suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, alleging that Astellas is able to overcharge the Medical Center for the Adenoscan product by unlawfully tying the patented right to perform the patented cardiac test to the purchase of the unpatented Adenoscan. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the Medical Center's request to certify a class seeking damages against Astellas for unlawful tying because the direct purchaser rule precludes the Medical Center's own treble damages claim. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify the class for purposes of seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lakeland Regional Medical Center v. Astellas US, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Lenox MacLaren Surgical began to sell some of its bone mills (a device it manufactured for use in spinal surgery) through a Medtronic entity, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA. The arrangement ended badly: Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA initiated a recall of Lenox's bone mills, and another Medtronic entity began to manufacture and sell its own bone mill. The result, according to Lenox, was that four Medtronic entities acquired an unfair competitive advantage; thus, Lenox sued these entities for monopolization and attempted monopolization from 2007 to 2010. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both claims, and Lenox appealed. Upon review of the claims and the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding market definition, monopoly power, exclusionary conduct, and harm to competition. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Medtronic on the claims involving monopolization and attempted monopolization, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lenox MacLaren Surgical v. Medtronic, et al" on Justia Law

This criminal antitrust case stems from an international conspiracy between Taiwanese and Korean electronics manufacturers to fix prices for TFT-LCDs. Defendants, AUO, a Taiwanese company, and AUOA, AUO's retailer and wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, "the corporate defendants"), and two executives were convicted of conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court concluded that venue in the Northern District of California was proper; defendants waived their jury instruction challenge regarding the extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act; the price-fixing scheme as alleged and proved is subject to per se analysis under the Sherman Act; the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. 6a, does not limit the power of the federal courts, but rather, it provides substantive elements under the Sherman Act in cases involving nonimport trade with foreign nations; the FTAIA does not apply to defendants' import trade conduct because the government sufficiently pleaded and proved that the conspirators engaged in import commerce with the United States and that the price-fixing conspiracy violated section 1 of the Sherman Act; there was no constructive amendment because the facts in the indictment necessarily supported the domestic effects claim; the evidence offered in support of the import trade theory alone was sufficient to convict defendants of price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act; the unambiguous language of the Alternative Fine Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3571(d), permitted the district court to impose the $500 million fine based on the gross gains to all the coconspirators; and no statutory authority or precedent supports AUO's interpretation of the Alternative Fine Statute as requiring joint and several liability and imposing a "one recovery" rule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hsiung" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Nicholas Long and Julianne Ricci, purchased Dell computers in late 2000. In 2003, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit alleging that Dell violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DPTA) and was negligent in charging Plaintiffs sales tax on nontaxable services purchased in conjunction with the computers. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Dell. The case remained pending for more than ten years. Here, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the negligence count and on the request for injunctive relief by Long; (2) vacated the grant of summary judgment on the DTPA count by Ricci; and (3) affirmed the superior court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the tax administrator’s affirmative defenses. Remanded. View "Long v. Dell, Inc." on Justia Law