Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Students and former students of the University of Alabama, Auburn University, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham, filed three separate class-action lawsuits in the Jefferson Circuit Court challenging the legality of so-called "dining-dollars" programs implemented by the universities and pursuant to which all undergraduate students were required to pay a mandatory dining fee each semester, which was then credited back to the students in the form of "dining dollars" that could be spent only at on-campus dining outlets controlled exclusively by the food-service vendors for the universities - Aramark Educational Services, Inc., at UA; Compass Group, USA, Inc. (Chartwells) at Auburn; and Sodexo, Inc., at UAB. The trial court dismissed the three actions, and the students appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion and affirmed all three. The students sued the boards of trustees governing the universities and the food-service vendors, alleging that the dining-dollars programs violated: (1) state antitrust laws; (2) the Alabama Constitution inasmuch as it forbids the State from having an interest in a private enterprise; (3) the rule in 16-1-32(d) barring universities from charging excessive transaction fees to merchants that accept university-issued debit cards; and (4) the common-law prohibition on conversion. Because the boards of trustees are entitled to state immunity pursuant to section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, all claims against them were properly dismissed. The university administrators and foodservice vendors were entitled to immunity on the asserted antitrust claims as well, albeit state-action immunity as opposed to state immunity. Moreover, because the students lacked standing to pursue a cause of action for a violation of 16-1-32(d), and because the students did not and could not allege the necessary elements of a conversion claim, the trial court also properly dismissed the students' other claims.View "Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick and Mandelena Harmon bought a home pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that realtor Dianne Burright, a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Fiscus Realty, prepared at the Fiscus Realty office. The home was built by Dianne's husband, Jerry. The Harmons subsequently discovered numerous construction problems. The Harmons sued Defendants Jerry and Dianne Burright and Fiscus Reality, raising several causing of action, including a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). A jury returned a verdict against the Burrights on breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims and held for Defendants on all other claims. After trial, Defendants filed motions for attorney fees as prevailing parties under the Act, which the district court denied. Fiscus Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to Fiscus Realty as the Harmons' claims had a basis in fact and law and were not frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded.View "Harmon v. Fiscus Realty" on Justia Law

Progressive Products, Inc. (PPI) filed a four-count complaint in district court against Defendants, former employees of PPI, on various theories alleging Defendants misappropriated protected trade secrets. The trade secrets at issue were a formula, computerized customer lists, and a computerized pricing program. The district court entered judgment for PPI, holding that Defendants misappropriated protected trade secrets possessed by PPI. The court then imposed a royalty injunction on Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) PPI owned protected trade secrets relating to the formula, (2) the price lists were not trade secrets as a matter of law, (3) no evidence supported a finding the customer lists were a trade secret, and (4) the royalty injunction was not supported by the district court's factual findings and did not comport with the available statutory remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment regarding the protected trade secrets but reversed the court of appeals' opinion reversing the remedy the district court ordered, holding that because the district court's findings were incomplete, they did not permit meaningful appellate review. Remanded.View "Progressive Products, Inc. v. Swartz" on Justia Law

St. Louis County enacted an ordinance that established a new trash collection program in the county. Specifically, the ordinance authorized the county to establish trash collection areas in the county and allowed the county executive to advertise for bids or proposals to provide services for trash collection in the designated areas and award contracts to selected trash haulers. The County subsequently enacted an ordinance prohibiting trash haulers that were not selected in the bidding process from providing trash collection services within the eight designated collection areas. Taxpayers living in the waste collection areas then filed a class action petition, alleging (1) the County violated its charter and Mo. Rev. Stat. 260.247, violations that deemed the trash collection program void, and (2) the respondents violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MPA). The trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County did not violate its charter, (2) the taxpayers did not have standing to file a claim under Section 260.247, and (3) the taxypayers' claim under the MPA was derivative of their claims that the trash collection program was void, so that claim also failed.View "Weber v. St. Louis County " on Justia Law

