Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against polystyrene food service packaging manufacturers and two trade associations, claiming that Defendants refused in concert to deal with Plaintiff in a recycling business method for polystyrene food service products. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Massachusetts Fair Business Practices Act (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A). The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and entered judgment in their favor, finding that, as in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, there were legitimate business reasons that could explain Defendants' refusal to deal with Plaintiff or to compete with each other for market share. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to adequately plead its Sherman Act claim; and (2) because the district court summarily dismissed Plaintiff's chapter 93 claim because it failed for the same reasons that its Sherman Act claim failed, the issue needed to be reconsidered. View "Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Pactiv Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a company that sold aviation fuel at a Puerto Rico airport. Plaintiff filed this action Defendants, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA), Airport Aviation Services (AAS), and employees of those entities, claiming that Defendants wrongfully interfered with its business. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that a corrupt relationship existed between AAS and PRPA and that Defendants took improper actions in order to drive Plaintiff out of business. Before trial, the district court dismissed the claims against some defendants and, after a bench trial, granted judgment for the remaining defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not indicate a sufficiently clear intent to appeal the judgments dismissing the PRPA defendants from the case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding no conspiracy on the part of AAS and its employees to restrain trade, and the court correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to proffer evidence to prove Defendants' actions were unreasonable or anticompetitive. View "Diaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport Aviation Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Stephan was a GMAC Mortgage employee who signed summary judgment affidavits on behalf of GMAC in foreclosure proceedings instituted in Maine. The notarization on the summary judgment documents falsely stated that Stephan personally appeared and swore before the notary, when he did not. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine certified the following question of state law to the Maine Supreme Court: "Is Maine's common law judicial proceedings privilege an available defense to both legal and equitable claims brought under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act based upon statements made in court filings of affidavits and certifications in state judicial foreclosure proceedings?" The Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question, where (1) if the Court answered the question in the affirmative, then the claim would be immediately and summarily dismissed even though the facts may have established that the privilege was not available to the defendant under any circumstances; and (2) if the Court answered the question in the negative, it would render a broad pronouncement of law that would have no application to this case if a threshold issue produced the same result - namely, that the judicial proceedings privilege was simply unavailable on these particular facts.View "Bradbury v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Creative Playthings Ltd., a Massachusetts corporation, entered into a franchising agreement with Defendant under which Defendant agreed to operate a Creative Playthings franchise store in Florida. Plaintiff later terminated its agreement with Defendant and commenced this action against Defendant in the U.S. district court for breach of contract and associated claims. Defendant filed several counterclaims against Creative. Creative moved for summary judgment on Defendant's counterclaims, asserting they were time barred under the limitations provision in the franchise agreement. The federal district court judge declined to decide Creative's motion and instead certified the question of whether contractually shortened statutes of limitations are generally enforceable under Massachusetts law. The Supreme Court answered by holding that, in a franchise agreement governed by Massachusetts law, a limitations period in the contract shortening the time within which claims must be brought is valid and enforceable under Massachusetts law if the claim arises under the contract and the agreed-upon limitations period is subject to negotiation by the parties, is not otherwise limited by controlling statute, is reasonable, is not a statute of repose, and is not contrary to public policy.View "Creative Playthings Franchising Corp. v. Reiser" on Justia Law

The Board petitioned for review of the FTC order finding that it violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, by engaging in unfair competition in the market for teeth-whitening services in North Carolina. The court concluded that the Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine; the Board engaged in a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; and substantial evidence supported the FTC's factual findings regarding the economic effects of the Board's actions and that those findings supported the conclusion that the Board's behavior violated section 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "The NC State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law

Decedent hired David Poirot as an associate in his law office. After Decedent died, Poirot left Decedent's law office to open his open practice. Poirot and Gordon Johnson (collectively, Defendants) subsequently litigated two traumatic brain injury cases that had originated in Decedent's law office. Plaintiff, Decedent's wife, filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff failed to identify any evidence of damages resulting from her claimed CUTPA violations. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff's failure to produce an itemization of her claimed damages was fatal to her CUTPA claims. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) a litigant need not produce "an itemization" of her claimed CUTPA damages in order to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment; but (2) the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff had failed to identify any evidence of ascertainable loss. View "Marinos v. Poirot" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees asserting claims for conspiracy, fraud, and violating the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after Appellees took control of a biotech company and bought out the former CEO of the company. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellants then filed a motion to reconsider seeking to vacate the judgment, which was denied. On appeal, Appellees filed motions to dismiss Appellants' appeal, alleging that Appellants' motion to reconsider was a nullity and that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of entry of summary judgment. The Supreme Court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that the motion to reconsider was a valid motion.View "Muccio v. Hunt" on Justia Law

The CEO and sole shareholder of Zee decided to expand his chemical sales business into the water treatment industry and hired employees who were currently working or had previously worked in the industry. Four employees came from GE and were bound by non-compete agreements. GE sued Zee and its former employees in North Carolina state court for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and unfair trade practices. The state court found the agreements enforceable and held Zee and the employees jointly and severally liable for $288,297.00 in compensatory damages as a result of unfair and deceptive trade practices and for $5,769,903.10 in attorney fees, $864,891.00 in punitive damages, and $257,931.44 in costs. GE discovered that Zee had tied up virtually all of its assets in a credit facility agreement with BMO Harris Bank before entry of judgment; registered the judgment in Illinois, Harris’s principal place of business; and served Harris with a citation to discover Zee’s assets. GE objected to removal to federal court, but the district court dismissed GE’s case entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that GE raised a timely and sound objection to removal under the forum-defendant rule, and the district court should have remanded the case. View "GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee initiated this putative class-action lawsuit against DIRECTV, seeking damages for herself individually and on behalf of other former DIRECTV subscribers who paid an early cancellation fee to DIRECTV after they terminated DIRECTV's service. Appellee alleged that DIRECTV's enforcement and collection of its early cancellation fee was deceptive and unconscionable in violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Appellee moved to certify the litigation as a class action. DIRECTV moved to compel Appellee to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration provision in the customer agreement that DIRECTV alleged had been mailed with Appellee's first billing statement. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration and granted Appellee's motion for class certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied DIRECTV's motion to compel Appellee to arbitration on the basis that Appellee cancelled her service so quickly she did not assent to the arbitration agreement by her continued use of service; and (2) there was no merit to DIRECTV's arguments for reversal of the class-certification order.View "DIRECTV, Inc. v. Murray" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the recent energy crisis. Appellants alleged that Respondents, in violation of Nevada antitrust laws, conspired with the now-defunct Enron Corporation to drive up the price of natural gas in the Southern Nevada and Southeastern California markets. Appellants asserted (1) Respondents engaged in rapid bursts of purchasing natural gas followed by rapid bursts of selling the same gas, which resulted in considerable profits for Respondents and significantly higher prices for natural gas consumers; and (2) Respondents' plan for manipulating the markets worked because of a secret agreement with Enron that left Respondents with greater profits from the sale of gas as well as ensured that Respondents would always have a sufficient supply of natural gas. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the claims were barred by principles of federal preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by federal field preemption. View "State v. Reliant Energy, Inc." on Justia Law