Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

D&G filed suit against wholesalers under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15(a), and moved for class certification. The court concluded that this case presented a factual dispute about the real terms of the wholesalers' agreement and this genuine material factual dispute prevented summary judgment as to whether a per se violation occurred; the court denied summary judgment under the rule of reason where D&G submitted enough evidence to create a genuine factual dispute about the relevant market and the injury caused by the wholesalers' alleged antitrust violation; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification for all SuperValu customers in the Midwest region; the court vacated the denial of D&G's request to certify a narrower class of SuperValu customers who were charged according to the ABS formula and supplied from Champaign, Illinois; and the district court correctly concluded that 15 U.S.C. 15b does not render D&G's claims untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "D&G, Inc. v. SuperValu, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal and state antitrust laws by conspiring to fix the price for SD cards and engaging in improper practices with respect to the licensing of defendants' patents to other manufacturers of SD cards. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26. The court distinguished this case from a recent decision in Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd v. Panasonic Corp. The court concluded that, because plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief under federal law, their federal antitrust claim was subject to the equitable doctrine of laches and not the four-year statute of limitations in section 4B of the Clayton Act. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish that laches was not a bar to plaintiffs' federal antitrust claim. The court also concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' state law claims. On remand, the district court should apply the California Supreme Court's recent decision in Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. in determining whether plaintiffs' Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 16720, claim was timely filed. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oliver v. SD-3C" on Justia Law

UNM, a trade show cleaning company, filed suit against SDC, alleging claims for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and antitrust violations. The court reversed the district court's holding that under California law, SDC could not be held liable for the tort of intentional interference with contractual relationship; reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on that ground; affirmed the district court's holding that it committed instructional error by not interpreting the terms of the contract and that this error constituted prejudicial error that warranted a new trial; affirmed the district court's holding that SDC possessed state action immunity from UNM's antitrust claim; held that the a new trial is warranted on UNM's claim for intentional interference with contractual relationship; and concluded that, under California law, SDC could not be liable for punitive damages because it is a public entity. View "United Nat'l Maint. v. San Diego Convention Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a baseball bat manufacturer, filed an antitrust suit against the NCAA and the NFHS, alleging that they imposed a regulation, the Bat-Ball Coefficient of Restitution Standard (BBCOR), that restrained trade in the market for non-wood baseball bats. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; the only plausible injury asserted was its own and only injuries to the markets were cognizable; and therefore, plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the district court properly dismissed its Sherman Act claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to amend where two prior amendments were granted and allowing a third would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend. View "Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athl. Assn., et al." on Justia Law

In order to renovate a former warehouse building into administrative offices, Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“School Corporation”) implemented a plan to convey the Building to the EVSC Foundation (“Foundation”), a private non-profit entity, have the Foundation contract with a contractor for the renovations, and then have the Foundation sell the Building back to the School Corporation. School Corporation officials selected this arrangement because the Foundation was not subject to public bidding laws, and therefore, the renovation could occur more quickly. Plaintiffs, several area contracting businesses paying taxes in the school district, filed an action against the School Corporation and the Foundation (together, “Defendants”) claiming that Defendants violated public bidding statutes and Indiana’s Antitrust Act. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the School Corporation engaged in the transactions to circumvent the public bidding statutes but that the transactions were not unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the project violated the Public Bidding Laws. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that the scheme used by Defendants violated the Public Bidding Laws; and (2) concluded that Plaintiffs' antitrust claim failed because Plaintiffs did not present evidence of an antitrust injury. View "Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

King Coal Chevrolet Company and Lewis Chevrolet Oldsmobile Cadillac Automotive were two competing Chevrolet dealerships located twelve miles apart. After General Motors Corporation filed for bankruptcy, Lewis closed its Chevrolet operations pursuant to a wind-down agreement with General Motors. General Motors subsequently signed a dealership agreement with Crossroads Chevrolet, which was located ten miles from King Coal. King Coal demanded that General Motors provide it with written notice, as required by W. Va. Code 17A-6A-12(2), of General Motors’ intent to “establish an additional dealer” so that it could exercise its statutory rights and protect its interests under the West Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealers, Distributors, Wholesalers and Manufacturers Act. General Motors asserted that it was exempt from providing notice to King Coal by the safe harbor provision contained in section 17A-6A-12(4) because it was re-establishing a new motor vehicle dealership that had closed within the preceding two years. The federal district court submitted a certified question to the Supreme Court, which answered by holding that the circumstances in this case permitted General Motors to avail itself of the safe harbor contained in section 17A-6A-12(4). View "King Coal Chevrolet Co. v. Gen. Motors LLC " on Justia Law