While employed with Alpharma, a pharmaceutical company, Debra Parks was involved in marketing a prescription drug known as Kadian. Parks filed a complaint in circuit court for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, claiming that Alpharma was involved in illegal marketing activities and that after Parks had raised her concerns with various people at Alpharma, Alpharma retaliated against her by terminating her employment. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Parks' appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own initiative. The Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court on the basis that Parks failed to identify any clear mandate of public policy allegedly violated by Alpharma and allegedly reported by her that would constitute some of the required elements of a wrongful discharge claim.View "Parks v. Alpharma" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an agreement between Oneida County and Waste Management for the disposal of municipal solid waste. E-Z Roll Off brought suit against Oneida County, alleging the agreement created an illegal restraint of trade and seeking damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. 133.18. The circuit court granted Oneida County's motion for summary judgment, holding that E-Z could not bring suit because E-Z had not filed a timely notice of claim in accordance with Wis. Stat. 893.80(1)(a). The court of appeals reversed, holding that antitrust actions brought pursuant to Section 133.18 are exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in Section 893.80(1). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) antitrust actions brought pursuant to Section 133.18 are not exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in Section 893.80(1); and (2) E-Z did not meet the requirements of Section 893.80(1)(a) when it failed to give Oneida County notice of its claim within the 120-day limitations period. View "E-Z Roll Off, L.L.C. v. County of Oneida" on Justia Law

After defendant Price-Rite, a fuel delivery business, failed to fulfill its prepaid delivery contracts, the state filed a five-count complaint charging Price-Rite with four violations of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). Following a jury-waived trial, Price-Rite moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing for the first time that judgment should be granted to it because the state had not complied with the ten-day notice requirement of Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 209. The court denied the motion, finding that the failure to provide notice was inconsequential. The court then held that Price-Rite had violated the UTPA and imposed a civil penalty on Price-Rite's owner and CEO for the UTPA violations. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Price-Rite's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and (2) the trial court's finding that the owner and CEO intentionally violated the UTPA was not clearly erroneous.View "State v. Price-Rite Fuel, Inc. " on Justia Law

David Rasmussen filed a class-action complaint against several automobile companies, including Nissan Japan and its wholly owned subsidiary, Nissan North America. The complaint alleged that the automobile company defendants violated Wisconsin's antitrust and conspiracy laws. The circuit court dismissed Nissan Japan from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed the order of dismissal. At issue was whether Wisconsin's long-arm statute granting personal jurisdiction over individuals engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within Wisconsin subjected Nissan Japan to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory prerequisites for general personal jurisdiction were not met because (1) the activities of the subsidiary corporation, Nissan North America, were insufficient to subject its nonresident parent corporation, Nissan Japan, to general personal jurisdiction, and (2) Rasmussen did not meet his burden to show that the corporate separateness of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America should be disregarded such that the activities of Nissan North America in Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan.View "Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp." on Justia Law

In a 1905 water exchange agreement, Big Ditch Irrigation Company conveyed its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to the Salt Lake City Corporation in exchange for the City's commitment to supply Big Ditch with a specified quantity of irrigation-quality water from City sources. Concerned that Big Ditch was infringing upon the City's water rights, the City initiated this case against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders in district court. The City sought declaratory judgment on several issues. Big Ditch and the shareholders counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on most major issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and correctly concluded that the City holds title to the water rights conveyed in the agreement. The Court held, however, that the district court erred in (1) determining that Big Ditch did not have a right to file change applications; (2) determining that the parties had modified the agreement or, alternatively, that Big Ditch was estopped from enforcing its right to the amount of water specified in the agreement; and (3) refusing to dismiss the City's claims against the shareholders.View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co." on Justia Law

POM, which produces and sells a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend, filed a Lanham Act suit (15 U.S.C. 1125) against Coca-Cola, alleging that the name, label, marketing, and advertising of a Coca-Cola juice blend mislead consumers into believing the product consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it actually consists of less expensive apple and grape juices, and that the confusion causes POM to lose sales. The district court granted Coca-Cola partial summary judgment, ruling that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 321(f), 331, and its regulations preclude Lanham Act challenges to the name and label of the juice blend. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that competitors may bring Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA. The Court noted that the issue was preclusion, not pre-emption. Even if the Court’s task is to reconcile or harmonize the statutes instead of to determine whether one is an implied repeal in part of another, the best way to do that does not require barring POM’s Lanham Act claim. Neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA expressly forbids or limits Lanham Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. The laws complement each other in major respects: both touch on food and beverage labeling, but the Lanham Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while the FDCA protects public health and safety. The FDCA’s enforcement is largely committed to the FDA, while the Lanham Act allows private parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a case-by¬case basis. Allowing Lanham Act suits takes advantage of synergies among multiple methods of regulation. Because the FDA does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures regarding all objectionable labels, preclusion of Lanham Act claims could leave commercial interests, and indirectly the general public, with less effective protection in the food and beverage labeling realm than in other less regulated industries. Neither the statutory structure nor the empirical evidence indicates there will be any difficulty in fully enforcing each statute. View "POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co." on Justia Law