Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a Mutual Strike Assistance Agreement (MSAA) that was entered into by defendants (grocers) where the MSAA included a revenue-sharing provision (RSP), providing that in the event of a strike/lockout, any grocer that earned revenues above its historical share relative to the other chains during the strike period would pay 15% of those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their pre-strike shares. At issue was whether the MSAA was exempt from the antitrust laws under the non-statutory labor exemption, and if not, whether the MSAA should be condemned as a per se violation of the antitrust laws or on a truncated "quick look," or whether more detailed scrutiny was required. The court held that the MSAA between the grocers to share revenues for the duration of the strike period was not exempt from scrutiny under antitrust laws and that more than a "quick look" was required to ascertain its impact on competition in the Southern California grocery market. Given the limited judicial experience with revenue sharing for several months pending a labor dispute, the court could not say that the restraint's anti-competitive effects were "obvious" under a per se or "quick look" approach. Although the court concluded that summary condemnation was improper, the court expressed no opinion on the legality of the arrangement under the rule of reason. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State, ex rel. v. Safeway, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff, a carpet dealer, settled state law claims against a competing dealer and a manufacturer, alleging slander and refusal to deal arising from a 1998 agreement between the defendants. The federal district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, based on continuing refusal to deal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff adequately alleged an ongoing conspiracy to restrain trade and that the defendants acted on their agreement after the settlement. Although the lawsuit was a plausible alternative reason for refusal to deal, conspiracies are presumed to be ongoing and the allegation was sufficient for the pleadings stage. The 2007 settlement did not bar the claims because it did not effectuate a withdrawal from the conspiracy. The defendants took no actions inconsistent with a continuing conspiracy. View "Watson Carpet & Floor Covering v. Mohawk Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a), prohibition on selling the same product to different buyers at different prices, by a manufacturer of mowing equipment and a distributor/retailer of that equipment. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, courts may no longer accept conclusory allegations that do not include specific facts necessary to establish the cause of action. The new "plausibility" standard is particularly difficult for the plaintiff in this case, because only the defendants have access to the pricing information necessary to show discriminatory pricing, but the plaintiff may not use discovery to obtain those facts. The plaintiff did not have sufficient facts to establish the manufacturer's control of the distributor to proceed under the "indirect purchaser" doctrine. View "New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc." on Justia Law

The hospital filed the proposed class action, alleging that the pharmaceutical company violate antitrust "tying" prohibitions by using its knowledge of insurance reimbursement rates to leverage its market power in one market—White Blood Cell Growth Factor drugs—to impair competition in the market for Red Blood Cell Growth Factor drugs (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 14, 15). The district court dismissed on the ground that the hospital was not a "direct purchaser." The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The mechanics of the hospital's contracts for acquiring the drugs show it to be an indirect purchaser that placed orders and received the drugs through a middleman, despite some direct communications between the manufacturer and the hospital and a rebate program between the two. The court rejected the hospital's claim that it should be granted standing as the first party in the distribution chain to suffer injury from the anti-competitive conduct. View "Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of retail cable and satellite television subscribers, brought suit against television programmers and distributors alleging that programmers' practice of selling multi-channel cable packages violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. At issue was whether the district court properly granted programmers' and distributors' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' third amended complaint with prejudice because plaintiffs failed to allege any cognizable injury to competition. The court held that the complaint's allegations of reduced choice increased prices addressed only the element of antitrust injury, but not whether plaintiffs have satisfied the pleading standard for an actual violation. Therefore, absent any allegations of an injury to competition, the court held that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brantley, et al. v. NBC Universal, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The hospital opposed a proposed medical office building by lobbying public officials, conducting a public relations campaign, offering incentives to discourage prospective tenants, and making negative statements about the developer. Prospective tenants withdrew from conditional agreements and approvals were denied. The developer sued, alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, under which efforts to petition government are shielded from liability, and rejecting a claim of "sham." Even if the hospital made material misrepresentations during and relating to village board proceedings, which were legislative in nature, those misrepresentations are legally irrelevant because those meetings were inherently political in nature. The public relations campaign was inextricably intertwined with efforts before the board. The hospitalâs contacts with other healthcare providers constituted mere speech that is not actionable under the Sherman Act. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the record that the successful effort to convince physicians not to relocate their practices constituted predatory conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws.

Petitioners, registered nurses ("RNs") employed in the region, filed a complaint alleging that various hospital owners and operators in the Albany-Schenectady-Troy metropolitan area had conspired to depress the compensation of RNs in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. A petition for leave to appeal was filed well outside the limitations period but filed within the fourteen days of the district court's denial of the motion to amend the class certification. At issue was whether such a denial constituted "an order granting or denying class-action certification" for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 23(f). The court dismissed the petition and held that petitioners failed to timely petition with respect to an order reviewable pursuant to Rule 23(f) where an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) could not properly be taken from an order denying amendment to a previous order granting class certification, at least when the motion to amend was filed fourteen days after the original order granting class certification.

The insured was treated as an outpatient for "mental or nervous disorder" in 2005-2007, allegedly incurring expenses of more than $125,000. In 2006 the company informed her that it had already paid $8,506 and would pay only $1,494 more toward the lifetime cap of $10,000. The district court held that the contract was not ambiguous and that the limit was not prohibited by New Hampshire law. The First Circuit affirmed. The policy limit for mental health benefits, stated as "the amount shown on page 3" is not ambiguous simply because that page refers to both the "Mental and Nervous Disorder Limit" of $10,000, and the "Maximum Benefit Limit Per Covered Person" of $1 million. A state law prohibiting unfair trade practices, including discrimination in insurance does not provide a private right of action until after the claimant obtains a favorable ruling from the insurance commissioner.

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their putative class action asserting antitrust claims against defendants where plaintiffs alleged that the fares they paid for airline tickets were unlawfully excessive and in violation of both state and federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. At issue was whether plaintiffs' state law claims were properly dismissed; whether the court erred in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend to add federal claims; and whether the court had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory case management order governing the pretrial coordination of pending cases in the same multidistrict litigation. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims and held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713, preempted state regulations of foreign air carriers. The court also held that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend to add federal antitrust claims where the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to plaintiffs' motion by denying leave to amend on the basis of the court's prior case management order. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory case management order where these decisions did not represent final judgments.

The real estate multiple listing service (MLS) website policy prohibited distribution of information about exclusive agency and other nontraditional listings to public advertising sites through its feeds. The FTC determined that the prohibition was an anti-competitive policy in violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after conducting a full rule-of-reason analysis. The MLS is a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" between competing brokers. The policy gave rise to potential genuine adverse effects on competition due to the MLS's substantial market power, the lack of substitutes for its service, and the policy's anticompetitive nature; the policy actually caused actual anti-competitive effects by narrowing information and choices available to consumers and reducing the number of discount-commission listings. Proffered pro-competitive justifications were insufficient to overcome a prima facie case of adverse impact.