Lucas County has about 440,000 residents and includes Toledo. Two-thirds of the county’s patients have government-provided health insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid; 29 percent have private insurance, which pays significantly higher rates to hospitals than government-provided insurance. General acute-care (GAC) inpatient services include “primary services,” such as hernia surgeries, radiology services, and most inpatient obstetrical (OB) services. “Secondary services,” such as hip replacements and bariatric surgery, require more specialized resources. “Tertiary services,” such as brain surgery and treatments for severe burns, require even more specialized resources. “Quaternary services,” such as major organ transplants, require the most specialized resources. Different hospitals offer different levels of service. In Lucas County ProMedica has 46.8% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals, which together provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. Mercy Health Partners has 28.7% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals in the county, which provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. University of Toledo Medical Center (UTMC) has 13% of the GAC market with a single teaching and research hospital, focused on tertiary and quaternary services. It does not offer OB services. St. Luke’s Hospital had 11.5% of the GAC market and offered primary (including OB) and secondary services. In 2010 ProMedica merged with St. Luke’s, creating an entity with 50% of the market in primary and secondary services and 80% of the market for obstetrical services. The FTC challenged the merger under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Commission found that the merger would adversely affect competition and ordered ProMedica to divest St. Luke’s. The Sixth Circuit upheld the order. View "ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Rapid-prototyping “additive technology” creates parts by building layer upon layer of plastics, metals, or ceramics. Subtractive technology starts with a block and cuts away layers. Additive technology include SL, fused deposition modeling, laser sintering, 3D printing, direct metal laser sintering, and digital light processing. 3DS is the sole U.S. supplier of SL machines, which use an ultraviolet laser to trace a cross section of an object on a vat of liquid polymer resin. The laser solidifies the resin it touches, while untouched, areas remain liquid. After one cross-section has solidified, the newly formed layer is lowered below the surface of the resin. The process is repeated until the object is completed. Users of SL machines often own many machines with varying sizes, speeds, and accuracy levels. 3DS began equipping some of its SL machines with wireless technology that allows a receiver to communicate with a transmitter on the cap of a resin bottle. A software-based lockout feature shuts the machine off upon detection of a resin not approved by 3DD. 3DS has approved two of Desotech’s resins and entered into negotiations for approval of additional resins. After negotiations broke down, Desotech sued, alleging tying, unreasonable restraint of trade, and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act; tying under the Clayton Act; patent infringement; and violations of the Illinois Antitrust and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. The district court granted 3DS summary judgment on the antitrust claims and certain state-law claims. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Samsung filed suit alleging that defendant's SD card licenses were an anti-competitive agreement in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. At issue was the scope of the continuing violation exception to the four-year statute of limitations on private actions to enforce the antitrust laws. The court agreed with Samsung that defendants' committed two overt acts within the limitations period: the adoption of the 2006 license, which extended the license to cover the second-generation SD cards, and the attempt to enforce either license by collecting royalty payments from Samsung. The court held that, even if the 2006 license was merely a restatement of the 2003 license, the application of the licenses to Samsung when it began to make SD cards in the fall of 2006 was also an overt act that restarted the limitations period. Because the harm Samsung challenged in this suit was speculative at the time of the initial wrong, the law of limitations in federal antitrust actions allowed Samsung to file suit once the harm crystallized in 2006. Because the court concluded that the federal antitrust claims were timely, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the state law claims and remanded. Construing the district court's order as an implicit dismissal of the equitable claim, the court vacated that dismissal and remanded for a determination of whether the equitable claim was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the federal antitrust claims and on the supplemental state law claims. View "Samsung Electronics v. Panasonic Corp." on Justia Law

DuPont filed suit against Kolon, alleging the theft and misappropriation of its Kevlar trade secrets (the trade secrets case). Kolon's answer included the instant counterclaim (the antitrust case), alleging that DuPont had illegally monopolized and attempted to monopolize the U.S. para-aramid market through its supply agreements with high-volume para-aramid customers. Para-aramid is a strong, complex synthetic fiber used in body armor, tires, fiber optic cables, and a variety of other industrial products. The court concluded that following United States v. Owens, recusals under 28 U.S.C. 455(b) include a judicially implied timely-filing requirement, and that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied Kolon's recusal motion on timeliness grounds. The court deferred to the district court's considerable discretion in overseeing discovery and will not disturb its discovery rulings. On the merits of Kolon's antitrust suit, Kolon has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact sufficient to sustain either its attempted or actual monopolization claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kolon Indus. Inc. v. E. I. DuPont De Nemour" on Justia Law