Justia Antitrust & Trade Regulation Opinion Summaries

Relevent Sports, LLC, a U.S.-based soccer promoter, alleges that the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (popularly known as FIFA) and the United States Soccer Federation, Inc. adopted and enforced a geographic market division policy in 2018 that unlawfully prohibits soccer leagues and teams from playing official season games outside of their home territory. Relevent claims that the 2018 policy represents an agreement among direct competitors to restrict competition in violation of federal antitrust laws. The district court concluded that Relevent failed to allege that the challenged anticompetitive conduct stemmed from a prior agreement to enter into the 2018 policy.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that a plaintiff challenging an association policy or rule that governs the conduct of the members’ separate businesses need not allege an antecedent “agreement to agree.” Because Relevent challenges the allegedly monopolistic 2018 Policy directly, it has adequately alleged concerted action. The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act require no further allegations of an agreement to engage in concerted action for Relevent’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Relevent Sports v. U.S. Soccer Federation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are participants in the physical and derivatives markets for platinum and palladium and seek monetary and injunctive relief for violations of the antitrust laws and the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants—mostly foreign companies engaged in trading these metals—manipulated the benchmark prices for platinum and palladium by collusively trading on the futures market to depress the price of these metals and by abusing the process for setting the benchmark prices. Defendants allegedly benefited from this conduct via trading in the physical markets and holding short positions in the futures market. The district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over two of the foreign Defendants, but it dismissed Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims for lack of antitrust standing and the Plaintiffs’ CEA claims for being impermissibly extraterritorial. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of these claims.   The Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part. The court reversed the district court’s holding that the “Exchange Plaintiffs” lacked antitrust standing to sue for the manipulation of the New York Mercantile Exchange futures market in platinum and palladium. The court explained that as traders in that market, the Exchange Plaintiffs are the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws for that injury. But the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that KPFF Investment, Inc. did not have antitrust standing. Additionally, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ CEA claims. View "In re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Direct purchasers of drywall—not including Home Depot—sued seven drywall suppliers for conspiring to fix prices. Those cases were centralized in multi-district litigation. Home Depot was a member of the putative class. Georgia-Pacific was not sued. Before class-certification or dispositive motions were filed, a settlement with defendants USG and TIN was certified. Home Depot did not opt-out. Lafarge settled. The court certified a new settlement class; Home Depot opted out. The court later certified a new settlement class with respect to the remaining defendants with terms similar to the USG/TIN settlement—preserving the right of class members to pursue claims against alleged co-conspirators other than the settling defendants. Home Depot remained in the settlement class. The court entered judgment.Home Depot then sued Lafarge. Home Depot never bought drywall from Lafarge, but argued that Lafarge was liable for the overcharges Home Depot paid its suppliers; its expert opined that the pricing behaviors of Lafarge and other suppliers, including USG, CertainTeed, and Georgia-Pacific, were indicative of a conspiracy to fix prices. The court struck the expert report, citing issue preclusion and the law of the case, noting the grant of summary judgment to CertainTeed, that Georgia-Pacific had not previously been sued, and that alleged conspirator USG settled early in the class action.The Third Circuit vacated. Issue preclusion applies only to matters which were actually litigated and decided between the parties or their privies. Home Depot was not a party (or privy) to any of the relevant events. Two of the three events to which it was “bound” were not judicial decisions. The law of the case doctrine applies only to prior decisions made in the same case. View "Home Depot USA Inc v. Lafarge North America Inc" on Justia Law

The Federal Trade Commission (the “Commission”) alleges that Defendant and his six companies engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Relying on its authority under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission obtained a preliminary injunction that included an asset freeze and the imposition of a receiver. Defendant argued that the preliminary injunction must be dissolved because a recent Supreme Court decision undermines the Commission’s Section 13(b) authority.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order denying Defendant’s emergency motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The court explained that Defendant urged the court to read AMG Capital as a signal to interpret the FTC Act with a view to “reigning in the FTC’s power.” But, the court wrote, that AMG Capital teaches the court to read the FTC Act to “mean what it says.” 141 S. Ct. at 1349. In AMG Capital, that meant limiting Section 13(b)’s provision for a “permanent injunction” to injunctive relief. Here, that means recognizing the broad scope of relief available under Section 19. When the Commission enforces a rule, Section 19 grants the district court jurisdiction to offer relief “necessary to redress injury to consumers.” To preserve funds for consumers, the Commission sought to freeze Defendant’s assets and impose a receivership over his companies. Section 19 allows such relief. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Steven J. Dorfman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ACTGC brought federal antitrust and various state law claims in a suit concerning tours of two New Orleans cemeteries, Defendant New Orleans Archdiocesan Cemeteries d.b.a. New Orleans Catholic Cemeteries (“NOAC”)  and Defendant Cemetery Tours NOLA LLC (“CTN”). ACTGC also requested injunctive relief, which the district court denied, and ACTGC first appealed. The district court then dismissed ACTGC’s federal antitrust and state law claims, which ACTGC also appealed. Defendant NOAC then moved to dismiss the first appeal as moot.   The Fifth Circuit granted NOAC’s motion, dismissed the first appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the district court on all issues in the second appeal. The court agreed with NOAC and found that the first amended complaint is a legal nullity because it was not incorporated by the subsequent second amended complaint. Thus, because the first amended complaint is nullified, the court cannot consider—and thus must dismiss—an appeal of a denial of injunctive relief stemming from the complaint. Further, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying ACTGC leave to amend its complaint to add affidavits that do not add additional evidence of irreparable harm and do not address the pleading deficiencies of its federal law claims.   Moreover, the court held that ACTGC has not pleaded a legally sufficient product market under either of its proffered definitions. If the relevant product market is cemetery tours, it has not identified or included reasonably interchangeable substitutes. And if the product market is cemetery tours of Nos. 1 and 2, such a market is unduly narrow. View "New Orleans Assoc v. New Orleans Arch" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims concerning a standard exclusive dealing arrangement between Triple-S Salud, Inc. and Dr. Rodriguez-Blazquez and companies owned by him (Urologics) incident to the maintenance of closed healthcare networks, holding that the complaint, in part, stated a plausible claim to relief.Plaintiffs, who were under contract with Triple-S to provide urology services to urology patients in the area, asserting that the exclusive dealing arrangements in this case caused them to lose business and made it more difficult for patients to obtain urology services in Western Puerto Rico. The district court dismissed the claims. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims concerning the exclusive dealing arrangement between Triple-S and Urologics, holding that Plaintiffs adequately stated a claim to relief that was plausible on its face; and (2) affirmed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims concerning a different arrangement, holding that the district court properly dismissed these claims. View "Vazquez-Ramos v. Triple-S Salud, Inc." on Justia Law

The Hollywood Foreign Press Association (HFPA) is a California non-profit mutual benefit corporation whose members are involved in reporting for media outlets outside of the United States. The members are offered advantages such as access to Hollywood talent granted by movie studios. The HFPA strictly limits the admission of new members   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an antitrust action brought by two entertainment journalists who challenged the membership policies of HFPA. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the journalists’ antitrust claims. The journalists alleged that the HFPA’s exclusionary membership practices violated section 1 (restraint of trade) and section 2 (monopolization) of the Sherman Act, as well as California’s Cartwright Act. The panel held that the journalists also failed to state a claim that the HFPA’s practices were unlawful under a rule of reason analysis.   The panel held that the journalists did not state a claim of per se liability based on a horizontal market division agreement because this theory was inconsistent with statements in the complaint that the HFPA’s members do not participate in the same product market. The panel held that, under a rule of reason analysis, the journalists failed to allege that the HFPA had market power in any reasonably defined market. The panel also affirmed the dismissal of the journalists’ claim based on California’s right of fair procedure, which protects, in certain situations, against arbitrary decisions by private organizations. View "KJERSTI FLAA, ET AL V. HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN PRESS ASSOC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. He claimed that he was injured after purchasing and trading a Euroyen TIBOR futures contract on a U.S.-based commodity exchange because the value of that contract was based on a distorted, artificial Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).   The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Here Plaintiff failed to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. As such, the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Finally, Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims. View "Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al." on Justia Law

Dreamstime alleged that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining a monopoly in the online search advertising market. Dreamstime asserted that Google furthered this monopoly by impeding Dreamstime’s use of Google’s paid advertising services as well as harming Dreamstime’s performance on Google’s free search engine. The district court dismissed on the ground that Dreamstime did not sufficiently allege anticompetitive conduct in the relevant market of online search advertising.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an antitrust claim brought by Dreamstime.com, LLC, an online supplier of stock images, against Google LLC. The panel held that the record did not support Dreamstime’s contention that it defined the relevant market to include the online, organic search market (in addition to the online search advertising market). Rather, by its course of conduct before the district court, Dreamstime waived any Section 2 claim arising from the online search market. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Dreamstime failed to allege anticompetitive conduct in the online search advertising market.   Further, allegations related to Dreamstime’s performance in Google’s unpaid, organic search results did not plausibly state a claim for anticompetitive conduct in the online search advertising market. Dreamstime’s allegation that Google unlawfully captured data from users and advertisers also did not state anticompetitive behavior. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly dismissed Dreamstime’s Section 2 claim with prejudice and without leave to amend. View "DREAMSTIME.COM, LLC V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Netflix Inc. and Hulu, LLC (together, Defendants) were not video-service providers under the Fair Competition in Cable Operations Act, Ohio Rev. Code 1332.21 (the Act) and that the Act did not expressly or impliedly give the City of Maple Heights the authority to bring a cause of action such as the one at issue in this case.The City of Maple Heights filed a federal class action and declaratory judgment lawsuit against Netflix and Hulu in federal court asserting that Defendants were in violation of the Act. Defendants moved separately to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that their streaming services did not fall within the Act. The federal court certified two state-law questions for Supreme Court review. The Court answered (1) Netflix and Hulu were not service providers under Ohio law; and (2) the Act did not grant Maple Heights either an express or an implied right to bring an action against Defendants to enforce Ohio's video service provider provisions. View "City of Maple Heights v. Netlix, Inc." on Justia Law